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1.  INTRODUCTION 
         
            Following the idea of understanding the causes of economic growth across countries, 
the current thesis is addressed to identify economic growth features in the Kyrgyz Republic 
(KR). All three contributions aim to analyze economic growth of the KR from different 
perspectives within a broad context of economic growth theory.  
 
          Our aim in this introduction is to give a general understanding of the recent economic 
growth theories and to provide a justification of the theoretical framework described in all 
three chapters. Firstly, we review the relevant literature on economic growth related to each 
chapter of the thesis, as each chapter is written as a self-contained unit. Secondly, we present 
the overall structure of the thesis and refer to the general and specific objectives, and findings 
of each chapter. 
 1.1.  Review of relevant literature 
         For years economists have been interested in the growth of nations and to answer the 
question: what makes some countries rich and others poor? Thus, growth economics has 
aimed to understand what are the forces that drive economic growth since the times of Adam 
Smith and Karl Marx.  Yet for all the progress in the growth theory, the truth is that economic 
growth remains something of a mystery. Literature emphasizes the recent three revivals of 
interest in the growth theory, that give explanations of a mystery of economic growth from 
different perspectives, generally known in the mainstream literature as the ‘waves’ of interest 
in the growth theory1.  
        Regardless of considerable interest in economic growth, growth economics was formed 
as a discipline within economics only in the 1950s, since the recent waves. The first wave 
goes back to Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who developed a theory explaining the effects of 
capital accumulation (physical and human capital), and technology on the long-run economic 
growth of a single country. Acemoglu (2011) points out the simplicity of the model and its 
abstract representation of a complex economy, which became a starting point for richer 
models. In Solow’s model, economic growth is generated by capital accumulation and it is 																																																								
1	Literature on growth economics provides two “waves” of interest in economic growth theory, however we 
consider that the new institutional economics has changed general opinion on growth theories formed by 
exogenous and endogenous theories. Therefore we assume that the new institutional economics as the third 
wave of interest in economic growth theories, which has set completely new view to economic growth. 	
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only temporarily assuming that the population grows at a constant rate, the capital depreciates 
at a constant rate, and the productive labor improves at a constant rate. Therefore, investment 
in the capital to effective labor is required to keep the capital-labor ratio at its original level 
and to compensate capital depreciation. However, the required investment leads to economic 
growth only till the steady state is reached. Once the economy is at the steady state, the ratio 
of capital to effective labor depends only on the rate of technological progress, and 
technological progress in Solow’s growth model is considered to be exogenous. According to 
the exogenous model the diminishing marginal productivity of all factors of production 
implies that the income level in the long-run would be expected to converge across countries.  
All countries are supposed to have the same growth rate, which depends on the rate of 
exogenous technological progress (Helpman, 2004). However, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992) and Mankiw et al. (1992) questioned Solow’s argument of ‘absolute convergence’ 
arguing that saving rates and population growth rates vary from country to country, thereby 
these differences generate different income levels in the long-run. By analyzing differences in 
saving rates and population growth rates, the authors evidenced that poor countries and rich 
countries converge to different income levels, so there is no an ‘absolute convergence’, but  
‘conditional convergence’. Hence, the main implication of the exogenous model is that a 
fundamental cause of long-run economic growth is technological progress, and it is 
exogenous. However, exogenous theory could not provide a satisfactory explanation of 
divergence across poor and rich countries, hence the same question remains: what forces 
make some countries rich and others poor? 
         The second “wave” of interest was initiated by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), with 
their endogenous growth models, and the new growth theory provides another answer to the 
question. Both exogenous and endogenous models stress the technological progress as an 
engine of economic growth. However, unlike the standard neoclassical growth theory based 
on the impact of exogenous technological progress on the long-run growth, the new research 
argues that the technological progress is, indeed, endogenous. Furthermore, Romer (1986) 
and Lucas (1988) link the technological progress to the stock of knowledge and state that 
economic growth is determined by increasing the stock of knowledge rather than physical 
capital.  According to them knowledge externalities accelerate the increasing returns to scale, 
which compensate the decreasing returns to scale from capital accumulation and thus 
generate economic growth in the long-run. In terms of convergence/divergence hypothesis, 
Helpman (2004) argues that developing countries do gain from international knowledge 
spillovers, but developed countries benefit from higher output and this leads to divergence of 
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income levels across countries, not convergence. Thus, the new growth theory provides a 
plausible explanation of causes of economic growth, evidencing that the technological change 
is endogenous and closely linked to human capital. More precisely, the theory emphasizes 
that human capital allocated in the R&D and innovation is central in explaining sustained 
economic growth. However, the arguments of new growth theory lead to the greater 
divergence between poor and rich countries.  
        Under the ideas of endogenous growth theory that gives a central role to human capital, 
innovations and knowledge spillovers in promoting economic growth, Krugman (1991) 
highlights the spatial nature of knowledge spillovers and agglomeration. His ideas on the role 
of location in fostering knowledge spillovers and innovation, and thereby economic growth 
resulted in the formation of the new economic geography. According to Krugman’s theory 
geographical concentration of economic activity explains economic growth through 
innovation, knowledge spillovers and production process. Geographic concentration results 
as a consequence of knowledge spillovers if distance is a factor in the diffusion of 
knowledge. As the firms located closer to the R&D activities learn earlier than the firms 
located farther, thereby early-adopters grow faster and more effectively (Martin and 
Ottaviano, 1996). Similarly, Romer (1990) emphasizes a positive effect of the spatial 
organization of economic activity on economic growth, i.e. an increase in the size of the 
market due to the concentration of firms may foster economic growth due to the R&D 
activities. Shortly, the new economic geography likewise the endogenous growth theory 
considers that knowledge spillovers and the R&D activities foster economic growth, but 
geographic concentration enhances knowledge diffusion, therefore boosts economic growth. 
Nevertheless, substantial differences in growth across countries remained even after 
accounting for technological progress, investment in the R&D and geography. Thus, the 
previous growth theories, both exogenous and endogenous, and the new economic geography 
did not provide a complete answer to the question ‘why some countries are getting richer and 
others not?’ 
         The third wave of interest in growth theories has started with the creation of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) in the beginning of 1990s. The NIE has been attracting a 
considerable attention during the last 20 years. According to this theory institutions matter for 
growth and divergence across countries can be explained by the differences in institutions. 
North (1990) argued that the factors mentioned by the exogenous and endogenous growth 
theories (such as technological progress, innovation, a stock of knowledge and capital 
accumulation) are the proximate determinants of growth; in fact, a fundamental explanation 
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of differences in growth are institutions.  Similarly, Hall and Jones (1999) consider that 
variations in capital accumulation, overall productivity and output per worker across 
countries are caused by differences in institutions. With respect to institutions, Rodrik (2007) 
states that markets are not self-creating, self-regulating, self-stabilizing, or self-legitimizing. 
Therefore, markets require non-market institutions addressed to regulate, stabilize and 
legitimize the economy; and every well-functioning market is a combination of state and 
market, laissez-faire and intervention. This is consistent with the North’s  (1990) definition 
given to institutions  “ … are rules of the game . . . or . . . humanly devised constraints”. 
Hence all institutions, in general, are endogenous and established by the government, society 
or part of it (North, 1990, Rodrik, 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). Nevertheless, it is 
much more complicated to identify which institutions matter for growth. In this context, 
Rodrik (2007) emphasizes the importance of property right institutions, arguing that better 
protected property rights promote investment and enhance technological progress and 
therefore increase income levels.  Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1995) stress the importance 
of property rights, political and bureaucracy institutions on economic growth. Acemoglu et 
al, (2005) highlight the role of economic institutions in structuring economic incentives in 
society, thus economic outcomes. He argues that nations with proper economic institutions 
that create incentives for factor accumulation, innovation and efficient allocation of resources 
will prosper2. However, there is no a general set of institutions for economic growth, every 
country is unique in its institutional design. So that each country has its unique institutional 
preconditions and the need to define the right set of institutions in order to accelerate 
economic growth.  
       Thus, new institutional economics shifted the focus from technological progress and 
human capital to the environment (rules) in which economy and its agents operate. 
Institutional arrangements have become more fundamental determinants of economic growth, 
then accumulation or investment in R&D. Institutions as determinants of growth explain 
economic growth reasonably well, yet it does not provide a convincing answer why countries 
differ in their set of institutions and how do ‘good’ institutions arise.  
																																																								
2	Other research on the impact of economic institutions on economic growth: Rubin H. (2005) identified three 
key mechanisms for the establishment of rules and constraints, such as legislature, private entities and, 
particularly, law jurisdictions, judges and courts. Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) conducted detailed historical 
analysis of impact of property right institutions on economic growth. Mauro (1995) mentioned an impact of 
corruption on economic growth. Acemoglu et al, (2005) distinguished property right institutions which are 
addressed to protect economic agents against government and elite expropriation, from contracting institutions, 
which are addressed to support private agreements and contracts. 
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1.1.1.  Cluster theory. Does location matter? 
        As we discussed at the beginning, location matters for growth, as geographical 
concentration allows firms to gain positive externalities through knowledge spillovers and 
agglomeration effects. These effects occur due to the clustering of production processes in a 
single location.  In this regard, the cluster theory, as one field of economic geography, has 
been a subject of increasing research since the seminal work of Porter (1990) discussed the 
competitive advantage of nations. According to him “clusters are geographic concentrations 
of interconnected companies, specialized suppliers and service providers, firms in related 
industries, and associated institutions (e.g. universities, standards agencies, and trade 
associations) in particular fields that compete but also cooperate” (Porter 2000) 3. In order to 
provide a complete discussion about the cluster approach, we review the most prominent 
theories proposed by Krugman (1991), Porter (2000) and Sölvell et al. (2003). They highlight 
the importance of concentration of industries in specific geographical areas for achieving 
regional and national economic growth. As it is discussed before, the theory of Krugman 
(1991) began a revival in the geography-based analysis, which has become to be known as 
the “new economic geography”. His theory explains the benefits of geographic concentration 
for firms and emphasizes the importance of increasing returns, but it does not propose any 
answer or tools to direct the concept of geographic concentration to enhance economic 
growth.   An appropriate tool to initiate economic growth and stability is provided by Porter 
(1990) and Sölvell et al. (2003) by their ideas about cluster initiatives (CIs).  They define CIs 
as “organized efforts to increase growth and competitiveness of clusters within a region, 
involving cluster firms, government, institutions and/or the research community.” They 
emphasize the importance of cooperation between cluster and government bodies, when the 
government increases the competitive advantage of clusters by improving physical 
infrastructure, creating favorable legal environment and public institutions.  Potential 
beneficiaries of cluster (involved parties) have an interest in strengthening competitive 
advantage of the cluster by achieving the following six objectives: creating a highly 																																																								
3 The cluster theory is considered to have originated from neoclassical economist Marshall (1920) who first 
discussed about agglomeration phenomenon in his seminal work the “Principles of economics”. Marshall first 
linked knowledge spillovers and regional economic growth, by mentioning the agglomeration effects. Decades 
later, his agglomeration theory was expanded upon by a number of authors; Weber (1929) proposed a concept of 
agglomeration economies in its “industrial location theory”, considering that an industry’s costs are affected by 
transportation and labor costs and the agglomeration effect. Same-industry spillovers, localization and 
agglomeration economies are known as “Marshall-Arrow-Romer” externalities, based on Marshall’s idea on the 
agglomeration, Arrow (1962) in his concept of “learning-by-doing” described the effects of innovation and 
technological change, and Romer (1986) proposed  an analysis of increasing returns. 	
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specialized and qualified labor market, attracting external firms fitting into the cluster, 
identifying new markets for further growth, enhancing cooperation among firms within the 
cluster, promoting innovation and knowledge spillovers, and improving business 
environment.  Sölvell et al. (2003) argue that the abovementioned objectives are crucial to 
improve the competitive advantage of CIs and thus to generate economic growth. 
        Relying on the studies summarized above, it is possible to set up an image of cluster as a 
broad concept. The authors agree that cluster connects firms, economic actors and 
institutions; this in turn creates a competitive advantage from their mutual proximity and 
connections.  The location matters due to its benefits of lower costs and knowledge 
spillovers, and this creates a competitive advantage and thereby generates economic growth 
of a region or a nation. Lastly, cluster is not only about developing individual firms or 
involved parties within an industry, but it is an implementation of agreed strategy for 
development. Therefore a whole industry will be better placed to create a competitive 
advantage and opportunities of cooperation. 
        As the current thesis is focused on the analysis of economic growth in the KR, which is 
an agrarian country  and agriculture is the main source of income for more than a half of its 
population. We aim to contribute to the understanding of the development of the KR's 
agricultural sector. Therefore, giving the importance to agricultural development in economic 
growth of the KR and following the ideas of endogenous growth theory, new economic 
geography and the cluster theory that highlight the role of innovations, knowledge spillovers 
and geographic concentrations in economic growth, the first chapter of the thesis addressed to 
analyze the role of clusters for the Kyrgyz economy and if the country has strong 
prerequisites to implement an agro-based cluster in particular4.  
 
																																																								
4	The cluster approach is a quite new “phenomenon” for all Central Asian countries. There are only few research 
on agro-based clusters in Central Asia. The literature does not provide a research on agro-clusters in Tajikistan 
or Turkmenistan. More research has been done with respect to Kazakhstan’s agricultural sector: McCombie and 
Spreafico (2014) investigated if it is optimal to implement a resource-based cluster development strategy for 
Kazakhstan; Maira  et al. (2016) formulated a cluster model and gave recommendations to promote a livestock 
cluster as this can enhance the competitiveness of entire livestock industry of the country; Kim and S. Hasanov 
(2013) and Hasanov et al. (2014) assessed the agricultural sector of Uzbekistan to identify if the country can 
benefit from of agro-based clusters. Referring to the research on the KR, the possibility of implementing of an 
agricultural cluster in the country has not been investigated, except Choi et al, (2013) who analyzed agricultural 
sectors of the KR, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan and consider that agro-clusters could 
be one of the promising strategies for all these countries. However, the study did not provide any specific 
recommendations for each country in particular.   
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1.1.2. Growth Diagnostics. One economy, many recipes. 
       As we have seen, there is an extensive literature on economic growth, explaining what 
factors are the key determinants of economic growth and debating what policies best serve 
economic growth. The recent literature emphasizes that better institutions result in greater 
economic growth. Rodrik (2007) states that if an economy is so far below its steady-level of 
income, even a little movement in the right direction can accelerate growth. It is not 
necessarily to perform ambitious reforms, it is more reasonable to identify the most binding 
constraint on growth at the right time by undertaking the so-called ‘growth diagnostics’.  
      The ‘Growth Diagnostics’ approach is developed by Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco 
(2005), the so-called ‘HRV’ approach provides a refreshing framework for thinking about  
country’s growth constraints that is practical and country-specific in its application. The HRV 
approach suggests an analytical framework to formulate hypotheses on what factors may be 
constraining growth. 
      Closely related to the neoclassical economics, the Growth Diagnostics framework 
considers that private investment and entrepreneurship are the main engines of the long-run 
economic growth. Yet, the fundamental difference between the Growth Diagnostics approach 
and previous  growth models is that, the former is addressed to a particular country, and the 
latter to a general phenomenon in which individual countries are examples. The approach 
proposes a new view to foster economic growth; it is focused on the identification of the 
potential obstacles on growth rather than identifying the causes of growth. 
      In order to identify binding constraints, Hausman et al. (2005) conceptualized its 
methodology as a decision tree5. The basic assumption of the decision tree is that the levels of 
private investment and entrepreneurship depend on the costs of finance and the returns to 
economic activity. The tree suggests, firstly, identifying whether the costs of finance are high 
or that the returns to economic activity are low. Once the problem area is defined, then an 
analyst focuses on the determinants of the problem area. The concept, in general, is complex 
and includes many potential determinants (physical and human capital, infrastructure, 
geography, international and domestic finance, governance, institutions). Based on the 
assumption that there could be a variety of constraints on growth, the authors consider that 
each constraint generates a different set of “symptoms”. These symptoms need a distinctive 
diagnostics in which the analyst tries to differ among potential explanations of what is 
restricting a country from achieving sustainable growth (Hausmann et al., 2008).  																																																								
5	The decision tree proposed by Hausman et al. (2005) is discussed in the second chapter of the thesis.		
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       Once the bindings obstacles are defined, the consequent issue of interest for policy 
designers is how the framework works. The government cannot remove constraints directly, 
therefore an appropriate policy with the best set of policy levers is needed to remove these 
constraints. The main objective of the policy is to remove or reduce the negative effects of 
those bindings constraints on the economy, by definition removing nonbinding constraints 
cannot affect growth. That is “good diagnostics facilitate better therapeutics” (Hausman et 
al., 2008, pp. 90). The role of therapeutics is to design a policy that promotes growth, given 
the understanding of problem areas in a particular economy. This is very different from the 
agenda where growth policies are assumed to be identical for all countries. Growth policies 
should be country-specific, as each economy is unique and has its circumstances, 
opportunities and constraints that should be taken into account. It also differs from a ‘best 
practice’ agenda, usually based on international experience, where the areas of policies are 
compared to a benchmark and the government attempts to move its policy towards that 
benchmark, without evidence of its applicability (Hausmann et al., 2005). Thus the 
government policies should be carefully targeted on removing own binding constraints, rather 
than going after too many reforms or moving towards some international ‘best practice’ 
agenda.     
       Resuming, as it is formulated by Rodrik (2007) “One economics, many recipes”, that is 
to say that all countries are unique in terms of their opportunities, circumstances and threats. 
One economics, but each country has its own recipe for growth. The recipe based on the 
country’s unique problems, opportunities and threats and the policies ignoring the uniqueness 
cannot not be successful. Therefore, being motivated by the concept ‘one economics, many 
recipes’ and as well as the fact that the framework has not been applied in Central Asian 
countries; this study aims to employ the Growth Diagnostics approach to identify the most 
binding obstacles on growth in the KR. 
1.1.3. The role of central bank. Do Institutions Matter? 
         Reviewing the literature on the growth theories, we highlighted a fundamental role of 
institutions in enhancing economic growth, thus institutions matter for growth. Indeed, 
market needs to be regulated: ‘markets are not self-regulating and self-stabilizing. Markets 
require extensive regulation to minimize abuse of market power, internalize externalities, 
deal with information asymmetries and etc. … ’ (Rodrik, 2004 p. 27). In this respect, the new 
institutional economics emphasizes a particular importance of monetary and fiscal institutions 
for macroeconomic stabilization and growth. These institutions can contribute to growth by 
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decreasing macroeconomic uncertainty, by enhancing the resilience of an economy to 
macroeconomic shocks and by reducing inflationary pressure (Serven and Montiel, 2005). 
There is an extensive literature explaining that economic growth comes as a consequence of 
macroeconomic stabilization and good performance of both monetary and fiscal institutions.   
        According to the results of our previous paper (the Growth Diagnostics approach) weak 
institutions are one of the binding constraints on growth in the KR. Therefore, the third 
chapter of the thesis assesses the performance of central bank of the KR, as the main financial 
institution, and its role in promoting price stability and economic growth. Thereby, further 
discussion is intentionally focused on the contribution of central bank to economic growth. 
      Achieving sustained growth while ensuring low and stable inflation has become the 
primary objective of central banks all over the world. Central bankers and policy makers 
view price stability as a worthy objective of monetary policy due to the insight that inflation 
is costly. As high and volatile inflation is harmful for economic growth and it causes welfare 
costs6. The general consensus is that firms and other economic agents are considered to 
perform poorly when inflation is volatile and uncertain. In fact, contemporary mainstream 
macroeconomic thought, represented in New Neoclassical Synthesis (NNS) 7, stresses a 
conducive role of monetary policy in short-run economic growth. The effect of monetary 
policy disperses in the long run due to the neutrality of money. Following the NNS, there has 
been a gradual recognition of the importance of giving to central bank a mandate clearly 
focused on price stability. The main NNS conviction is that price stability maximizes 
household welfare because price stability precludes fluctuations in price markups, which 
would otherwise arise due to sticky prices (Goodfriend and King, 2001). In conditions of 
fully credible price stability, households decide not to change prices as current prices are 
already maximizing their profit.  Stable average markups, in turn, lead to sustained increase 
in output and employment. By contrast, in an environment with high and volatile inflation, 
households tend to move actual prices up with expected price increase (Goodfriend, 2008). 
So the best that central bank can do is to ensure low and stable rates of inflation, so that 
economic agents can anticipate future inflation and, by doing so, smooth economic cycles. 
Furthermore, Barro (1995) states that inflation results in a decrease in investment and lower 
levels of investment adversely influences economic growth. Lucas (2000) argues that 
inflation volatility and uncertainty about future inflation have a significant negative effect on 																																																								
6	 Widely discussed in the literature: the so-called ‘shoe-leather costs’ (non-payment of interest on currency, 
Issing, 2000; Lucas, 2000; Mankiw, 2008) and ‘mark-up costs’ (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Lucas, 2000).  
7 For more discussions see Blanchard et al. (2009), Woodford (2009), Goodfriend (2007), Goodfriend and King 
(1997)  
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the price mechanism and leads to the misallocation of resources, decline in investment and 
hence decline in output (Lucas, 2000). Thus, monetary policy ensuring price stability 
favorably influences the nature of output – inflation relationship, reduces fluctuations of 
output and thereby may tend to contribute to growth8.  
         Nonetheless, the world financial crisis resulted in the reassessment of the role of central 
banks in the context of protecting the soundness of financial system and supporting 
macroeconomic stabilization. Therefore particular attention has been paid to the strengthened 
link between the financial and price stability and to the role of central bank in enhancing 
financial stability. Referring to the link between financial and price stability, a predominant 
point of view is that price stability is an essential precondition for financial stability and in 
the long-run price and financial stability reinforce each other9. Another insight is that the 
nexus between price and financial stability should be reversed. According to this insight, 
stable and low inflation may result in too optimistic view on the future financial development 
and soundness, assuming that stable inflation at low levels may lead to an increase in assets 
value (Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio et al., 2003, Shirakawa, 2012). Accordingly, the link 
between price stability and financial stability is still need to be investigated. 
        Referring to the role of central bank in supporting financial stability, there is no a 
general stream of thought whether financial stability should be an explicit objective of 
monetary policy, as price stability is. One insight is that the central bank should implement a 
more proactive policy towards financial stability by extending central bank’s objectives, so 
that is to include financial stability as an explicit goal of monetary policy (Eichengreen et al. 
2011). Another insight is that financial stability should be an objective of an institution 
particularly created for this purpose. Hence, this view distinguishes financial policy from 
monetary policy (Svensson, 2011).  
     Resuming, it has been generally recognized that central bank’s primary objective is to 
maintain price stability and, in doing so, create a favorable environment for economic 
growth. However, to achieve price stability objective central bank needs a sound financial 
system, an essential condition for an efficient monetary transmission. Yet, price stability 
remains a priority objective of any central bank, but concern over central bank’s role in 
enhancing financial stability is still an open issue.  
     Thus having discussed the importance of central bank in ensuring price stability and 
following the convictions of NNS and as well as the ideas of new institutional economics that 																																																								
8 Fischer (1993), Bruno and Easterly (1996), Boyd and Champ (2006); 
9	Bordo and Wheelock (1995), Bordo (2007), Bordo et al. (2000), Issing (2003);	
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give essential role to central bank as an institution that contributes to economic growth by 
provision of price and financial stability, we address our last paper to analyze the 
performance of central bank of the KR. Our third paper is devoted to assess monetary policy 
of the KR and its role in promoting price stability as a necessary condition for economic 
growth.  
1.2. Thesis structure 
     The thesis is structured in three chapters, which represents the main axis of the dissertation 
and each chapter is written as an independent unit. The general objective of the thesis is to 
contribute to the empirical literature of economic growth by analyzing the case of the KR by 
applying three different approaches under the ideas of recent theories of economic growth. 
Therefore, the first chapter implies the idea of new economic geography and the cluster 
theory; the second chapter employs the Growth Diagnostics framework in order to identify 
the key obstacles restricting growth in the KR; and the third chapter based on the 
considerations of the new institutional economics, addressed to analyze the performance of 
central bank of the KR; Despite that each chapter is written as an independent paper, all of 
them could be merged into one broad topic, namely growth economics. 
        The first chapter aims to answer the question: “if the KR has strong economic 
opportunities and prerequisites in agriculture to implement an effective agro-based cluster in 
the livestock sector?”10 A complex S.W.O.T. analysis is carried out to analyze internal and 
external environment.  We consider that the implementation of livestock cluster can foster 
development of agricultural sector of the economy, and as well as it will increase the 
agricultural production growth and improve the food security of the country, increase income 
of farmers and align regional economic development. Yet, the key finding is that the country 
has good climatic and natural preconditions to start adapting to form a livestock cluster, but 
there is still lack of standards for food quality and safety, weak sanitary and veterinary 
conditions, including poorly equipped laboratories that are some of problems of the sector. 
      The second chapter of the thesis employs the HRV approach developed by Hausmann et 
al. (2005) in order to identify the most binding constraints on economic growth. The analysis 
is based on the qualitative and quantitative data at national and international levels. The 
following CIS countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 																																																								
10 This chapter is based on the article published in the journal of Review of Agricultural and Applied 
Economics: “Regional Development Based On Cluster in Livestock Development. Cluster in Livestock Sector 
in the Kyrgyz Republic”.  ISSN 1336-9261, XVII (Number 2, 2014): 103-112  doi: 
10.15414/raae.2014.17.02.103-112  
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Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are chosen as a comparator group 
of countries in order to formulate a plausible hypothesis on the binding constraints. Key 
findings indicate that weak institutions, a limited access to domestic funds and inefficient 
energy sector are the major factors restricting economic growth in the country. 
        The third chapter aims to analyze monetary policy framework of the National Bank of 
the KR. It provides a brief overview of monetary reforms during the country’s transition 
period after the collapse of USSR and proceeds to the current monetary trends. In order to 
assess the behavior of monetary policy of the NBKR, we employ the Taylor-type rules for an 
open economy. The key findings of the study give two possible explanations for the NBKR’s 
monetary policy. First explanation is that the NBKR performs a pro-cyclical monetary policy 
by adversely responding to output deviation. Another explanation is that it performs price 
stabilization policy strongly reacting to the changes in inflation and exchange rate. However, 
both possible policies do not give a plausible explanation for opposite reaction of the NBKR 
to output growth.    
          In the last chapter the main results are summarized. And we suggest possible avenues 
for future research. 
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CHAPTER I 
2. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BASED ON CLUSTER IN LIVESTOCK 
DEVELOPMENT. CLUSTER IN LIVESTOCK SECTOR IN THE KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC11 
 
Abstract 
In most developing countries, where agriculture is the main economical source, clusters have 
been found as a booster to develop the economy. The Asian countries are now starting to 
implement agro-food clusters into the mainstream of changes in agriculture, farming and 
food industry. The long-term growth of meat production in the Kyrgyz Republic during the 
last decade, as well as the fact that agriculture has become one of the prioritized sectors of 
the economy, proved the importance of livestock sector in the economy of the Kyrgyz 
Republic. The research will evaluate whether the Kyrgyz Republic has strong economic 
opportunities and prerequisites in agriculture in order to implement an effective agro cluster 
in the livestock sector, focusing on the description of the prerequisites of the Kyrgyz Republic 
in agriculture to implement livestock cluster. The main objective of the research is to analyze 
the livestock sector of the Kyrgyz Republic and observe the capacity of this sector to 
implement an agro-cluster. The study focuses on investigating the livestock sector and a 
complex S.W.O.T. analysis was carried out based on local and regional databases and 
official studies. The results of the research demonstrate the importance of livestock cluster in 
national economy. It can be concluded that cluster implementation could provide benefits to 
all of its members if they build strong collaborative relationship in order to facilitate the 
access to the labor market and, implicitly, to the exchange of good practices. The ability of 
potential cluster members to act as a convergence pole is critical to acquiring practical skills 
necessary for the future development of the livestock sector. 
 
Keywords: Development, livestock, cluster, agriculture; 
JEL: L16, O11, O13, Q13, R11; 																																																								
11 This paper has been published as a discussion paper: Sydykova, M. and Rodriguez, C., (2014) Regional 
Development based on cluster in livestock development. Cluster in livestock sector in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Review of Agricultural and Applied Economics, vol. 17, issue 2. Nitra, Slovakia  
		
	18	i	 	
2.1. Introduction 
 
        The concept of clusters has attracted increasing interest in researchers of development, 
regional studies, and industrial development studies during the 1990s (Hector O. Rocha. 
2004). During the last two decades, the successful performance of clusters in developed 
countries has stimulated new attention to the cluster organization for ﬁrms of developing 
countries. The possibility of clustered ﬁrms to be economically competitive and developed 
has attracted interest in development studies (e.g. Schmitz, 1995). However, it is likely to be 
quite a challenge. The existing literature shows that clusters in developing countries 
(including those in the agricultural sector) are usually dominated by smaller-scale firms, 
which are organized in a more informal manner, have weaker linkages among actors, face 
more difficulties in achieving a critical mass of firms and are specialized in lower-value 
niches, although they are now increasingly entering higher-value markets. Consequently, it is 
far more difficult to promote clusters in developing countries than in developed ones (Eva 
Gálvez-Nogales, 2010). 
  Livestock production in the Kyrgyz Republic is predominately based on traditional 
agriculture. Livestock farmers manage to preserve age-old traditional methods and 
experience in livestock. Meat products are environmentally friendly, because the animals are 
fed on natural feed, without using chemical deposits such as those from insecticides and 
fertilizers. In return, the government makes efforts to develop the livestock sector while 
simultaneously maintaining traditional agriculture. All of these above mentioned factors give 
a strong point of livestock industry and determines good perspectives for the industry. 
Growth of the livestock sector during the last decade improved the material and technical 
basis for clusters, creating a large number of farms and an availability of trained professionals 
are the achievements of livestock breeders. At the same time, livestock development has also 
had a number of problems that need to be solved in order to provide sustainable livestock 
sector development. 
  The agro-processing sector of the Kyrgyz Republic is at a disadvantage not only in 
respect to export markets; they also face similar problems while trying to remain competitive 
in local markets. Difficulties within the union of farmers such as lack of organizational and 
methodological guidelines in order to rearrange their functions in accordance with the needs 
of farmers, lack of sufficient cooperation between members of the association, insufficient 
quality of resource base, small production volumes, lack of equipment for processing 
enterprises and packaging, lack of standards for food quality and safety, including poorly 
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equipped laboratories are some of the problems of the sector. Insufficient processing of 
agricultural products is becoming a major obstacle to the further development of agriculture 
(MAM strategy, 2012). 
   Livestock, namely the meat production sector, is of great importance to the Kyrgyz 
Republic’s economy and, subsequently, to the country's GDP. The Kyrgyz Republic is a 
country which has the potential to produce large amounts of meat and has good perspectives 
to export meat products to neighboring countries such as Tajikistan, China, Iran and members 
of the Customs Union, namely Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. The Customs Union 
envisages unified customs territory between the member-countries of the union where custom 
duties and economic restrictions are not applied. The exceptions are special protecting, anti-
dumping and countervailing measures. In case the Kyrgyz Republic joins the Customs Union 
between Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, the Kyrgyz Republic must provide laboratory data 
not only for meat, but also for any produced food.  
   The poverty level in rural areas is very high, where the number of people living below 
the poverty line is about 60 percent. Rural population is mostly engaged in agriculture. Thus, 
development of livestock sector could be the way to overcome poverty in these areas. 
    Experience of the countries implementing clusters in the agricultural sectors has 
provided evidence that they create favorable conditions which boost business competitiveness 
through the implementation of strong linkages between cluster members associated with their 
geographical proximity, including facilitating access to new technologies, management skills, 
use of knowledge as well as reducing transaction costs, providing the prerequisites for the 
formation of joint cooperation projects and productive competition. 
        Agricultural clusters became popular and successful in developing economies. A good 
example is root crop processing cluster in Dong Lieu (Vietnam), grape cluster in Maharashtra 
(India), Chinese livestock clusters, Kenya cut-flower cluster, South African wine cluster (Eva 
Gálvez-Nogales 2010). All of these successful examples of clusters demonstrate the 
importance of agro-based clusters for developing economies and indicate beneficial influence 
of agro-based clusters on economic development of developing economies. 
       This paper focuses on cluster development in the Kyrgyz Republic, which illustrates 
challenges present in a developing country’s settings. Development of agriculture must be 
considered as one of the prioritized sectors of the economy. Ethnographic preconditions have 
played an important role in the development of livestock in the Kyrgyz Republic. For many 
centuries, the Kyrgyz people were engaged in cattle breeding. Although there is a wide range 
of research papers and initiatives relating to clusters in general, there has been little attention 
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paid on clusters in developing economies and just few of them dedicated to agricultural 
sector. This is a relatively poorly investigated area within research on clusters. Furthermore, 
there has not been any meat cluster in the territory of Central Asia up to date. All of these 
conditions create the relevance of this study. 
       In the least developing countries, agriculture is the major source of income for 70 percent 
of the world’s poor in rural areas. It takes up more than one-third of the world’s area (the 
World Bank, 2013). Since agriculture represents the largest share of output and employs the 
majority of the labor force, this sector has been integral to any linking about development 
(NSCKR, 2012). Hence, the greatest potential for sustainable growth lies in agricultural 
sector. But, ironically, it is the sector where poverty is the most widespread and found in its 
worst forms. So, “new agriculture” needs new tools to increase its competitiveness and 
innovation capacity. One of these tools is the promotion of clusters. 
        Concerning pro-poor growth, it has been shown that cluster approach can be a strong 
tool to reduce poverty (UNIDO, 2010).Implementing clusters in developing countries can be 
crucial on the way to achieve broad-based growth. In order to maximize pro-poor benefits, 
cluster research should focus on specific investment with respect to the poor. Despite a lot of 
benefits to be achieved by implementing a successful clustering strategy in developing 
economies, there are several obstacles influencing negatively on enterprises and supporting 
institutions in one location to work together. For instance, (1) engaging in collaborative 
ventures entails high transaction costs related to gathering and assessing information on, for 
example, whether partners are reliable and the relationship beneficial. Also, (2) small-scale 
firms usually operate under short-term horizons, leading them to magnify short-term costs 
while preventing them from identifying longer-term benefits. (3) Low levels of trust also 
makes difficult cluster firms and supporting institutions to interact, reducing their propensity 
to exchange information and hindering the development of business partnerships (Meyer-
Stamer 2005). Local governments can be unresponsive to the needs of the private sector, 
particularly when this is mainly constituted by small firms. 
2.2. Materials and methods 
       Farmers, households, and industries in the livestock sector of the Kyrgyz Republic, who 
have capacities to produce livestock products, were selected for this study. The cluster study 
was based on analyzing qualitative data on farmers, workers, households, food processing 
enterprises, policy makers at national and local levels. Current research is based on official 
publications, surveys, interviews and experts’ opinions. This method was important because 
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there is considerable shortage of analytical data and research for the Kyrgyz Republic. The 
study classified actors into seven groups according to Maya-Ambía (2011)—namely, 
suppliers of inputs; a group of companies, as a basis of clusters; designers of public policies; 
research, development and educational institutions; financial institutions; consumers. Data is 
analyzed by using the framework of S.W.O.T. analysis. S.W.O.T analysis helped to reveal 
weaknesses and strengths of cluster development. Secondary data were collected from the 
research, publications and annual reports of the Ministry of Agriculture and Melioration of 
the Kyrgyz Republic, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, USAID, the 
World Bank. The results from this research were used to evaluate whether the Kyrgyz 
Republic has capacity to implement agro-based cluster in livestock sector. This paper is 
organized as follows: The second section analyses general economic situation, agricultural 
industry and the livestock sector in the Kyrgyz Republic. The third section proposes the 
cluster model for the Kyrgyz Republic. The final section concludes and provides 
recommendations. 
2.3. Results and discussion 
      The Kyrgyz Republic’s economy operated within the Soviet economic system, which had 
a planned economy, prior to the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS). The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed in December of 1991. 
The Kyrgyz Republic joined the CIS in March of 1992. The Kyrgyz Republic's main 
economic indexes such as employment, inflation, income, GDP were mostly at an average 
level, as it had received sufficient financial support from central budget that allowed the 
country to grow. After the collapse of the Soviet Union national borders and international 
trade controls were set up and divided Soviet Union member-countries into small 
independent countries with their segmented market economies with limited economic growth 
potential. Before the Soviet Union disintegration, all these CIS countries were interrelated in 
terms of production base due to the allocation of natural recourses and production bases 
located in different countries according to their possibilities, but then they were separated 
from each other.  
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Figure 1 GDP by sectors (% of total GDP), (2012) 
Figure 2 Urban and Rural population (% of total population) 
Source: The World Bank (2013) 
 
          In order to clearly explain the importance of agricultural sector for the Kyrgyz 
Republic, I seek to compare some economic indicators of the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Kazakhstan. It can be helpful to compare both countries, because both of them are located in 
Central Asia, they have similar economic, climatic, historical and cultural background. 
Despite having the same background, Kazakhstan is more developed in economic terms. 
According to the structure, Kazakhstan's GDP resembles the more developed countries, as the 
main part of the GDP is industry and services, and the Kyrgyz Republic's agricultural sector 
is a major part of national production and income (Fig.1). But at the same time, a main part of 
the production and exports of the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan are neither innovative nor 
high-tech products, but the products of farmers and mining. 
 
Figure 3. Employment by sectors in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan (% of total employment) 
Source: UNCTAD stat (2014) 
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        Figures 2 and 3 show that more than half of the population of the Kyrgyz Republic is 
rural population. It indicates the central role of agricultural development for the country. On 
the contrary, Kazakhstan has more of an urban population, demonstrating a comparatively 
lower influence of agriculture for economic growth. As it is shown, the Kyrgyz Republic is 
an agrarian economy, thus almost half of total labor forces are engaged in agricultural sector 
and agriculture is the main industry providing employment opportunities. In accordance with 
the research of the Ministry of Agriculture and the goals of the Kyrgyz Republic; being to 
make agriculture the main source for employment, this sector uses only 2 percent of all his 
production capacity. 
Figure 4 Export and import of goods and services (% of GDP)  
Source:  National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2013) 
 
        As shown in figure 4, the economy of the Kyrgyz Republic is dependent on import. The 
Kyrgyz Republic imports food products (17.2 percent), machinery and transport (24.3 
percent), minerals (22.2 percent), metal products (8.1 percent), textile (8.6 percent), and 
others (19.6 percent) (NSCKR). Taking into consideration that the country is agrarian the 
ratio of import of food products to total import indicates that the Kyrgyz Republic’s domestic 
market is still weak to provide population with the food. 
 
Review of agricultural –industry of the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
        As other CIS countries, the Kyrgyz Republic started its economic transition in 1989-
1990 after the Soviet Union disintegration. In the past, there was no private land ownership 
and land was organized in the form of large-scale collective farms sized at thousands of 
hectares with hundreds of workers. Since the Kyrgyz Republic has become independent, it 
started its transition into market–oriented agricultural industry. The Kyrgyz Republic is a 
mountainous country. It has about 10 million hectares of agricultural land, 900,000 hectares 
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
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are irrigated land and 9.2 million ha are pastures. Most of the population lives in rural areas 
(60 percent). Specifically, 40 percent of agricultural output is produced by private farmers, 
and more that 50 percent by family farms (USAID, 2012). 60-65 percent of population 
engaged in agriculture. Overall poverty level in rural areas is higher than in urban areas 
(NSCKR). 
       Agriculture in the Kyrgyz Republic is a growing sector of the economy, which has 
tendency to increase year by year. In order to enhance the productivity, government and 
private sector should work in close cooperation in terms of creating conditions to develop 
livestock cluster. Annual growth of production in 2012 is 1.2 percent, compared with 2008 
increased by 7.6 percent. Average annual growth of production during the period 2008-2012 
increased by 1.7 percent. In 2012 share of livestock production was 47.9 percent of the total 
gross output of agriculture. 
Figure 5 Gross output in agriculture including services  
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic (2012) 
 
       Despite the low production level of the livestock sector it has the potential to develop a 
livestock cluster. The Kyrgyz Republic has very strong potential to create a livestock cluster 
because of favorable climate conditions, territory possibilities (53.3 percent of total territory 
is agricultural land (NSCKR, 2012) and available natural recourses. The livestock sector in 
the Kyrgyz Republic is one of the leading agriculture sub-sectors and a key component of 
agriculture. Involvement of farmers in clusters could provide for an effective use of local 
recourses, which could be competitive not only in the domestic market, but also in 
international markets. The agricultural sector consists of 33 percent of total value-added GDP 
(NSCKR, 2012). 
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Livestock sector performance 
 
          More than 350 000 individual livestock farmers are operating in the Kyrgyz Republic, 
70 percent of them have 1-5 cattle, about 10 sheep and several horses (NSCKR). 
Stockbreeding is based on two systems: (1) grazing on highland pastures and croplands in the 
mountain valleys; and (2) grazing on arable lands in valleys, where intensive dairy production 
and beef production are based mainly on indoor farming techniques. Mountainous regions 
can specialize in breeding calves for further growth in less mountainous areas. These regions 
have great number of cattle, sheep, horses and yaks, and these conditions create a good 
opportunity to develop domestic processing with increased added value and improve the 
performance of the region. 
        Seven distinct breeds of sheep are recognized. Though broadly adapted to the local 
conditions, the new breeds were more dependent on winter housing and supplementary 
winter feed than the traditional ones. During this time the dominant characteristic of the 
original indigenous fat-tail and-fat-rump, coarse wool sheep was changed to merino type fine 
wool breeds. Nonetheless a number of the indigenous breeds such as the Kyrgyz Coarse 
Wool Fat-tail and the Hissar (sic Gissar) fat-rump were retained and even 'improved' though 
in reduced numbers. Mutton from the indigenous types is generally preferred by the local 
Asiatic population (FAO, 2010). 
         Sheep and goats in the Kyrgyz Republic are about a million, and the approximate 
annual production capacity is 48,800 tons (NSCKR). Domestic demand for mutton and its 
consumption is very high. There is high external demand for mutton, for instance, the Iranian 
company has its cattle slaughter point in Kaiyndy. The company sends carcasses to Iran. 
Recently, the company began to cut the carcass, then pack and freeze them in boxes of 20 kg 
for export to Iran. 
Structure of livestock cluster 
 
       For a clearer understanding of the capacity of livestock sector to implement an agro-
cluster S.W.O.T. analysis is carried out (The World Bank, 2009) as follows: 
Table 1. S.W.O.T. Analysis of livestock sector corresponding to meat-cluster. 
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(i)Input 
Suppliers  
(ii) Production (iii)Designers 
ofpublic policy 
(iv)R&D, 
educational 
institutions 
(v)Financial 
institutions 
(vi) Demand and 
consumers 
Strengths  
Suitable natural 
and climatic 
recourses; 
Presence of 
pastures; (MAM 
operational data, 
2012) 
Environmentally 
favorable region; 
Feed supply is 
satisfactory; 
(MAM strategy, 
2012) 
 
Low taxes on 
production stage; 
Presence of 
sufficient labor 
force at the 
production stage; 
There are a number 
of meat processing 
companies 
producing sausages 
for the local and 
regional markets; 
(CCI, 2012) 
Presence of 
required 
government 
authorities that 
are responsible 
for agricultural-
policy, livestock 
development. 
 
They could focus 
on regulation, 
coordination, 
control, 
monitoring and 
support. 
Possibility to 
hybridize local 
breeds; 
Veterinary 
services are not 
developed 
properly;  
Financial 
sector of the 
Kyrgyz 
Republic is 
developed 
enough in 
order to be 
able to 
provide with 
finance the 
farmers and 
enterprises 
involved into 
the cluster.  
There are 
sufficient 
number of 
banks, non-
bank financial 
institutions; 
(NBKR)  
Large number of 
markets for 
distribution of 
products of livestock; 
The Kyrgyz Republic 
was meat supplier for 
the entire Soviet 
Union and it has a 
good reputation as a 
country which has 
high quality meat; 
Steady demand for 
fresh meat in domestic 
market; 
The Kyrgyz Republic 
exports meat products 
to Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, 
Iran; (NSCKR, 2012) 
Weaknesses 
Lack of initiatives 
on the part of 
farmers; 
Unstable feed 
supply; 
Lack of logistics 
between farmers 
and processors 
(slaughter floor); 
Absence of 
contemporary 
cattle slaughter 
points; (USAID, 
2011) 
Small-scale 
production; 
Low technical level 
of meat processing 
companies; 
Sanitarian 
inspections are 
not carried out 
properly; 
There are no 
inspectorates, 
restricting 
uninspected meat; 
(USAID, 2011) 
Absence of 
sanitary 
standards;  
Absence of 
laboratories for 
product 
standardization
; 
The  Kyrgyz 
Republic has 
budget deficit, 
consequently 
it has no 
enough 
financial 
resources to 
invest;  
Large number of 
traders, thereby 
livestock are bought 
and sold several 
times; 
Border issues 
restricting export; 
(MAM operational 
data, 2012)  
High retail costs; 
The Kyrgyz Republic 
imports large number 
of cheap Chinese 
meat;  
Opportunities 
Traders could be 
involved in order 
to establish links 
between regions 
having livestock 
surplus and 
fattening farms; 
Possibility to 
create 
contemporary 
cattle slaughter 
points; 
Production of 
economically 
friendly products 
that meet 
international 
standards; Taxes 
based on patent; 
Increase the level 
of production to 
provide with fresh 
meats other 
markets in CA 
countries; 
Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic 
could be 
responsible for 
meat inspection, 
licensing; 
Creation of 
Veterinary 
association; 
Development of 
production and 
develop import 
substitution policy 
Most of high 
educational 
institutions are 
involved into 
international 
programs, 
which allow 
students to train 
abroad in the 
field of 
agriculture.  
Presence of 
many 
international 
organizations 
such as 
USAID,UNDP
, OSCE,WB, 
ADB, t creates 
opportunities 
to attract 
foreign 
grants, 
support, aid 
and 
investment. 
High demand for 
cattle in Kazakhstan; 
Develop legal cattle 
trade in Kazakhstan’s 
market; 
Develop young stock 
market in Dubai; 
Growing demand for 
meat production in 
Russian, Tajikistan; 
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Threats 
Emergence and 
spread of animal 
diseases and 
epidemics; (MAM 
operational data, 
2012) 
Inefficient use and 
degradation of 
pastures; 
Reduced product 
competitiveness in 
comparison with 
cheap Chinese 
meat; 
Absence of 
integrated 
approach across 
the value chain 
(from the farmer to 
the buyer) could 
make matters 
worse as a whole; 
Lack of 
inspection, poor 
sanitary 
conditions led to 
spread of disease 
outbreaks; 
The "shadow 
trade" and bribes; 
Government of the 
Kyrgyz Republic 
do not control 
uninspected meat; 
(USAID, 2011) 
There is a 
decreasing  
tendency in the 
number of 
students who 
want to study in 
the field of 
agricultural 
sciences.  
Attracted 
financial 
recourses 
could be 
allocated 
ineffectively, 
due to the 
high level of 
corruption 
and shadow 
economy. 
 Increase in imports of 
meat and meat 
products from China, 
Russia, Kazakhstan; 
Increased number of 
packaged meat from 
Turkey and Germany; 
(NSCKR, 2012) 
New requirements and 
regulations of the 
Customs Union which 
restrict the volume of 
export; 
 
        An agro-industrial cluster has the following seven components [13]: (i) input suppliers, 
(ii) production, a group of companies as a basis of clusters (meat processing companies), (iii) 
designers of public policies, (iv) R&D and educational institutions (v) financial institutions, 
(vi) consumers. 
       (i)The first component of the cluster that was mentioned above is that it is a common 
supplier of inputs and services. The most important inputs and services for the livestock 
sector are cattle, seeds, agrochemicals and specialized machinery. Pastures in the Kyrgyz 
Republic occupy approximately 9.2 million hectares. These grazing systems are based on 
three grazing seasons: winter (animals are contained in a shed or outside the house), the inter-
season (spring and autumn, when the animals are grazed in pastures or households) and 
summer (animals being kicked away from home to mountains). It should be mentioned that 
almost all families in rural areas have livestock. Therefore, there is a very low demand for 
meat and milk, because people do not need to buy them outside their own communities 
(MAM operational data, 2012). Small fattening farms are located in Chui and the Talas 
regions. The Chui region has become a center of livestock fattening, having more than 500 
fattening points (MAM operational data, 2012). Improved feed rations and a reduction of 
production costs could help to improve the competitive advantage of the companies 
specializing in fattening cattle, sheep, horses for slaughter and export. Cattle slaughter points 
do not correspond to international requirements. Cattle slaughtering is carried out in old state 
buildings that were previously used as meat factories or slaughterhouses. A large number of 
cattle is slaughtered in private backyards and other uncontrolled territories. Consequently, the 
quality of meat and sanitary conditions are unsatisfactory. Newly established contemporary 
slaughter points will comply with standards for production buildings. Cattle slaughtering 
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points will be able to perform several functions: (1) sell meat carcasses of beef, lamb and 
horses to fresh meat markets; (2) Process carcasses into the main part (the major muscle 
groups); (3) separate meat from bones and prepare fresh or frozen cuts of meat for retail sale; 
and (4) sell meat parings to meat processing companies for production of meat products. In 
total, the first component of the cluster is extremely weak. 
       (ii) Currently, the meat processing industry is one of the most dynamic sectors of the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s economy. One-third of industrial output is processed and more than 25 
percent of production is exported to other countries. By the end of 2012 the total number of 
meat processing enterprises reached 298, including 92 legal entities and 206 individual 
entrepreneurs (NSCKR). The highest growth was observed among individual entrepreneurs. 
Currently, these small companies produce more than 93 percent of the total meat production 
in the country (MAM strategy, 2012). Their production over the last five years is steadily 
increasing. Even if there is an upward trend in the number of food-enterprises, most of them 
do not have sufficient capital to invest in necessary equipment which would enable them to be 
competitive and to meet international requirements. Furthermore, in accordance with the 
Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic it is reported that only 2 percent of processing 
capacities are used in meat industry. The meat processing industries are characterized by low 
innovation and technology use, a lack of current assets and high indebtedness. We can 
conclude that the second component of the cluster is almost complete in terms of presence of 
sufficient number of food-enterprises, but at the same time it is not developed enough. 
      (iii) The next key component is a set of public institutions that design policies conducive 
to the formation of a cluster. Successful clusters reveal that the different levels of government 
(local, regional, national) play a central role. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, both the 
state and national government led to a large-scale livestock sector through the creation of 
required infrastructure. The main state institutions which would play a significant role in the 
livestock cluster are the Ministry of Agriculture and Melioration and other state bodies such 
as the Ministry of Economy and Anti-monopoly policy of KR; the Ministry of Finance; State 
Custom Service under the government of KR; the Ministry of Agriculture and Melioration 
and its main departments related to livestock development, for instance: State Veterinary 
Department; Department of pastures; Department of Mechanization and energy supply; 
Republican State Seed Inspectorate; State selection and breeding center; Certification Center 
of veterinary medicines. They could focus on regulation, coordination, control, monitoring 
and support. The central government could play a supportive role by managing funds. The 
State Veterinary Department could be responsible for the appropriate veterinary services 
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provided by government and private sector; Department of pastures could make regulations 
for the effective use of pastures. State selection and a breeding center may regulate 
laboratories in order to improve selection and breeding activities. However, there is a big lag 
in other infrastructure items, especially, an obsolete railroad operating in poor conditions and 
bad highways, particularly during the rainy and snowy season. In sum, the third key 
component of the cluster is complete and present. 
       (iv) The fourth component of a cluster is R&D and educational institutions. Most studies 
of successful clusters highlight the presence and active participation of educational 
institutions such as universities where research is carried out closely related to the economic 
activities of the cluster’s core enterprises. There are two institutions whose graduates are 
closely related to livestock: Kyrgyz National Agrarian University named after Skryabin and 
the Institute of veterinary medicine and biotechnology. These High Educational Institutions 
train more than 8000 students (NSCKR). The most important problem of agricultural 
education system is an insufficient quality of education, regardless of specialty and status of 
institution. A number of educational institutions providing training in agriculture have 
disadvantages in teaching methods, material and a technical base. The present situation with 
low professional level of veterinarians is gradually getting better; however, the skills of these 
professionals are still unsatisfactory. Agricultural science is weakly involved in carrying out 
research work aimed to provide sustainable agricultural production. In sum, it is concluded 
that the forth component of the cluster is present but still extremely weak. 
       (v) The fifth component involves financial institutions supporting the cluster’s activities. 
They are public financial institutions, government authorities at different levels (local, state, 
national) or private companies such as banks or non-bank organizations. The financial system 
is represented by 24 commercial banks, 195 micro-credit companies, 63 micro-credit 
agencies, 146 credit unions (NBKR, 2013). MKK “Finka”, FG “Companion” are the largest 
micro-finance companies, which are considered as the largest creditors in agriculture. At this 
moment the financial and credit institutions system is institutionally developed, there are 
associations of banks, micro-credit companies and credit unions. Thus, all these conditions 
make it possible to provide farmers and agro-producers with financial services. Despite all 
these possibilities, several problems need to be resolved. For instance, high costs for 
insurance, leasing, financial services and lack of experience in leasing operations; 
Summarizing, the fifth component of the cluster has all the prerequisites to be completed, but 
in order to implement the cluster, these financial resources are not sufficient. 
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        (vi) A final component of the cluster is the presence of customers and consumers within 
the cluster or outside. In this case direct customers are local companies within the country. 
The indirect final clients would include a wide range of buyers, mainly local and regional 
population. In this case, the key to the operation of the Kyrgyz Republic’s export of livestock 
is the concentration of trading companies at the border point closest to the producing region. 
Widespread practice is that farmers sell livestock to local traders, who in turn sell it to 
commercial traders, who have large trucks that could accommodate 60-70 sheep or 15-20 
cattle. Kazakh traders buy livestock and livestock products in a livestock market located in 
Tokmok, but also directly from farmers and other private markets. The existence of trans-
boundary diseases (FMD, anthrax, brucellosis) and a low capacity of national veterinary 
services to control the spread of these diseases have led to the fact that Kyrgyz producers of 
meat and meat products are not officially allowed to sell their goods in the markets of Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus. However, this fact does not stop dynamic development of shadow 
market sales of beef carcasses and processed meat. Most of meat products are sold in local 
open markets. Enhanced and rapid increase in weight of livestock will benefit modern 
slaughtering industry, which, unfortunately are not developed at the moment. In conditions of 
absence of contemporary cattle slaughtering industry, conforming to required sanitary 
standards, livestock breeders will not be able to sell their livestock at the highest possible 
prices. The livestock are slaughtered in the places which do not conform to sanitary norms, 
thus, limiting the  possibility of Kyrgyz meat products to be sold in international markets. Due 
to absence of contemporary cattle slaughtering points there is no opportunity to effectively 
processing of carcasses for fresh meat markets and for meat processing industries as well. 
Resuming, the last component of the cluster exists, but it is not adequate. 
The proposed livestock cluster model for the Kyrgyz Republic 
 
        Having analyzed the agricultural sector of the Kyrgyz Republic, and having studied 
features and the potential of the Kyrgyz Republic for the implementation of livestock cluster, 
I will discuss the implementation of a cluster in Chui region. Almost 40 percent of meat and 
dairy processing companies are mainly located in this region (NSCKR). Furthermore, the 
location of the cluster in the Chui region is the most effective in terms of selling meat in the 
local and international markets, due to a high demand for meat and meat products compared 
to other regions. Additionally, the international livestock market is located in the Chui region, 
Tokmok. This fact may facilitate access to the markets of Kazakhstan and Russia, which are 
the main foreign markets of meat in the external market. In terms of logistics and 
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infrastructure for the development of the cluster, the Chui region is the most developed. In 
terms of labor recourses, main agricultural educational institutions are located in Chui. Taking 
into account the presence of both the local labor force and internal labor migration to Bishkek, 
I conclude that the cluster would have all possibilities to be provided with necessary human 
resources. To present more clearly the model of cluster, I propose this organizational scheme 
of agro cluster which could be implemented in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Figure 5 Proposed model of livestock cluster in the Kyrgyz Republic 
Source: own elaboration based on the data given above 
 
           Implementing any cluster initiatives in developed countries is different from 
implementing them in developing ones. With respect to developing countries, the role of 
government would be the most important. The importance of government intervention in 
developing countries is caused by the weakness of market institutions and low coordination 
possibilities between private and state actors. It does not mean that government should create 
clusters from “scratch” by declining markets and industries. Instead, government may work as 
a catalyst, a broker bringing actors together, creating forums for dialogs, supplying supporting 
structures and incentives to facilitate the clustering and innovation process. 
The government’s policy to clusters should be implemented by taking into account the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s specifics, especially agricultural sector and cluster members. In order to 
implement successful meat production cluster, the government must develop a program for 
cluster development and include it to the regional, local and national strategies. The 
government must take legal and administrative measures in order to provide direct and equal 
partnership inside the cluster through creating legislative basis. Only with creation of cluster 
institutions to control and monitor financial, sanitary, organizational issues, it would be 
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possible to develop effective clusters. Support of government and local authorities are needed 
in order to establish strong linkages between main actors of cluster: companies, government, 
research community, financial institutions, trade associations, etc. Regional and local 
authorities may serve as a nucleus of cluster formations and development. They could 
stimulate farmers to enhance cluster efficiency through strong cooperation in solving common 
problems. In the case of the Kyrgyz Republic, it is possible to apply a “top-down” cluster 
approach (Andersson et al., 2004): (i) step - Identify companies that could be basis for further 
growth and would be a basis for clustering, by identifying leading companies in order to 
concentrate on the basic recourses and tools, such as budget, centralized, own, borrowed etc. 
State-private partnership should be used for creation of these basic companies; (ii) step – 
Clusters should be formed based on these leading companies, which would include input 
suppliers, processing, trade, marketing, and financial organizations. Recourses should address 
to create effective value chain. Livestock cluster should have three main centers: development 
of raw material production; development of meat processing; development of sales. These 
centers would ensure investment, planning, and production. 
  At the preliminary stages of the cluster development the government must support 
maintaining and expanding traditional methods of agricultural production and develop policy 
supporting specialization of agriculture in production of environmentally friendly products. 
Clusters of organic livestock production should specialize in producing competitive agro-
products and products produced by using organic agro technology. Organic livestock 
production should be oriented toward international markets, which have high stable demand. 
External economic orientation of the cluster ensures rapid growth of profits of agro-
producers, which allow the base to improve their technologies. Government must develop 
technical regulations on production and control of environmentally friendly products based on 
Eco-EU standards, national standards of halal products. Regulatory legal acts, which would 
contain provisions on production and controlling ecologically friendly products, must be 
developed (MAM strategy, 2012). 
      This paper pays more attention to implementing cluster and the role of the government in 
livestock cluster development. Mentioning the government as one of the main actor of cluster 
implementation is caused by weakness of market institutions and low coordination 
possibilities between private and state actors. But on the other hand other risks of involving 
government still exist. Large-scale corruption can stand a main obstacle to implement the 
livestock cluster and it would restrict its development. Due to high level of corruption in high-
level officials the political situation had been extremely unstable during the last years since 
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2010 year. Large-scale corruption restricts the operations of international companies that wish 
to expand to the Kyrgyz Republic. Furthermore, getting licenses and permits is also used to be 
obstacle in doing business in the country. Another negative issue is high bureaucracy which 
can lead to corruption. Protection of property rights is still weak that confines the 
attractiveness of the country for foreign investors as well as for local business agents (GAN, 
2014). Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks the Kyrgyz 
Republic 150th out of the176 countries and territories assessed. In accordance with the data of 
the World bank  the Kyrgyz Republic has scored 10.4 on control of corruption on a scale from 
0 to 100 (Maira Martini, 2013).  
        Taking into account all the information mentioned above, it can be concluded that in 
order to succeed in the implementation of effective livestock cluster, corruption reducing 
measures should be taken first. Otherwise, involvement of the government in contributing to 
the development of the cluster will result in its failure. To address corruption in the country, 
the government of the Kyrgyz Republic has adopted the Anti-Corruption Plan in December 
2013 which is aimed at preventing corruption among judicial and law enforcement officials. 
In order to support international companies and foreign investors in facilitating bureaucratic 
procedures, the government has implemented a one-stop shop licenses and permits office 
under the Ministry of Economy and Anti-Monopoly Policy. The Kyrgyz Republic has five 
law enforcement agencies that deal with corruption: the Prosecutor General's Office, the State 
Customs Committee, the Financial Police, the National Security Service and the Ministry of 
the Interior (GAN, 2014). 
2.4. Conclusions 
        Development of agriculture is a complex social and economic problem. The agricultural 
sector provides jobs for more than half of the Kyrgyz Republic population. Furthermore it is 
the main source of income for the most families living in the rural areas. Development of 
agriculture is possible only through the implementation of appropriate public policy aimed at 
organizing modern agricultural production, more efficient use of existing resources and 
improvement of population’s quality of life in the rural areas. This paper is aimed to 
investigate the livestock sectors’ capacity to implement effective livestock clusters.    
       Being an agrarian country, the Kyrgyz Republic has not developed any agro-cluster. 
Before implementing any cluster in the country, all its capacities and features must be 
analyzed. The Kyrgyz Republic has all necessary preconditions in order to start forming a 
livestock cluster. Markets of organic agricultural products over the world are growing year by 
		
	
34	
year. Kyrgyz people have been engaging in cattle breeding for centuries, up to now they could 
preserve traditional methods of livestock breeding, which will allow them to produce 
environmentally friendly meat products applying their unique skills. Natural and climatic 
conditions create possibilities in order to provide farmers and processors with required 
quantity of livestock, feed, and seed. Significant share of agricultural products are produced 
with minimal use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Livestock are fed on natural pastures. 
It gives additional opportunities for the Kyrgyz Republic to organize the production oriented 
to segment of environmentally friendly products. At the same time, veterinary and sanitary 
conditions are still weak. The lack of standards for food quality and safety, including poorly 
equipped laboratories are some of problems of the sector. International meat trading is a real 
opportunity for meat industry of the Kyrgyz Republic which requires compliance with certain 
sanitary requirements. The cost of compliance with these standards can be high and, therefore, 
necessary to attract financial resources at least in the initial stages.         
         Long-term results of cluster implementation in the country would result in agricultural 
production growth improvement of food security of the Kyrgyz Republic, increase in income 
of farmers, alignment of regional economic development, reduction in migration. The main 
outcome would be the development of agricultural production. Successful cluster 
implementation may result in reducing import of livestock products, as local producers would 
be able to provide for the domestic market. 
        In case of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) it is clear which  public institutions would be able 
to support network formation and clustering. The government bodies such as the Parliament, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Melioration and its departments, the Ministry of Economy 
and Anti-monopoly policy, the Ministry of Finance, State Sanitary, Veterinary and 
Phytosanitary Inspections under government supervision may directly be involved   design 
processes through creating legal framework which can serve as a cluster’s codified policy. In 
sum, the main role of the government in cluster development is to create supporting networks 
and knowledge exchange structures for all actors involved in the cluster, namely farmers, 
households, food processing enterprises, financial institutions and non-government 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
 
3. DIAGNOSING GROWTH CONSTRAINTS IN CENTRAL ASIA: THE 
CASE OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
 
Abstract 
The Kyrgyz Republic is a country with transition economy and its growth performance is 
constantly one of the lowest compared to the CIS countries. The weak growth performance is 
mainly caused by a strong political instability and high corruption. Despite being a leading 
reformer in the region, the country has not done enough to solve the key problems.  Thus, the 
current study employs the growth diagnostic approach proposed by Hausmann et al.  (2005) 
to identify the binding constraints of growth in the country.  The paper founds that a weak 
institutional framework, high corruption, a large share of the informal economy, inefficient 
energy sector are the most binding constraints to the KR’s economic growth. 
  
Key words: growth, constraint, institutions, corruption; 
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3.1. Introduction 	
          The nature and principles of sustainable economic growth have always attracted the 
attention of researchers, experts from the business sector and policymakers. The literature on 
economic growth broadly discusses the nature of economic growth and there is an increasing 
debate by both economists and policy designers regarding the set of policies to ignite 
economic growth, particularly in transition and developing economies; while most of 
prescriptions on the right policies promoting growth have remained very general. The one size 
fits all approach, which is well known as the Washington consensus, typically recommends a 
general set of required reforms to achieve growth. However, by the end of the1990s it became 
clear that the recommended set of reforms did not bring the desired outcomes without strong 
governance and institutional foundations.   
         The need to avoid the one size fits all approach and to develop context-specific and 
country-specific growth policies has become a new conventional stream. In this regard, 
Hausmann et al. (2005) proposed a growth diagnostics framework as an analytical instrument 
to determine what are the key problems constraining economic growth in a particular country 
with an emphasis on developing economies12. Focusing on a small number of binding 
constraints, instead of removing all possible distortions that use the conventional Washington 
Consensus approach, is the most distinct characteristic of the growth diagnostic framework 
(Felipe and Usui, 2008). Due to its systematic focus on constraint conceptualization, the 
approach has become a tool for formulating country-specific growth policies in many 
developing countries over the last decade and it has become a subject of increasing debate 
among researchers, development economists and policymakers.  
          Referring to the Kyrgyz Republic (KR), being one of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States formed following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the country 
implemented market-oriented reforms under the triple arrangements: privatize, liberalize, and 
stabilize. The KR followed the waves of reforms, modeled by the World Bank, the so-called 
Washington Consensus13, but given its limited political power and economic resources only a 
few of these reforms were successfully implemented. Since becoming independent in the 
1990s, the country became a leading reformer compared to the other former Soviet Union 
economies and the first country in the region that joined the WTO in 1998. As a result, 																																																								
12 The approach proposed by Hausmann et al (2005) is  known as the growth diagnostics approach or also as the 
HRV approach using the capital letters of the authors surnames (Hausmann, Rodrik and Velasco). 
13 Similar set of reforms was adopted in Latin American countries and in many Sub-Saharian African countries. 
For more discussion see  Rodrik, 2004; 2006a. 
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currently the country is the most open and liberalized economy among the CIS. Nevertheless, 
the KR’s experience in establishing the Washington Consensus reform package did not bring 
the expected results. The country experienced a strong decline in GDP growth, faced 
hyperinflation, high unemployment rates and an extreme increase in the poverty during the 
1990s. The county’s growth performance has varied from a strong declining phase in the 
beginning of the 1990s, a relative stabilization and a gradual accelerating phase in the first 
half of the 2000s, followed by another declining phase after 2005. Though the adopted 
reforms helped the KR to achieve a relative macroeconomic stabilization and some positive 
impact on the growth, it appears that the reforms have not contributed to a sustained growth 
path. This leads us to the question of as to what kind of reforms (or conditions) are required to 
ignite a sustained economic growth in the KR.  
        Therefore, under the concept of the growth diagnostics approach, this paper attempts to 
identify the existing binding constraints to growth in the country by applying the mentioned 
framework. The identification of the factors that restrict growth allows the government to 
develop a well-focused growth policy and, by doing so, contributes to the ‘biggest bang for 
reform buck’ (Hausmann et al., 2005). Therefore, the key objective of this paper is to build a 
plausible hypothesis on the most binding constraints in the KR.  
         The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section provides theoretical 
foundations of the growth diagnostics approach; section three describes the framework and its 
methodology. In the fourth section we discuss the KR’s growth performance since the 
collapse of the USSR till the present time (1991-2015). Finally, the fifth section attempts to 
identify the constraints to the country’s economic growth, and the last section provides our 
conclusions. 
3.2. Literature Review 	
         There is an extensive literature providing an advanced understanding of the nature of 
economic growth and the fundamental factors accelerating growth. For many decades 
economists and policymakers have been debating on what should developing countries do to 
promote growth and eventually converge with developed countries. By the end of the 1980s 
there was a general consensus in the literature that emphasized a set of required reforms to 
ignite growth in developing countries. This led to the implementation of the Washington 
Consensus being promoted as the most relevant market-oriented reforms for developing 
economies, which in the general sense recommended to perform reforms towards  
‘privatization, liberalization and stabilization’ of economies (Rodrik, 2006a). However, by the 
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end of the 1990s, it had become obvious that this 'one size fits all approach' was not 
successful, and it was suggested to implement a second generation of reforms more focused 
on the role of institutions and the government. Thus, the original Washington Consensus has 
widened to include much more reforms. This broadening is known as the Augmented 
Washington Consensus14.  Nevertheless, neither the original Washington Consensus nor the 
Augmented Washington Consensus did work. The enlarged set of reforms was impossible to 
accomplish for developing countries due to their limited financial resources and capacity15. 
         In this context, Rodrik (2006a) argues that ‘the question now is not whether the 
Washington Consensus is dead or alive, it is what will replace it’ (p.2). The experience from 
the decades of reforms shows that there is no unique set of reforms (or rules) for all countries 
in all times, indeed, growth policies should be country-specific and well-targeted based on the 
specific circumstances of an economy. Each country has its own way of solving their 
problems of economic underdevelopment, and increasing the level of private investment may 
require different measures depending on the stage of development and specific constraints of 
the given country.  
        Thus, Hausmann et al. (2005) proposed a new tool addressed to identifying the problems 
that restrain growth in a particular economy, so that the constraints can be properly accounted 
for designing the right set of policy reforms. The growth diagnostics approach allows to 
perform different fixes to different countries depending on their country-specific problems, 
but at the same time it ensures a very unified methodology to identify these problems. It is 
fundamentally based on the proper diagnostics - on the ability and capacity to figure out the 
problematic areas with the greatest return to reform. As Hausmann et al. (2005) indicate, the 
developing countries are poor because they have many wrong things, but an appropriate 
diagnosis would help them to identify where the most binding obstacles are at a particular 
point of time. The identification of these obstacles may allow the government to develop 
context-specific policies because it is based on the argument that the binding constraints differ 
from country to country and from setting to setting. In this, unlike the Washington Consensus 
that suggests to each country a typical package of reforms, the growth diagnostics gives 
country-specific solutions.  
																																																								
14 The distinction between the original and the Augmented Washington Consensus is important to mention. If the 
former is mainly addressed to  ‘stabilize, privatize, liberalize’ economies, the latter is focused on the establishing 
secure property rights, strengthening instituions and governance (Rodrik, 2006a). 
15	The investigation of the failure of the Washington Consensus is beyond our research, for the more discussion 
on the Washington Consensus , see Rodrik, 2004; 2006a; 2006b; 
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           The HRV approach proposes a methodology based on the decision tree, where low 
level of private investment and entrepreneurship are considered as the key factor of low 
economic performance in developing countries (we describe the decision tree in the 
methodology section).  According to the authors, the framework is focused on the level of 
investment considering that many developing countries’ main problem is the scarcity of 
capital equipment and productive capacity. Under the consideration that developing countries 
operate below the full employment, it is more likely that they face difficulties related to the 
lack of productive capacity and its underutilization (Felipe et al., 2011). A large body of 
literature on economic growth highlighted the key role of investment in the context of 
accelerating economic growth. However, Rodrik (2006a) argues that the issue is not about the 
relevance of investment for growth, but why investment and capital formation are low in the 
most developing economies.  
          Yet regardless of increasing interest in the growth diagnostics approach, it also caused 
many debates and critiques. Sartor (2007) argues that the approach does not contain any 
scientific formula in its application; indeed it gives only a framework to build some 
hypotheses on critical constraints rather than tools to test binding constraints. Therefore, 
identification of the critical constraints within the approach mostly depends on the person 
who applies this approach. Similarly, Leipziger and Zagha (2006) criticize that the results of 
application mostly rely on the abilities and points of view of the analyst, thus potential 
scenarios of economic reforms may differ depending on analysts’ creativity. Felipe and Usui 
(2008) consider that the analyst may accept one constraint as a binding one for which data is 
available, and reject others due to the lack of data. Furthermore, Felipe and Usui (2008) 
criticize the starting point of the decision tree, as they consider that low private investment 
and entrepreneurship are not crucial for all countries, and there are some countries that have 
different causes of low economic performance. In response to the criticism, Hausmann et al 
(2008) state that the most developing economies aim to increase productive capacities, and 
the framework is mainly proposed for the countries with low level of investment and low 
growth performance. In regard to the imperfect data used by the analysts, the authors indicate 
that the only way is to take into account these limitations when analyzing the signals.  
        Nevertheless, despite its criticism, the framework achieved a relative high acceptance 
due to its systematic approach in problem conceptualization. Thus, Temple (2009) 
emphasizes that the growth diagnostics framework allows identification of clear policy 
priorities focusing on country-specific conditions and therefore becomes relevant for policy 
design in practice. In spite of their criticism, Felipe and Usui (2008) also agree that the 
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approach could be helpful for policymakers to build a growth strategy in terms of limited 
resources.  In addition, the growth diagnostics framework is widely used by the international 
institutions and researchers for the identification of policy priorities in many developing 
countries, and it became a key analytical tool for donor agencies to develop their operational 
strategies. 
       Resuming, to date, the growth diagnostics approach has become a widely implemented 
analytical tool that is based on an economic theory and focused on the country-specific 
circumstances. It assumes that growth can be restricted by many different obstacles varying 
from country to country and, as we mentioned before, the poor countries are poor because 
they have many wrong things. However, most of these problems are not binding, in the sense 
that not all of them have direct impact on growth. This argument is consistent with the 
experience of many developing economies following the ‘standard’ growth policies that 
recommended a similar set of required reforms (we are referring to the Washington 
Consensus) for all countries.  Yet, the growth diagnostics approach is not a panacea, it needs a 
very precise analysis, and we do presume that the application of the framework depends on 
the abilities and knowledge of the analyst, the answers sometimes might not be obvious and 
the constraints will not be figured out convincingly. Nevertheless, the approach has the 
advantage that it may allow countries to perform their own analysis focused on binding 
constraints and to build context-specific policies, instead of  ‘copying’ successful polices of 
other countries or expecting international institutions to present ready-made policies.  
3.3. Methodology and data 	
     So far we have provided a brief overview of the theoretical background of the growth 
diagnostics approach. In this section, following the main idea of the framework, we aim to 
figure out the key binding constraints of growth in the KR. We apply the methodology tree 
provided by Hausmann et al. (2005). The decision tree starts by assuming that a low level of 
private investment and entrepreneurship are the key problems in developing countries and 
different branches of the tree represent various constraints. The right-side branch represents 
high costs of finance, which could be caused by either a low level of saving or a weak 
financial intermediation. If it is the latter, that could be due to the lack of competition or high 
risks. The right-side branch explores different factors of low returns to investment. This can 
be determined by the social factors (such as a lack of human capital, a bad infrastructure or a 
poor geography), or by government or market failures (at micro and macro levels). Therefore, 
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by moving downwards in the decision tree, we attempt to evaluate along the way the 
relevance of each potential constraint for the country. 
 
Fig. 1. The decision tree    
Source:  Hausmann et al., 2005 
     
        Hausmann et al. (2008) recommend several techniques to perform a proper analysis. In 
this context, the first technique is to observe the actions of firms and entrepreneurs. The 
attempts of firms and entrepreneurs to overcome the binding obstacle can help create ‘tell 
tale’ signs that are observable to the analyst. The second technique is using international 
benchmarking. Hausmann et al. (2008) state that using international rankings allows assessing 
the country’s performance what seems feasible. Thirdly, the authors recommend performing 
growth accounting and country regression techniques for a deeper analysis of the constraints.  
         Therefore, based on these recommendations, the current analysis is carried out by using 
a combination of econometric, graphical and cross-country comparison techniques. 
Nevertheless, our assessment is mainly relied on the international benchmarking to perform a 
comparative analysis using qualitative and quantitative data at national and international 
levels. Data for this study was collected from research papers, publications, reports of the 
National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic and statistical data published by the World Bank, 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook, UNdata, Economic Freedom Network, Global Economic 
Forum, the Heritage Foundation, etc.  
        The following CIS countries such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were chosen as a 
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comparator group of countries in order to formulate a plausible hypothesis about the binding 
constraints. These countries were chosen based on the following several criteria: (a) level of 
economic development: they belong to the group of developing economies; (b) landlocked 
countries; (c) Former Soviet Union Republics, which implies that they have a common 
historical, economic and political background.   
3.4. The KR’s growth performance after independence  (1991-2015): Brief Overview 	
       Before 1991, the KR was a country with a centrally planned economy operated within the 
Soviet Union economic system and following the collapse of the USSR, the country started a 
rapid transition towards a market-based economy and improving the overall economic 
performance. The country was seen as one of the most dynamic reformers comparing to the 
other Former Soviet Union countries and international institutions such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund have been guiding and providing significant financial 
support in forming a market-oriented economy in the KR. The reforms were undertaken on a 
wide front, including a rapid privatization, liberalization, and stabilization of the economy16. 
However, regardless of its success in transforming its economy, the outcomes have not been 
all positive: the country still remains one of the low growing economies among the other CIS 
countries and over the world.  
        The economic growth of the KR after its independence (1991) can be divided into three 
periods17. The first period (1991-1995) replicates the economic growth pattern of the other 
CIS countries (see fig. 2). This period was marked by a strong decline in output18, driven by a 
sharp decrease in industrial production. The industrial production decreased by 55.2 percent 
in 1995 compared to its level in 1991 (see fig. 3)19. The main factors resulted in the industrial 
output decline where the loss of markets (due to the disintegration of the Former Soviet 
economy), increased input prices, decreased demand and the weakening of former soviet 
economies. At the same time, the additional impact of the economic reforms during the early 
transition period led to hyperinflation, high unemployment rates, and higher inequality in 
income distribution 20. Therefore, the macroeconomic stabilization was the only priority of the 
economic policy of the KR, and in 1992 the country implemented a macroeconomic 																																																								
16 For more discussion on the reforms and transition period in the KR see Torm (2003). 
17 First period of active reforms during 1991-1995; the second period 1996-2005, when the KR accomplished the 
reforms and maintained economic stability; the third period 2005-2015 of gradual economic growth;  
18 The country’s GDP growth extremely declined from -7.8 percent in 1991 to - 20.1 percent in 1994.	
19 Olcott (1997)	
20 Inflation rate reached 200 percent in 1991, 900 percent in 1992, 929 percent in 1993 and 62 percent in 1994 
(Huseynov and Jamilov, 2014). For more details about poverty and unemployment trends see ILO (2008). 
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stabilization program, which tightened monetary and fiscal policies, limited the credit 
expansion of the state enterprises and the newly established private companies. As a result, 
the country achieved a relative macroeconomic stability and the output recovered 5.4 percent 
in 1995 (from - 20.1 percent level in 1994), and inflation significantly decreased (from 62 
percent in 1994 to 31.1 percent in 1995)21. 
 
Fig.2. GDP growth rates in the Kyrgyz Republic and the average of CIS countries (1991-2015) 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
        After a constant decline in output during the first half of the 1990s, since 1996 the output 
has gradually resumed. During the second period (1996-2005) the economy grew at an 
average of 4.7 percent annual growth rate and the average GDP per capita growth rate was 3.4 
percent.  The growth was driven by output growth in industry sectors and services, which 
accounted for 39 percent of GDP22. In regard to services, the liberalization of custom 
regulations and favorable taxation regime for firms involved in international trade, resulted in 
a rapid growth of commercial, trade and re-exporting services23. However, the growth 
performance of the KR was hampered by external and internal shocks that led to high output 
fluctuations between 1996-2005: (i) the Russian financial crisis of 1998; (ii) a strong decline 
at Kumtor; (iii) the antigovernment protest that overthrew the president of the KR and the 
subsequent political turmoil in 2005. 
  																																																									
21 For more details see Mogilevsky and Omorova (2011); Atayev (2012). 
22 A moderate recovery of industry since 1997 (fig.3) has been attributed to the beginning of a gold mining 
industry ‘Kumtor’, which is the gold mining industry and it generates more than half of industrial output of the 
KR (see Mogilevskii et al., 2015) 
23 In terms of re-exporting services, commodities are mainly brought from Turkey, China and then redistributed 
in Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and the other CIS. 
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Fig.3. Composition of GDP growth in the KR (%)  
Source:  World Bank Indicators (2016a) 
 
       Referring to the economic growth path during 2005 till 2015, it has remained volatile and 
the average rate of GDP growth is at 4.7 percent. An increase in the GDP to 8.5 percent in 
2007 and 8.4 percent in 2008 was mainly determined by higher international prices for gold 
and a considerable increase in services. The share of the service sector in GDP increased from 
45.6 percent in 2005 to 57 percent in 2015.  The output growth has remained volatile and 
responsive to shocks, such as the consequences of the world financial crisis of 2009; the 
second government overthrow in 2010; the subsequent ethnic violence in the south of the 
country in 2011; and a strong economic slowdown in Russia and Kazakhstan (the country’s 
main trade and strategic partners) respectively in 2014 and 2015. Thus, a continuing political 
uncertainty (the revolutions of 2005 and 2010) 24 and the ethic violence (2011), followed by 
the embargo on trade by the neighboring countries (namely Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan) resulted in low growth rates and high output fluctuations during the second period. 
      Resuming, the KR’s growth performance after its independence has been volatile and 
below the CIS countries on average. In particular, growth rates became negative in the post-
revolutionary periods, accompanied by destroying and closing of companies, the local 
enterprises were not able to recover and had to close, international investors had to relocate 
their finance to the countries with more secure and stable economies.  
	3.5. Identification of the binding constraints for the Kyrgyz Republic. 
The applicability of the growth diagnostics approach for the Kyrgyz economy? 
          So far we have briefly discussed the country’s growth performance over the period after 
its independence (from 1991), however our interest is to identify the binding constraints for 
the recent years, thus we are referring to the period between 2005-2015. As we mentioned 
before, the growth diagnostics approach starts with the assumption that low economic growth 
in developing countries is caused by a low level of investment and entrepreneurship. In this 
context, Felipe et al. (2011) divide developing countries in four groups based on the average 
																																																								
24The main causes of both revolutions were a strong dissatisfaction of people with the government regimes of 
Presidents as Akaev and  Bakiev. Many observers believed that the government crisis in the KR in 2005 was 
caused by the following factors: the difficult economic situation of the population, and conflicts between the 
'wealthier north' and the 'poor south' exacerbated the dominance of 'northerners' in power and control. The causes 
of the second revolution were the very low standards of living, the ongoing struggle for power between the 
Kyrgyz clans of the north and south of the country, and the increase in the prices of some goods and services, 
such as electricity, gas and mobile services. 
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share of investment in GDP and the average GDP growth rates25. They argue that the 
approach should be applied only to the countries in the third group. Therefore, before 
proceeding to the diagnosis constraints in the KR following Felipe et al. (2011), we aim to 
clarify the applicability of the approach for the country. Thus, we attempt to build a 
scatterplot of the average GDP growth rates and investment share in GDP for the KR and the 
comparator group of countries (see fig.4).  
 
Fig.4. Growth and Investment for the KR and the comparator group of countries. 
Pooled data: the comparator group of countries and the KR, period 2005-2015. 
Source: Authors estimates based on the data from World Bank (2016a) and the IMF (2016) 
 
 
          According to fig.4, Tajikistan, Armenia and the KR are in the third group. They 
represent the GDP growth rates and the investment share in GDP below the world average, 
while others belong to the fourth group having lower growth rates than the world average, but 
the investment rates are above the world average. Furthermore, the results of a correlation 
analysis (see annex 1, table 1) indicate a strong positive and significant relationship between 
the GDP growth and the investment only for the KR (0.65) and Georgia (0.73). However, the 
results for the comparator countries are less encouraging: the coefficients are positive and 
significant for Armenia (0.41), Azerbaijan (0.42); no correlation in the cases of Uzbekistan 
(0.09) and Kazakhstan (0.02); a negative and significant correlation in Russia, Belarus and 
Tajikistan26.  																																																								
25 By building a scatter plot of the average GDP growth and the investment share in GDP during the period of 
1960-2004 (divided in five sub-periods), Felipe et al. (2011) classify four country groups: (i) countries with both 
above-average growth rates and investment share; (ii) countries with growth rates above the world average, but 
investment share below the average; (iii) countries with both growth rates and investment share below the 
average; and (iv) countries with growth rates below the world average, but investment share above the average; 
26 A more detailed analysis of economic growth in the CIS countries is beyond of the current analysis, therefore 
we provide an interpretation of the results only for the KR. 
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        Thus, the results we discussed above confirm that the approach is applicable for the KR, 
and our further analysis is addressed to identifying what are the key factors causing low 
investment, thereby weak growth performance in the country. In this regard, following the 
decision tree, we firstly determine which of the two ‘general’ constraints (high costs of 
financing or low rates of returns) could be a constraint for the KR. In other words, whether 
investment is constrained because firms and investors cannot get the financing that they need 
to start a business (or expand it), or investors do not want to invest as they do not expect to 
retain a sufficient share of returns of their efforts.  
Is access to finance a binding constraint to economic growth in the Kyrgyz Republic? 
        The high cost of finance can be a potential obstacle for private investments in the 
country, and the costs of finance can be observed by real interest rates and domestic credit to 
the private sector. The financial constraint, when it exists, can arise both from domestic 
or/and international sources. In this part, we firstly aim to identify if the costs of finance are 
high in the country, and if that is the case, we will proceed to the analysis of the sources (as 
indicated in the decision tree).   
       Regarding the costs of funds, the real interest rates in the country are the highest 
comparing to its regional peers and it remains to be high in 2015 (see fig.5). Furthermore, the 
availability of domestic credit to the private sector is also below the regional average, and 
regardless of considerable increase from 7.9 percent of GDP in 2005 to 23 percent of GDP in 
2015, the domestic credit to the private sector remains below the average level of the CIS 
countries  (35 percent to GDP) in 2015.  
 
Fig. 5. Real interest rates  vs. GDP per capita in the KR and comparator countries (average 2005-2015) 
Note: real interest rate is taken as the lending interest rate minus inflation (change in consumer price index). 
Source: World Bank (2016a)	
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Fig.6. Domestic credit to private sector vs. GDP per capita in the KR and comparator countries (average 2005-
2015) 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
         Thus, the current trend of the high real interest rates and the low share of domestic credit 
to private sector are indicative of high costs of funds in the country. According to Hausmann 
et al. (2008), the lack of availability of domestic credit accompanied with the high real 
interest rate represents that the high cost of financing is rather caused by the scarcity of 
resource rather than low demand for credit. Having identified that the costs of funds are high 
in the KR, we aim to analyze if it is caused by limited access to international or domestic 
financing.  
International financing 
         Many developing countries face difficulties attributed to the access to international 
credit markets due to either adverse international credit market conditions or country-specific 
problems. The latter does not necessarily refer that bad international financing is a binding 
constraint, indeed, this would rather signal about the country’s macroeconomic or political 
risk problems. In the case of the KR, an access to international financing is not a binding 
constraint to growth at the present moment. The KR’s attractiveness for foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is increasing year by year and it represents the second highest position 
among the countries considered (see table 1). The average rate of FDI is 7.5 as the share of 
GDP during 2005-2015, a significant increase in FDI inflows has been made in 2011-2015.  
Its average share is two times higher than the average of the CIS countries (4.8) for the same 
period. Furthermore, the country receives a significant amount of official development 
assistance (8.9 percentage of GDP, the average for 2005–2015) and remittances (24.4 
percentage of GDP, the average for 2005–2015). Considerable share of remittance inflows is 
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used for a residential investment and for the purchase of imported consumer goods. If an 
access to international financing would be a constraint to growth, we would expect that the 
increase in remittance inflows that occurred over the 2000s would have gone into a productive 
investment, but this is not the case of the KR. Furthermore, the average external debt accounts 
94.3 percentage of GNI for the period of 2005–2015, and 42.7 percent of all external debt was 
concessional and long-term (95.5 percent). Interest rates and maturities are more favorable 
than for other comparator countries, as the interest rate on external debt commitments is at 1.3 
percent, which is one of the lowest comparing to the CIS countries (see table 1). 
Table 1. International financing 
Country 
Foreign direct 
investment, net 
inflows (% of 
GDP) 
Net ODA received 
(% of GNI) 
Remittances received 
(% of GDP) 
External debt 
stocks (% of GNI) 
Average 
interest on 
new external 
debt 
commitments 
(%) 
2005-
2010 
2011–
2015 
2005-
2010 
2011–
2015 
2005-
2010 
2011–
2015 
2005-
2010 
2011–
2015 2005 2015 
Armenia 7.2 3.9 3.7 2.8 17.6 17.5 41.8 73.1 0.8 2.2 
Azerbaijan 15.0 6.3 0.9 0.3 3.5 2.6 14.1 17.0 2.9 1.0 
Belarus 2.7 3.5 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.6 31.2 59.0 5.3 3.9 
Georgia 11.1 8.1 5.6 3.8 8.8 11.3 53.9 88.1 0.8 1.8 
Kazakhstan 9.2 4.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 97.7 75.8 5.0 4.7 
Kyrgyz Republic 5.6 9.4 8.8 9.0 19.8 29.0 87.0 101.6 1.0 1.3 
Moldova 7.4 4.1 5.5 5.2 30.9 26.0 66.8 76.0 1.5 1.4 
Russia 3.4 1.9 n/a n/a 0.4 0.3 31.2 30.2 5.2 3.5 
Tajikistan 5.5 3.2 7.7 3.8 37.0 38.6 48.9 55.8 0.7 0.9 
Turkmenistan 10.7 10.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1 7.0 1.4 1.4 n/a 
Uzbekistan 2.4 1.7 0.7 0.5 7.3 9.2 22.7 19.0 1.9 1.9 
CIS average 7.5 4.8 2.5 1.7 10.6 10.7 41.5 49.5 2.6 2.1 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
      Based on the discussion above, we consider that the access to international financing is 
not a binding constraint for the country, as the country is able to borrow from international 
financial market, and relatively low interest rates are indicative of low country risk comparing 
to the comparator countries.  If the problem of high costs of finance is not caused by 
international source of financing, this could be related to bad local financing, thereby making 
domestic financing to be further analyzed. 
 Domestic financing  
     According to the decision tree, the difficulties with inadequate access to domestic 
financing can be attributed to low savings or/and a poor financial intermediation. Therefore, 
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moving downwards the right branch of the tree, we aim to identify if the high costs of 
financing are determined by either low savings or poor intermediation. 
       Referring to the savings rates, likewise many low-income countries, the KR’s savings 
have been low and even negative almost all the analyzed period (see fig.7). The average level 
of gross domestic savings between 2005-2015 was negative (- 7.02) and below the CIS 
countries, excluding Tajikistan (-24.3) and Moldova (-13) for the same period, while 
Turkmenistan (65.9), Azerbaijan (50.4), Kazakhstan (40.9) and Belarus (31.5) had the highest 
gross domestic saving levels.  
 
Figure 7 Gross Domestic Savings in the KR and comparator countries (percentage of GDP). 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
 
       Not surprisingly, the KR’s trade and current account deficits have been high, implying 
that the country is borrowing mainly from abroad to help sustain the current investment rates. 
The country’s current account deficit has been volatile, nevertheless it has been gradually 
increasing from 1.5 percent of GDP in 2005, - 4.3 percent of GDP in 2009 to 14.9 percent in 
2015 (see fig.8). 
 
Figure 8 Current account deficits in the KR and comparator countries (percentage of GDP). 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
      
         If a low level of domestic savings is a binding obstacle, then we expect that it can be 
caused by inability of profitable investment projects to find financing. In such case, we would 
observe relatively high deposit interest rates, caused by bank competition to fund profitable 
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investment projects. During the period of 2005–2015 the average deposit interest rate is 2.4 
percent, representing one of the lowest rates among the CIS countries and it has increased 
only by 1 percent over the last decade and remains to be the lowest in the region. In regard to 
the lending interest rates, the average rate is the second highest among the comparator 
countries, and it has decreased only by 2.4 percent. Consequently, the interest spread is the 
highest in the region and it remains to be the highest in 2015.   
Table 2. Financial intermediation indicators in the KR and CIS countries 
Countries 
Bank deposits  
as % of GDP Money and quasi money (M2) as % 
of GDP 
Deposit interest 
rates 
Lending interest 
rates 
Interest rate 
spread (lending 
rate minus 
deposit rate %) 
2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 2005 2015 
Armenia 9.1 28.1 16.3 36.9 5.8 14.1 18.0 17.6 12.2 3.4 
Azerbaijan 8.9 24.8 14.7 39.2 8.5 9.0 17.0 17.5 8.5 8.5 
Belarus 13.8 29.4 0.002 0.004 9.2 18.6* 11.4 18.7* 2.1 0.2* 
Georgia 8.9 32.5 16.9 42.1 7.5 8.9 17.6 12.5 10.1 3.6 
Kazakhstan 18.0 33.5 27.2 42.1 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Kyrgyz Republic 8.2 19.1 21.1 33.8 1.7 2.7 26.6 24.2 24.9 21.6 
Moldova 25.5 40.1 42.0 52.4 13.2 12.0 19.3 14.1 6.0 2.2 
Russia 20.7 49.5 33.4 61.7 4.0 9.2 10.7 15.7 6.7 6.5 
Tajikistan 4.5 11.4 14.4 22.3 10.2 4.2 23.3 25.8 13.1 21.6 
Note:  * data for 2014  
Source:  World Bank (2016a) 
     
     However, private banks in the KR are well capitalized, with the capital to assets ratio 
averaging about 31.3 percent, whereas the average for the comparable group of countries is 
about 19.7 percent (fig.9).      
 
Figure 9. Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio in the KR and comparator countries (%) 
Source: Source:  World Bank (2016a) 
 
        The discussion above indicates that the KR’s savings have been the lowest comparing 
regionally, yet this does not imply that it is a binding constraint due to the following reasons: 
firstly, the data on saving rates may underestimate the true amount of savings because many 
people prefer to save their money abroad as they consider that it is safer than the KR; 
secondly, in theory (as stated by Hausmann et al, 2008), if inadequate access is a constraint, 
then changes in the interest rates should result in a substantial increase in investment. 
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However, in the case of the KR, there is no meaningful relationship between the real interest 
rates and investment shares in GDP over the last decade (the coefficient is small and 
statistically not significant, see annex 1, table 2). Thirdly, we do not observe high deposit 
rates driven by bank competition for deposits in order to fund profitable investment projects.  
However, the alternative explanation of high interest rate spread (as argued by Hausmann et 
al, 2008) could be high reserves ratio requirements. In the KR the required sum was 10 
percent for liabilities in all currencies. Since 2015, the reserve requirements on liabilities in 
national currency is set at 4 percent and 12 percent on liabilities in foreign currencies, 
although this ratio is much higher than the corresponding 1 percent reserve ratio in developed 
countries.  
        Referring to the actions of firms assessed by the World Bank (2013), 40 percent of firms 
answered that they did not need loans and only 3.9 percent of firms were denied credit. 
However, 26.1 percent of surveyed firms identified access to finance as a major obstacle to 
growth, which is significantly higher than the average of the CIS countries (17.1).  
Table 3. Access to finance as a constraint on firm growth in 2013 (percentage of firms) 
Countries 
Proportion of loans 
requiring collateral 
(%) 
Proportion 
funds 
financed 
internally (%) 
Proportion of 
funds financed 
by banks (%) 
Percent of firms 
identifying access 
to finance as a 
major constraint 
Percent of 
firms not 
needing a 
loan 
 
Armenia 88.7 72.7 9.5 25.9 45.3 
Azerbaijan 85.5 77.4 21.9 22.1 51.4 
Belarus 84.6 78.2 14.3 16.3 41.5 
Georgia 95.6 75.2 12.1 18.3 59.8 
Kazakhstan 86.7 83.4 8.8 8.8 52.7 
Kyrgyz Republic 89.5 80.1 8.7 26.1 40 
Moldova 95.0 80.0 7.7 7.2 63.4 
Russia 84.2 84.3 6.3 28.0 43.1 
Tajikistan 91.8 73.9 5.1 22.6 56.1 
Uzbekistan 96.5 82.3 12.0 5.2 74.7 
Note: the latest available data for 2013  
Source: the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2013) 
 
      Perhaps, the most serious constraint to access to bank loans is the strictness of collateral 
requirements in the KR. As it is shown in the table above (see table 3), 89.5 percent of the 
firms that obtained loans from banks had to provide collateral, and as a result banks provided 
only 8.7 percent of funds (still remains lower than the average of the CIS countries 11 
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percent). Instead, most of the country’s funds are provided by the internal sources of firms 
and individual entrepreneurs, which account for 80 percent.  
       Resuming, as we discussed before, the analysis shows that the savings are not considered 
as the binding constraint to growth in the KR.  However, the high costs of finance in the 
country are driven by the lack of domestic funds, and the majority of loans require collateral, 
which makes it difficult to get financing from banks. Furthermore, the interest rate spread is a 
reliable indicator of financial intermediation, with high spreads indicating a less efficient 
financial system. The KR’s interest has been the highest during the whole analyzing period. 
These facts do not reject the possibility that financial intermediation in line with the strict 
rules to get loans by firms are the binding constraint for the KR.  
Is low social returns on economic activity a binding constraint to growth in the KR? 
        Following the structure we indicated before, that is moving downward the decision tree, 
we now proceed to analyze the social returns to economic activity in the KR, which could 
occur due to the poor geography (including natural resources), the lack of human capital or 
bad appropriate infrastructure. In regard to the geography and natural resources, they are not 
considered as binding constraints of growth for the country.  As the country’s central location 
makes it a major transportation corridor between Russia, China and other Central Asian 
countries and therefore its proximity to a neighboring market means that geography is not a 
major constraint for growth. Referring to the KR’s natural resources, the country has 
significant fields of gold, coal, mercury and bismuth as well as small deposits of oil and gas 
resources. Therefore, the lack of natural resources cannot be considered as a binding 
constraint for the country. Nevertheless, the quality of services provided by transport and 
energy infrastructure might be binding constraints for growth, thus we further aim to assess 
quality and capacity of the country’s infrastructure.  
Transport infrastructure 
       Upon gaining independence, the KR’s infrastructures have been considered positively, 
comparing to the other Former Soviet Union counties. Furthermore, several measures have 
been carried out regarding the quality of the roads. As for the quality of transport 
infrastructures, the KR was ranked in 122nd position out of 144 in 2009 and increased to 113th 
position out of 144 countries in 2015 (table 4). The quality of overall infrastructures is 
assessed at 96th position out of 144 in 2015, yet this rank is below the majority of comparator 
countries. 
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Table 4. Quality of transport infrastructure 
Country  
Quality of overall 
infrastructure Quality of roads 
Quality of railway 
infrastructure 
Quality of air 
transport 
infrastructure 
index rank index rank index rank index Rank 
Armenia 61 4.4 80 3.7 68 2.6 72 4.3 
Azerbaijan 47 4.8 69 4 37 3.8 44 5 
Georgia 54 4.6 65 4 33 3.9 84 4.1 
Kazakhstan 62 4.4 113 3 28 4.2 85 4 
Kyrgyz 
Republic  96 3.6 123 2.7 67 2.6 123 3.2 
Moldova 86 3.8 140 2.1 61 2.8 102 3.7 
Russia 74 4.1 124 2.7 26 4.3 79 4.1 
Tajikistan 107 3.4 109 3 53 3 91 4 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (2016) 
 
        In addition, several projects have been funded by the international and donor 
organizations. One of the most important and still active projects is CAREC, which aims to 
improve main regional roads and build an international transport corridor connecting with 
China and other Central Asian countries. It is expected that the realization of transport 
infrastructure projects will facilitate domestic and international trade and reduce 
transportation costs in the country. A good transport infrastructure may contribute to 
strengthen a regional cooperation, increasing the competitiveness of the country and 
facilitating the access to international markets. However, it does not mean that these 
improvements will bring good enough conditions for economic growth, as it needs a complex 
approach, and other measures should be taken. Thus, bearing in mind the KR’s excess 
capacity at present and the country’s tendency to improve the quality of roads according to 
the international ranking of the Global Economic Forum and the results of BEEPS surveys, 
transport infrastructures do not appear as a binding constraint of growth for the KR. 
       In regard to the energy infrastructures, the KR has the second richest hydro resources in 
Central Asia (followed Tajikistan), with a high hydro energy potential. Yet, the KR’s energy 
sector faces difficulties related to its low productivity and efficiency. The low productivity of 
the energy sector is driven by the lack of investment in the sector and ineffective management 
rather than the deficit of water resources. In this context, ADB (2014) reports that the KR’s 
hydropower potential is estimated to be 150.000 mln kWh, but the country uses only 10 
percent of its potential. The KR has one of the lowest electricity output (15 billion kWh) 
comparing to the average of the CIS countries (21 billion kWh) The electricity output is 
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slightly higher than that of Armenia, Georgia and Moldova, but significantly lower than that 
of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Azerbaijan (Index Mundi, 2014).  
 
Figure 10. Electricity production, consumption, losses in the KR 
Source: World Bank (2016a); Index Mundi (2014) 
 
         Inefficient use of its hydro potential is caused by two factors: firstly, as the only 
(documented) source of electricity production are hydro resources, and the level of water in 
Toktogul Reservoir (main electricity production station in the KR) varies significantly from 
season to season, year to year, depending on weather conditions. Therefore, during the 
wintertime, water releases are low and demand is high, and the country has to import coal, oil 
and gas to sustain the power supply27. Secondly, the key constraint to productivity and 
efficiency of the sector is the existing outdated generation assets that have not been changed 
since the Soviet period. The average age of generation equipment was estimated at 35 years in 
2015, and only 11 percent of the equipment has been in use for less than 20 years. More than 
half of the transmission equipment is aged 20 years, and more than 5 percent is aged 45 years 
(ADB, 2014).  The outdated generation assets and long years of exploitation have resulted in 
very high technical losses (see fig. 10). The losses of the energy sector comprise more than a 
fourth of its production (2005-2015) and it is the highest comparing to the comparator 
countries. For instance, Russia shows 10.9 percent for the same period, Kazakhstan 8.9 
percent and Tajikistan 16.5 percent.  
        Furthermore, as it can be seen in table 5, the percentage of firms that identified 
electricity as a major constraint for the business is the highest (34.9), comparing with the CIS 
countries. The duration of the electricity outages is significantly high (2.1 hours), and the 
number of electrical outages per month (0.9) is two times higher than in the comparator 
countries (except Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). In addition, the quality of electricity supply is 
also low, scoring 2.9 out of 7, leaving it in the 115th position out of 144 countries (Global 
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Competitiveness Report, 2016). In a comparison with the chosen comparator countries, the 
KR has a very low score, while others reach 4.9 on average (except Tajikistan).  
Table 5. Energy sector as a constraint on firm growth (percentage of firms)     
 
 
Number of 
electrical 
outages in 
a typical 
month 
Duration of 
a typical 
electrical 
outage 
(hours) 
Losses due 
to electrical 
outages (% 
of annual 
sales) 
Percent of 
firms 
owning or 
sharing  a 
generator 
Days to 
obtain an 
electrical 
connection 
(upon 
application) 
Percent of 
firms 
identifying 
electricity as 
a major 
constraint 
Quality of 
electricity 
supply (1–7 
(best)) 
Armenia 0.3 0.3 0.1 9.7 4.8 7.9 5.1 
Azerbaijan 0.6 0.4 0.1 22.9 4.0 0.7 4.9 
Belarus 0.1 0.2 0.1 7.0 21.6 13.4 n/a 
Georgia 1.0 0.7 0.5 28.6 8.7 31.1 5.2 
Kazakhstan 0.5 1.0 0.4 15.7 31.6 14.7 4.7 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 0.9 2.1 2.3 39.1 54.6 34.9 
 
2.9 
Moldova 0.3 1.3 0.2 7.5 10.5 19.7 4.4 
Russia* 0.3 0.9 0.2 8.9 120.4 23.1 4.8 
Tajikistan 6.1 3.9 4.4 33.3 19.2 26.8 2.6 
Uzbekistan 5.7 1.8 2.2 5.1 6.2 11.8 n/a 
Note: *survey results for Russia is available only for 2012 
Source: The World Bank (2013) 
 
       The results of international assessments of the energy sector can be explained by the lack 
of technical support of the generation assets since the country’s independence. The latest 
reports of the World Bank estimated that an investment of 865 million US dollars is needed to 
rehabilitate the assets and increase the capacity and reduce the losses of the energy sector in 
the KR. The energy sector’s financial performance remains poor including its accumulated 
debts over the last periods. There is a high risk of collapse of the existing outdated equipment, 
and if this takes place there could be strong negative consequences for the country. In order to 
prevent the collapse and to increase the efficiency of the sector, a considerable amount of 
physical and financial capital is urgently needed. Therefore, based on the discussion above, 
which presents the unreliability of the sector and its importance for the businesses of the KR, 
we consider that it is a binding constraint of growth in the KR. 
Human capital  
        The availability of qualified human resources is one of the key components of any 
growing economy. In the case of the KR, the lack of skilled human capital could be a possible 
constraint of growth. According to the estimations of ADB (2014), the country’s labor 
productivity is one of the lowest in comparison with the CIS countries. The low labor 
productivity of the country is determined by numerous factors. Firstly, the majority of labor 
force is concentrated in low-productivity sectors. This is a general pattern in the CIS 
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countries, where agriculture and services are considered to have lower labor productivity than 
manufacturing28.  Secondly, it is caused by the lack of skilled labor force, despite the fact that 
more than 70 percent of the working-age population has a secondary education, and only 19 
percent has a tertiary education. (see fig.11). 
 
Figure 11. Tertiary education levels vs GDP per capita in the KR and comparator countries 
Note: data on the share of population with tertiary education for Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan is not 
available. 
Source: ILO (2016); World Bank I ndicators (2016a)   
        
       Although the share of labor force with tertiary education is the lowest among the 
comparator countries, it is significantly lower than that in Russia (60.1 percent), Kazakhstan 
(70.2 percent) and Belarus (50 percent). The shortage of qualified workers is consistent with 
the trends in the employment and wages. The employment levels for the people with complete 
secondary education is low (4.5 percent), with tertiary education (5.2 percent), and the overall 
level is 8.6 percent. Furthermore, the KR’s average monthly wage of labor force with a 
tertiary education is 2.4 times higher than that with only a primary education, and 2.1 times 
higher than those with only a secondary education29. The gaps between salaries due to the 
level of education are significantly higher than in Armenia and Russia. These results are also 
in line with the World Bank’s (2013) survey results, indicating 'inadequately educated 
workforce' as one of the binding constraints for local firms. 33.5 percent of firms identified 
the lack of qualified workers as a major constraint, and this percentage is the highest 
compared with the comparator group of countries (see Figure 12). 
																																																								28	 For more details see Mitra. (2008) 29	ADB (2014) provides the estimation results for the KR. The estimated the Mincerian earning equation which 
provides an explanation for the differences in earning levels by the number of years of schooling, work 
experience.  
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Figure 12 'Inadequately educated workforce' as a constraint on firm growth in the KR and comparator countries 
(percentage of firms). 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
 
        As it can be observed from table 6, in comparison with the comparator group of 
countries, enrolment in primary school is at the average level, while enrolment in secondary 
level is slightly lower. Enrolment in tertiary education level is not the worst in the region, but 
it is still lower than the enrolment rates in Russia and Armenia. This implies that the KR has a 
sufficient number of labor force, and it is higher than Azerbaijan, Georgia and Tajikistan, but 
significantly smaller than Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. Thus, the enrolment rate is not 
binding for the country, as it has a sufficient number of skilled workers. The problem is 
related to its quality and the qualification of workers. 
Table 6. Quantitative and qualitative assessment of the education system in the Kyrgyz Republic and CIS 
countries 
 
Country  
Quality Enrolment rate, gross % 
Primary 
education 
The 
educational 
system 
Maths and 
science 
education 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Armenia 3.7 3.5 4.2 84.1 95.9 46 
Azerbaijan 3.1 3.1 3.3 89.1 100.3 20.4 
Georgia 3.5 3.2 3.4 98.3 86.8 27.9 
Kazakhstan 4.1 3.6 4.1 85.6 97.7 44.5 
The Kyrgyz 
Republic 3 2.9 3 90.5 88.2 41.3 
Moldova 3.8 3.2 4 87.9 88.2 40.1 
Russia 4.2 3.5 4.3 96.2 95.3 76.1 
Tajikistan 3.7 3.8 3.8 98.4 87 20.5 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report (2016)   
 
       In accordance with the reports of the Global Competitive Forum (2016), the quality of the 
educational system of the KR is weak, with the country’s ranking 123rd out of 144 countries. 
Furthermore, the country’s educational system is low when compared internationally. The 
country has the lowest score (2.9 out of 7) among the comparator countries; this score is 
significantly lower than the scores of the CIS countries, e.g. Kazakhstan 3.6; Russia 3.5 and 
6.4	 0.5	 9.9	 13.1	
33.5	 31.2	 25.4	 15.3	
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Armenia 3.5 (see table 6). Furthermore, the other comparator countries demonstrate better 
quality of primary education, math and science education and the overall educational system. 
The interpretation is that the country has a sufficient number of qualified workers, but they 
are not satisfied with the quality of their education level. This could explain the higher level 
of  investment in staff and training in the country. The KR’s score on the local availability of 
specialized research and extent training services is at the average level compared to 
comparator countries and the country is ranked 110 out of 144 countries (see figure 13). 
 
Figure 13. Research and training services in the KR and comparator countries 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report  (2014) 
 
         The third (possible) explanation for low labor productivity could be the preferences in 
study programs of the youth in the KR.  As the youth in the country prefer to study 
economics, law, commerce and business, there is a significant lack of students who are 
willing to study technical professions, mechanics, engineering etc. Therefore, there is a big 
mismatch between the available labor force and the required labor force with particular 
qualifications.  
         Summing up, the KR’s labor productivity has been the lowest comparing to its regional 
peers, a low labor productivity is caused by a variety of factors: low productivity of the 
sectors, where the majority of the labor force is engaged (agriculture and services); low 
quality of overall education system; a large mismatch between the labor supply and demand; 
However, bearing in mind that the country shows the enrolment rates above the comparator 
countries, the highest level of investment in training, and a relatively good score in the 
availability of  research and trainings we conclude that the lack of human capital is not a 
3.3 
3.9 3.4 
4.2 
3.5 3.3 
4.3 3.9 
0. 
1.1 
2.2 
3.3 
4.4 
5.5 
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan 
Local availability of specialized research and training services 
3.4 3.7 3.5 
4.1 
3.5 3.4 3.8 3.7 
0. 
1. 
2.1 
3.1 
4.1 
5.1 
Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova Russia Tajikistan 
Extent of staff training, 1-7 (best) 
																																																																																					
	
61	
binding constraint at the current time. Yet, if the required measures to increase the quality of 
education will not be taken, it can become a critical constraint in the future. 
Is government failure a binding constraint to growth in the KR? 
Macro risks	
         Macro risks matter when the government’s ineffective macro policy leads to enhanced 
probability that the country will face macro instability and macro crisis in the long term. If 
potential future macro risks are considerable, this may depress private investment, as 
investors are unwilling to invest in the economy. In this regard, Hausmann et al (2005) argue 
that macroeconomic instability is caused by high fiscal deficit, high volatility of inflation and 
exchange rates. Following their arguments, we review the fiscal account and monetary 
stability in the KR and make a comparison with its regional peers. 
       In the fiscal front, fig.14 shows the difference between the government 
revenue/expenditure of the country and the fiscal balances in the comparator countries.  The 
government’s revenue has been between 14-17 percent as a share of GDP over the analyzing 
period (except 9 percent in 2010 caused by political instability). Since 2010 the government 
revenue has increased due to the improved tax administration in the country and the 
expansion of international trade. At the same time, after the overthrown of the previous 
government in 2010, the country performed fiscal adjustments through across-the-board 
expenditure cuts. The government reduced spending on strategic priorities such as irrigation 
networks, energy and transport infrastructures, education, and health services (ADB, 2014). 
These adjustments lead to the small improvements in fiscal deficit over the last years (see fig. 
14). Nevertheless, the KR’s fiscal deficit level over the analyzing period has been higher than 
those in the majority of comparator countries, except Georgia and Armenia during 2005-
2010. Yet, the country has a sustainable tendency to decrease its deficit, and much of it is 
associated with the decreased expenditure rather than the increased revenue. Regardless of the 
higher level of fiscal deficit comparing regionally, given the criteria of stability, the KR’s 
fiscal balance does not appear volatile over the period, its volatility is at the average of its 
regional peers30. 
																																																								
30 We calculated relative volatility (measrued by the coefficient of variance) of fiscal balance of the countries 
presented in fig. 14, the results are following: Armenia 0.38; Azerbaijan 2.35; Georgia 0.16; Kazakhstan 0.81; 
the KR 0.45; and Uzbekistan 0.39; 
		
	
62	
	
Figure 14 Fiscal balance of the KR and comparator countries 
Note: data on fiscal balance with respect to the CIS countries is available only to the countries presented in the 
figure 
Source: IMF (2016) 
 
        In the monetary and exchange rate side, fig.15 shows that the inflation rate in the country 
during the analyzing period has been at the average level of the comparator countries (9.01 
percent in the KR and 9.19 percent the CIS countries). Bursts of inflation in 2008 and 2011 
were attributed to the adverse effect of the world’s financial crisis of 2008 and the presence of 
high political instability, as we mentioned several times before. Furthermore, the domestic 
price level is highly responsive to external shocks and monetary trends in Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Fig. 15 shows that the inflation rates path of the KR replicates inflation trends of 
Russia and Kazakhstan31. Lastly, our assessment is consistent with the analysis of ADB 
(2014) which reports that monetary trends in the KR remain relatively stable comparing to the 
CIS countries and close to the level of its regional peers. 
 
Figure 15. Inflation rates  % change to the previous year in the KR and comparator countries (LCU per US$, 
monthly 2005-2015) 
Source: World Bank (2016a) 
																																																								
31 Firstly, both countries are main trade partners and share of trade consists about 47 percent of total trade 
operations. Secondly, due to remittances inflows, the NBKR (2016) reported that by the end of 2015, 95.8 
percent of all migrants work in Russia and Kazakhstan; and personal remittance inflows to the KR reached 25.7 
percent of GDP in 2015 (nominal values 1,987,703.92 USD (World Bank, 2016a). 
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       Regarding the exchange rate volatility comparing with the comparator countries, it does 
not appear to be excessive in the KR (see fig.16, and for the exchange rate volatility in the 
CIS countries see annex 2). The main contribution to the exchange rate increase in 2009 was 
driven by the consequences of the world’s financial crisis and 2015 was determined by the 
appreciation of the US dollar against the world currencies, and extreme devaluation of the 
ruble (Russian currency) and the tenge (Kazakhstan’s currency). Therefore, in terms of 
stability criteria, the monetary and exchange rates are not considered to be a binding to 
growth in the KR.  
 
 
Figure 16. Exchange rate, as % of the corresponding period of the previous year in the KR (LCU per US$, 
monthly 2005-2015) 
Exchange rate volatility in the KR (2005-2015) 
Source: CIS statistics (2016) 
 
      Summing up, following the criteria of stability in fiscal and monetary areas, based on the 
brief discussion above, we consider that macroeconomic instability does not appear to be the 
most binding constraints of growth in the KR. Nevertheless, the in the fiscal area, the 
allocation of government spending and its quality is not satisfactory. By saying this we are 
referring to the fact that the government considerably declined the spending in strategically 
priority sectors: energy sector and education system. Therefore, we suggest that more fiscal 
adjustments are needed to increase the allocative quality and efficiency of the government 
expenditure. In the monetary area, despite a relative stability of prices and exchange rate, it is 
important to highlight a high sensitivity of domestic prices to external shocks signals about 
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the fragility of monetary sector, the government should focus its policy in enhancing the 
resilience of its financial sector to external shocks.  
Micro risks 
        Microeconomic risks may occur due to high taxation rates, ineffective tax management, 
difficulties in obtaining licenses and permissions, high corruption or weak protected property 
rights. In the case of the KR, some of these micro-risks are potential binding constraints of 
growth. The first risk attributed to the taxes can be excluded from the list of potential 
constraints; we argue that the tax rates are not likely to be a binding constraint to growth for 
the KR. As it is seen in table 7, tax rates in the country are low comparing to its regional 
peers. Tariff rates (percentage) are considerably lower than the average of the CIS countries. 
Income tax rates are the lowest in the region, the same as in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, 
while the highest rate is 26 percent in Armenia. Corporate tax rate is the third lowest 
compared to other comparator countries. 
Table 7. Tax rates in the Kyrgyz Republic and CIS countries, 2015 
Counries Profit tax (%) 
Labour tax and 
other 
contributions (%) 
Other 
taxes (%) 
Total taxes 
(%) 
Tariff rate 
(%) 
Income tax 
rate (%) 
Corporate 
tax rate 
(%) 
Armenia 19.5 0 0.8 20.4 2.3 26 20 
Azerbaijan 12.9 24.8 2.1 39.8 4.5 25 20 
Belarus 11.9 39 1 52 2 12 18 
Georgia 14.3 0 2.1 16.4 0.7 20 15 
Kazakhstan 15.9 11.2 1.5 28.6 3 10 20 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 6.4 19.5 3.1 29 2.4 10 10 
Moldova 9.3 30.2 0.2 39.7 2.6 18 12 
Russia 8.4 35.4 5.1 48.9 5 13 20 
Tajikistan 17.7 28.5 34.8 80.9 5.2 13 15 
Uzbekistan 12.1 28.2 1.9 42.2 5.1 22 9 
Source: The World Bank  (2013) 
        In a comparison with the comparator countries, the KR demonstrates the lowest profit 
tax rates in 2015; with respect to labor tax rate it is the second lowest (19.5 percent), followed 
by Kazakhstan (11.2 percent). The overall tax rate, as indicated above, is the fourth lowest out 
of the given CIS economies; the rate is considerably lower than the average tax rate (39.8 
percent) of the comparator group of countries. Furthermore, the share of firms identified high 
tax rates as a major constraint to growth is 28.9 percent, while in Armenia (36.9 percent), 
Russia (59.1 percent) and Tajikistan (31 percent), this number is considerably higher. Thus, it 
is considered that taxes are not likely to be a restricting factor to growth in the KR. 
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       Furthermore, the several aspects of the regulatory apparatus, namely tax administration, 
customs and trade regulations, business licensing and permits are not identified as a major 
constraint of growth. According to the World Bank’s survey (2013), 0.5 percent of firms 
identified tax administration, 1.6 percent identified customs and trade regulations, and 1 
percent identified business licensing as major constraints to growth (see fig. 17). 
 
Figure 17. Binding micro-risks constraints to growth in the KR 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
 
         Referring to the most problematic factors for firms’ growth in the KR, 36.1 percent of 
firms identified political instability, 20 percent identified practices of the informal sector, and 
12 percent identified corruption as a major obstacle to growth. These three constraints 
together present the institutional framework and functioning of the law system in the KR and 
in total 68.1 percent of firms. We review each constraint in our further discussion.  
       In regard to political instability, there are two aspects. Firstly, frequent changes in law 
and bylaw. The law system is experiencing considerable changes every time with the change 
in the government, this was the case after political overthrows in 2005 and 2010, when the 
KR’s government made changes in the constitution. Furthermore, the KR frequently amends 
the important economic laws (for instance the frequent changes in the Law for Value added 
taxes, Profit taxes), which demonstrates the unpredictability and uncertainty in the law. 
Secondly, the political revolutions of the 2000s32 mentioned above, resulted in destroying and 
closing of companies operating in the country, and a majority of enterprises were not able to 
recover and had to close.   These results could be also confirmed by the assessment of the 
World Bank, the political stability and absence of violence index ranked the KR as the lowest 																																																								
32The main causes of both revolutions were a strong dissatisfaction of people with the government regimes of 
Presidents as Akaev and  Bakiev. Many observers believed that the government crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic in 
2005 was caused by the following factors: the difficult economic situation of the population, and conflicts 
between the 'wealthier north' and the 'poor south' exacerbated the dominance of 'northerners' in power and 
control. The causes of the second revolution were the very low standard of living, the ongoing struggle for 
power between the Kyrgyz clans of the north and south of the country, and the increase in the prices of some 
goods and services, such as electricity, gas and mobile services. 
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during the period of 2005-2015 (18.7), and it remains the lowest comparing to its regional 
peers having the value 18.6 in 2015 (see fig. 18) 
 
Figure 18 Political Stability, No violence indicator in the KR and comparator countries (percentage ranges from 
0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) rank) 
Source: World Bank (2016b) 
 
         In terms of the second major constraint for firms – widespread practices of the informal 
sector (20 percent of firms). Different sources of estimates provide different values, for 
instance, the official statistics of the KR estimates the size of the informal sector, excluding 
agriculture at 19.9 percent of the GDP in 2012.  However, ADB (2014) assessed the KR’s 
informal sector at 50-80 percent of the GDP, another estimates indicate that the informal 
economy accounts for more than 50 percent of the country’s GDP 33. Such a high share of the 
informal economy in the country’s GDP is determined by the difficulties in registering and 
measuring economic activity and tax evasion. Furthermore, according to ADB (2014) 
informal activities are common in cross-border trade, as it is evidenced by the large mismatch 
between the official statistics of the KR and the ‘mirror statistics’ reported by China34. 
Furthermore, the informal businesses have the lowest productivity rates; as these small-size 
firms prefer to stay ‘invisible’ to avoid the attention of the government bodies and therefore 
limiting their abilities to implement new technologies and new business practices; the labor 
force engaged in the informal sector is paid considerably less, and they work in poor working 
conditions. 
																																																								
33 Due to the lack of recent data on the size of informal sector in the KR, we analyze it based on the recent 
available data and qualitative assessment of the ADB (2014) and Central for International private Enterprises 
(2011)  
34  As it was mentioned before, import and reexport operations are the most increasing sector of services in the 
KR. Trade liberilaztion make the country a major ‘corridor’ of trade between China and other Central Asian 
countries.		
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       In regard to the third obstacle, a large body of international assessments supports a point 
of view that, the KR’s economy is hampered by widespread corruption. According to 
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (2013), 61.2 percent of 
respondents identified corruption as a major constraint for business, which is the highest 
percentage compared to its regional peers (Georgia - 2.9 percent, Kazakhstan - 19.6 percent, 
Russia - 33.1percent). Furthermore, 51.3 percent of firms identified that they expect to give 
gifts to public officials 'to get things done', while the average of the CIS countries is 13.8 
percent. According to the same survey, 59.6 percent of the firms identified that bribes are 
required to obtain operating licences from the government, while the average of the CIS 
countries is 15.7 percent (see table below).  
Table 8. Corruption as a constraint on firm growth (percentage of firms) 
Country Bribery 
incidence (% 
of firms 
experiencing 
at least one 
bribe payment 
request) 
Bribery depth 
(% of public 
transactions 
where a gift 
or informal 
payment was 
requested) 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts in 
meetings 
with tax 
officials 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to 
secure 
government 
contract 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to 
get an 
operating 
licence 
% of firms 
expected to 
give gifts to 
public 
officials 'to 
get things 
done' 
% of firms 
identifying 
corruption 
as a major 
constraint 
Armenia 7.1 6.1 4.6 2.7 10.6 4.6 13.5 
Azerbaijan  15.3 13.2 11.8 49.9 38.8 6.8 4.7 
Belarus 8.9 4.4 3.4 17 1.4 13.2 10.2 
Georgia 2.2 1.3 0.2 1.1 0 1.9 2.9 
Kazakhstan  26.7 22 22.3 19.1 15.8 20.4 19.6 
Kyrgyz 
Republic  
59.8 53.6 54.8 55.1 59.6 51.3 60.2 
Moldova 30.9 22.2 13.5 10.8 22.1 16.4 37.8 
Russia  14.2 9.7 7.3 30.9 12.6 20.5 33.1 
Tajikistan 36.3 29.6 31.9 33.6 28.7 37.2 23.7 
Uzbekistan 7 4.5 2.4 8 11.3 3.5 6.1 
Source: The World Bank (2013) 
 
      Similarly, the Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (2016) ranked 
the KR 136th out of the 176 countries and territories assessed. Corruption in the country is 
widespread and the KR’s score on corruption index is the fourth highest in the region and 
slightly lower comparing to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (see figure 19).  
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Figure 19. Corruption Perception Index in the KR and comparator countries, 2015 (1–100 (less corrupted)). 
Source: Transparency International (2016) 
 
         Likewise the previous assessments of corruption in the country, the World Bank 
(2016b) scored the KR at 11.5 for control of corruption in 2015, which is still one of the 
lowest scores among the CIS countries (see fig. 20). Comparing the current score to its level 
in 2005 (10.8), the country has not made any meaningful progress against corruption.  
 
Figure 20. Control of corruption in the KR and comparator countries 
Source: World Bank (2016b) 
 
         Furthermore, the Transparency International (2014) reported that the judiciary system 
and law institutions are highly corrupt and not independent. It assesses the judiciary system as 
the weakest and the most corrupt state institution of the country. According to the Economic 
Freedom Network, the country has the second lowest judicial independence in a comparison 
with other comparator countries in the region. ADB (2014) reports that the efficiency of the 
judicial system has worsened the public trust in it and more than 30 percent of respondents 
identified that the judiciary system is a problem for their business and 35 percent indicated 
that they were ready to bribe the judge if it is necessary. The weak and corrupt judiciary 
system and the results of surveys indicate that firms in the country without political protection 
are forced to sell their business at a very low price to the politically connected.  
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Figure 21 Juridical independence, the KR and comparator countries 
Source: Transparency International (2015) 
 
        In addition to the corrupt judiciary institutions, poor protected property rights 
significantly hamper investment climate of the country, as local and international firms are 
not willing to invest in the conditions of insecure property rights. According to the latest data 
of the Global Competitiveness Report, the country’s property right protection is scored at 3.2, 
ranking 125th out of 144 economies, and the intellectual property protection for the same 
period of time is 2.6, ranking 130th out of 144 countries. Both indicators are the lowest 
compared to the comparator countries, with the exception of Moldova (table 9). 
Corresponding to the data of the World Bank, the KR scored as one of the lowest on CPIA 
property rights and the rule-based governance rating over the 10 years from 2005 until 2014, 
achieving 2.5 out of 6, while Armenia and Georgia scored 3.5 for the same period. The same 
results give the latest data of the Heritage Foundation, and the KR obtained 20 out of 100 
scores, and still has the lowest score. 
Table 9. Property rights  
Country Intellectual property rights Property rights  
 score rank score rank (1-100 (best)) 
Armenia 3.5 84 4.2 67 20 
Azerbaijan 3.5 80 3.8 91 20 
Georgia 3 106 3.9 85 40 
Kazakhstan 3.7 74 4.1 70 25 
Kyrgyz Republic 2.6. 130 3.2 125 30 
Moldova 2.8 118 3.2 126 40 
Russia 3 107 3.3 120 20 
Tajikistan 3.7 67 3.9 87 20 
Source: Global Competitiveness Reports (2016), The Heritage Foundation (2014) 
 
        Resuming, based on the international assessment of micro risks in the country, we 
consider that the KR shows relatively good results only in tax management and tax rates, and 
consequently they are not considered as binding constraints for the KR. However, the results 
represents that the most problematic factors are a widespread practice of the informal sector, 
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high corruption, poorly protected property rights, low judicial independence. Thus, based on 
the discussion above, we consider that the micro risks (except taxes) are likely to be the most 
binding constraints of growth in the KR. 
3.6. Conclusions 	
       The purpose of this paper has been to identify the binding constraints to economic growth 
in the KR by applying the growth diagnostic framework. The approach is contrary to the 
prevailing Washington Consensus approach that the KR implemented after its independence. 
In order to identify the country-specific constraints to growth, a comparison has been made 
with the other CIS countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, 
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the analysis focuses on the period of 
2005-2015.          
        In general, our assessment indicates that the functioning of the legal and regulatory 
institutions are the most binding constraints to growth. The failure of well functioning 
institutions affect every part, as any economy, without required protection and well 
functioning system cannot ignite growth The majority of firms point out that the widespread 
practices of the informal sector, the insufficient independence of court system, high 
corruption as well as  political uncertainty are the major constraints of growth. Therefore, 
from the general point of view, the institutional failure of the government is considered as a 
key constraint in the KR.  
Furthermore, a limited access to domestic financing is considered as a second binding 
constraint to growth. The costs of domestic funds are identified as very high due to the lack of 
domestic financing. In addition, the international surveys represent similar results, as more 
than a quarter of firms identified access to finance as the major constraint for their businesses. 
The results show that obtaining finance is complicated not only due to the high lending rates 
and scarcity of financial resources, but also due to the collateral needs and other regulations 
that make difficult for firms to get financing from the banks. 
Lastly, despite the fact that the KR is marked by the presence of rich water resources 
and high hydro potential, the energy sector faces a number of difficulties related to the low 
productivity, outdated equipment from the Soviet Union period, a shortage of qualified 
workers. These difficulties resulted in increased electricity losses with a strong negative 
impact on business. The estimates of international surveys show that an unreliable electricity 
supply is a strong obstacle for firms’ growth.  
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        Concluding, we argue that the implementation of only a legal framework by adopting 
new laws to change the existing ones is not a sufficient measure; the legal framework must be 
consistent with the actual situation and should be proceeded in line with an enhancement of 
independent courts and effective regulatory institutions. The independent and credible 
institutions will increase public trust in the government, may promote incentives for long-
term private investment, and also may create incentives for the informal firms to operate 
legally.   
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Annex 1 
Table 1. Correlation between GDP annual growth (%) and Total Investment Share in GDP (%) 
Countries  1991-2015 
Armenia 0.41* 
Azerbaijan 0.42* 
Belarus -0.52** 
Georgia 0.73** 
Kazakhstan 0.02 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.65* 
Moldova -0.05 
Russian Federation -0.52** 
Tajikistan -0.55* 
Uzbekistan 0.09 
Note: the coefficients of correlation for Moldova and Georgia are calculated since 1996 due to data availability. 
** and * denote to the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively 
Source: the World Bank (2016); the IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics  
 
 
Table 2.Correlation between real interest rates (%) and total investment share in GDP (%) 
Countries  2005-2015 
Armenia -0.34 
Azerbaijan -0.19 
Belarus -0.02 
Georgia -0.65* 
Kyrgyz Republic 0.46 
Moldova -0.10 
Russian Federation -0.64* 
Tajikistan -0.29 
Note: ** and * denote to the 1% and 5% level of significance, respectively 
Source: the World Bank (2016); the IMF Cross Country Macroeconomic Statistics  
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Annex 2 
Exchange rate volatility in the comparator countries 
Source: CIS statistics (2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
50 
100 
150 
-0.2 
-0.15 
-0.1 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
l-0
5 
Ja
n-
06
 
Ju
l-0
6 
Ja
n-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
Ju
l-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
Ju
l-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
l-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
Ju
l-1
1 
Ja
n-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
Ja
n-
13
 
Ju
l-1
3 
Ja
n-
14
 
Ju
l-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
l-1
5 
Armenia 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
00 
50 
100 
150 
-0.15 
-0.1 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
l-0
5 
Ja
n-
06
 
Ju
l-0
6 
Ja
n-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
Ja
n-
08
 
Ju
l-0
8 
Ja
n-
09
 
Ju
l-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
l-1
0 
Ja
n-
11
 
Ju
l-1
1 
Ja
n-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
Ja
n-
13
 
Ju
l-1
3 
Ja
n-
14
 
Ju
l-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
l-1
5 
Azerbaijan 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
00 
100 
200 
300 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
n-
05
 
N
ov
-0
5 
A
pr
-0
6 
Se
p-
06
 
Fe
b-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
D
ec
-0
7 
M
ay
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
M
ar
-0
9 
A
ug
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
1 
Se
p-
11
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
D
ec
-1
2 
M
ay
-1
3 
O
ct
-1
3 
M
ar
-1
4 
A
ug
-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
n-
15
 
N
ov
-1
5 
Belarus 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
		
	
76	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.00 
50.00 
100.00 
150.00 
-0.3 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
n-
05
 
N
ov
-0
5 
A
pr
-0
6 
Se
p-
06
 
Fe
b-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
D
ec
-0
7 
M
ay
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
M
ar
-0
9 
A
ug
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
1 
Se
p-
11
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
D
ec
-1
2 
M
ay
-1
3 
O
ct
-1
3 
M
ar
-1
4 
A
ug
-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
n-
15
 
N
ov
-1
5 
Kazakhstan 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
00 
50 
100 
150 
-0.15 
-0.1 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
n-
05
 
N
ov
-0
5 
A
pr
-0
6 
Se
p-
06
 
Fe
b-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
D
ec
-0
7 
M
ay
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
M
ar
-0
9 
A
ug
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
1 
Se
p-
11
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
D
ec
-1
2 
M
ay
-1
3 
O
ct
-1
3 
M
ar
-1
4 
A
ug
-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
n-
15
 
N
ov
-1
5 
Moldova 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
00 
50 
100 
150 
200 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0 
0.2 
0.4 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
n-
05
 
N
ov
-0
5 
A
pr
-0
6 
Se
p-
06
 
Fe
b-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
D
ec
-0
7 
M
ay
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
M
ar
-0
9 
A
ug
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
1 
Se
p-
11
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
D
ec
-1
2 
M
ay
-1
3 
O
ct
-1
3 
M
ar
-1
4 
A
ug
-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
n-
15
 
N
ov
-1
5 
Russia 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
00 
50 
100 
150 
-0.2 
-0.1 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
Ja
n-
05
 
Ju
n-
05
 
N
ov
-0
5 
A
pr
-0
6 
Se
p-
06
 
Fe
b-
07
 
Ju
l-0
7 
D
ec
-0
7 
M
ay
-0
8 
O
ct
-0
8 
M
ar
-0
9 
A
ug
-0
9 
Ja
n-
10
 
Ju
n-
10
 
N
ov
-1
0 
A
pr
-1
1 
Se
p-
11
 
Fe
b-
12
 
Ju
l-1
2 
D
ec
-1
2 
M
ay
-1
3 
O
ct
-1
3 
M
ar
-1
4 
A
ug
-1
4 
Ja
n-
15
 
Ju
n-
15
 
N
ov
-1
5 
Tajikistan 
% change  6-month moving average Exchange rate 
																																																																																					
	
77	
 					
CHAPTER III 
 
4. MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORK OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses monetary policy of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic since the 
country has become independent (1991-2015). After a review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on monetary policy in developing countries, we provide an overview of the launch 
and evolution of monetary policy frameworks of the KR. Aiming to evaluate the behavior of 
monetary policy of the NBKR; we apply the Taylor rule for the period of 2005-2015. The 
results provide evidence of strict monetary policy stance with respect to inflation and 
exchange rate, but it counter-cyclically reacts to output growth. 
 
Keywords: monetary policy, Taylor rule, interest rate, exchange rate, and economic growth. 
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4.1. Introduction 
       Monetary policy is one of the main macro policy tools and its effective implementation 
might be a key ‘driver’ for a sustainable economic growth. Indeed, monetary policy has been 
the principal macro instrument used to manage the economy during the last decades in almost 
all developed countries and in most of the developing ones. 
       Rule-based monetary policies have become popular after the publication of the seminal 
paper by Taylor (1993), which explained the interest rate setting behavior of the Federal 
Reserves. Considerable number of research estimated Taylor-type rules to explain policy rate 
setting behavior of many developed countries. However, very little work has been done on 
developing economies, and this might be due to the hurdles their CBs face by operating in 
conditions of less developed financial markets and high vulnerability of the economy to 
external shocks. This makes it difficult for them to follow any rule-based policy. Nonetheless, 
it is reasonable to expect developing countries to have defined policy preferences, and 
therefore to follow some policy rules.  
      In this regard, the general objective of this study is to contribute to the understanding of 
monetary policy behavior in the Kyrgyz Republic (KR) by estimating Taylor-type rules. 
Nonetheless, before proceeding to the empirical estimation, it is worthy to provide and 
overview of the KR’s monetary policy since the establishment of the National Bank of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (NBKR). Therefore, we determine two specific objectives: the first 
objective is to review the launch and the evolution of monetary policy starting from the 
establishment of the NBKR (1991-2015). The second objective is to identify if the NBKR 
follows any rule-based monetary policy and if yes, which variables are the main concern of its 
policy  (2005-2015).   
       The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the section two reviews the literature on 
monetary policy in developing countries and reviews the studies assessing monetary policy in 
the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries and in the KR, in particular. 
Section three gives a brief overview of the launch of monetary policy during the transition 
period (1991-2005). The fourth section discusses the evolution of the NBKR’s monetary 
policy framework after the transition with more emphasis on the current choice of its policy 
framework (2005-2015). The fifth section presents the estimation methodology and the 
interpretation of the results. Lastly, the sixth section provides conclusions.  
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4.2. Review of the literature on monetary policy in developing countries 
      The literature on monetary policy indicates that the principles of central banking in 
developing and developed countries are not completely different (Goodhart et al., 1998). 
Nevertheless, there is no a general monetary policy framework, which is appropriate for all 
countries. One size does not fit all. The choice of monetary policy framework depends on the 
goals it aims to achieve, on the difficulties that the economy faces, and on the structure of 
financial market in which it operates. It is more likely that the choice of monetary policy 
framework in developing countries is more complex due to specific challenges these 
economies face and the problems related to their relatively weak financial market (Fischer, 
2015). Of course, developed countries are not “immune” to the problems related to financial 
markets, but there is a key difference in the degree of these problems in developing 
economies35. Thereby, we will review the literature and try to outline what makes monetary 
policy framework in developing countries different from that in developed ones.  
           There is a general consensus in the literature and in practice that price stability is the 
primary objective of monetary policy in developed economies. Central bank seeks to maintain 
price stability in the interest of sustainable economic growth, as high and unstable inflation 
rates negatively affect savings and investment, becoming a constraint to economic growth.  
An efficient monetary policy mitigates economic disturbances and ensures favorable 
conditions for economic growth and employment over the long term (Choi at al, 1996, 
Bernanke et al., 1999). Price stability is considered as important in developing countries too, 
but some CBs may pursue other additional objectives, including promotion of output growth, 
employment growth or reduce poverty. For instance, Bhattacharyya (2012) distinguishes 
monetary policies in developing economies in two main categories: (a) price-stability focused 
monetary policy or (b) dual-mandate monetary policy. A price stability-focused policy has a 
commitment to keep inflation low and to ensure that neither external nor domestics shocks 
lead to bursts of inflation. This policy implies that other goals such as an enhancement of 
financial market and output growth are shifted to the government. During the last two 
decades, many CBs have switched toward removing other goals and making price stability a 
primary objective of monetary policy. This can be observed by evidence that an increasing 
number of developing economies have shifted to inflation targeting framework (this 
framework will be discussed later). Referring to a dual mandate monetary policy, which 
pursues price stability and other development goals (promotion goals), such as economic 																																																								
35 Mishkin (2005), Mishkin (2002), Dutt and Ross (2008) and Bhattacharyya (2012) 
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growth, higher employment or lower poverty. Bhattacharyya (2012) considers that in 
developing countries, with widespread poverty and high unemployment, monetary policy 
should be also addressed to solve these problems.  Theoretically, CBs that perform a dual 
mandate monetary policy do not prioritize their objectives, but in practice, price stability is 
considered as a priority objective of any central bank. Similarly, Epstein (2005) considers that 
developing countries address their policies (in addition to price stability) to reduce poverty, or 
promote output or employment growth. He states that the choice of specific goals of monetary 
policy should be consistent with the economic situation in a country. A dual-mandate 
monetary policy requires a close and coordinated relationship of CB with other government 
authorities as monetary policy affects the economy at the aggregate level, while obtaining 
output growth and higher employment needs policies that addressed to specific sectors and 
regions. For instance, in order to direct credits to particular sectors or regions, CBs can use 
lending quotas on commercial banks, maintain interest rate control or create schemes to 
promote lending to particular sector. Bhattacharyya (2012) notes that number of CBs in 
developed countries successfully used credit allocation during their development phase36, but 
many developing countries have not succeeded in attempts to perform promotional policies37. 
Instead of acting as a promoter of financial development and economic growth, CBs of 
developing countries (most of them) became instruments of financial repression by 
constraining competition in the financial sector and hampering the flows of savings away 
from where they would bring the highest outcomes Similarly, ADB (2000) states that (in 
practice) interest rate control and credit allocation are inadequate to achieve development 
goals in developing countries.    
           As it is generally known, monetary policy transmits to economy through different 
transmission channels, usually classified as the interest rate channel, the exchange rate 
channel, the credit channel and the assets price channel38. The literature does not emphasize 																																																								
36 CBs in Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United States, and West Germany (Bhattacharyya, 2012); 
37 CB in East Asia and the Western Hemisphere (Bhattacharyya, 2012); 
38 The most conventional channel is the interest rate channel. Through regulating nominal interest rates, CBs can 
affect costs of borrowing and lending, which in turn influence the level of consumption, and hence leads to 
changes in investment and thereby real GDP (Taylor, 1995). The exchange rate channel influences prices 
through prices of imported goods and net exports. The effect of the channel depends on the volume of import, 
magnitude of currency depreciation and as well as  structure of an economy.  The credit channel affects the real 
economy through regulating volumes of credit provided by commercial banks. This channel arises when 
economic activity is not heavily dependent on the variations of price for credit (interest rates), but it is 
responsive to changes in availability of credit. This channel influences the aggregate demand through direct 
regulations of credit availability.  The use of the assets price channel allows CBs influence prices of bonds, 
shares and other assets. Higher assets prices influence investment and consumption and thus increase aggregate 
demand (Loayza and Shmidt-Hebbel, 2002).  However, an interesting classification of  transmission channels is 
mentioned by Boivin et al. (2010), who classified monetary transmission channels into two main types (both for 
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specific transmission channels in developing economies different from those in developed 
ones. However, there are some difficulties related to the proper functioning of transmission 
mechanism in those economies. Monetary policy in these economies are frequently hampered 
by weak transmission mechanism caused by underdeveloped financial market (Bhattacharya 
et al., 2010; Moreno, 2008). The interest rate channel is less effective in conditions of less 
developed financial markets, as a transmission of changes in the short-term policy rate to real 
economic variables tends to be weak (Hammond et al., 2009). Similarly, the assets price 
channel is not effective in generating wealth effects in developing countries with small and 
underdeveloped securities market. The credit channel might be relatively more important in 
developing economies, where commercial banks play an important role in financial 
intermediation and there is a small number of alternative sources of finance (Crocket, 2000). 
But in contrast, the exchange rate channel plays an important role in provision of price 
stability in developing economies (Adolfson, 2001).  Crocket (2000) considers that the 
exchange rate channel is the most effective channel, which affects both import and export 
prices. In addition, for countries with historically high inflation, the exchange rate fluctuations 
have a significant effect on inflation expectations, and the exchange rate channel influences 
inflation via inflation expectations. Hammond et al. (2009) emphasizes that the formulation of 
monetary policy has become even more complex in developing economies, due to the 
increase in worldwide energy and food prices, creating a dilemma for their CB to manage 
inflationary expectations and respond to commodity price shocks39. Likewise, Fischer (2015) 
considers that the exchange rate stability is a key consideration of developing countries, 
particularly in conditions of increasing openness of the capital account and integration into 
the world economy. In a long run, this will help them to attract considerable external finance 
for private and public sectors, but greater integration and external financial inflows might lead 																																																																																																																																																																													
developed and developing economies): (a) neoclassical channels in which financial markets are perfect and (b) 
non-neoclassical channels which implies financial market imperfections; the first type is distinguished by 
affecting directly to investment, consumption or international trade. Investment channels are direct interest rate 
channels regulating through the costs of capital; Consumption channels operate by wealth effect and substitution 
effects; lastly, international trade channel functions through the exchange rate. The authors consider that non-
neoclassical channels arise due to market imperfections, for instance, they arise due to government interventions 
or imperfections in private markets; Non-neoclassical channels categorized into tree basic types: (i) credit supply 
channel which arise from government interference in credit markets, it is aimed to obtain particular monetary 
policy goal such as allocating certain types of investment (ii) the bank-based channels regulating through lending 
and bank capital, decrease in banks’ capacity of lending effect spending, (iii) balance-sheet channel influencing 
firms and households. 
39 In particular when the theoretical models suggest CBs to target only core component of inflation and let food 
and energy prices adopt to market conditions. For CBs in those economies it is difficult to leave prices to market 
conditions, as the large share of total consumption expenditure takes expenditures on food (Hammond et al., 
2009).  
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to more complicated monetary policy in the economies with large external shocks and high 
exchange rate volatility. Thereby many central banks in developing economies remain to 
manage their exchange rate to varying degree. 
         The main conclusion from the aforementioned discussion is that the choice of monetary 
policy framework in developing economies is affected by: the objectives they pursue; the 
level of financial market development, where they operate; the effect of the exchange rate on 
domestic economy. As we mentioned at the beginning, one size does not fit all. Nevertheless, 
based on the past experience of both developed and developing economies, the mainstream 
literature provides a set of monetary policy frameworks: exchange rate targeting, monetary 
aggregates targeting and inflation targeting.  
        It has been discussed before that the exchange rate has a crucial importance in 
developing economies. The exchange rate could be a good nominal anchor for some 
developing countries, which economies are characterized by low financial development, weak 
institutions or lack of CB’s credibility (Husain et al. 2005). In most developing countries, a 
large share of domestic output is affected by international prices, and inflationary 
expectations are determined by exchange rate. In such conditions, many developing countries 
are likely to manage the exchange rate by performing the exchange rate targeting framework, 
which allows leveraging the exchange rate to varying degree. However, a strict version of 
exchange targeting “hard peg” ,eventually results in the loss of monetary independence and 
the transmission of monetary policy of the CB to which it is pegged. Fischer (2015) considers 
that nowadays the exchange rate peg has become an “impossible triad” (or “impossible duo”), 
a pegged exchange rate together with open capital account. This combination makes it 
complicated for monetary policy to be implemented independently to achieve price stability. 
Nonetheless, flexible, but properly managed, exchange rate (for instance against a major 
foreign currency or a number of currencies), can help economies mitigate some external 
shocks such as an increase in the world commodity prices to which developing economies are 
still exposed (Fischer, 2015; Hammond et al. 2009, Gray 2006). Along with the development 
of international financial system, greater capital mobility and increasing integration of world 
economies, targeting of exchange rate became more complicated for CBs of developing 
countries.   
        Since the 1980s, along with the increase in the international capital flows and the 
difficulties to maintain the parity of changes, the exchange targeting became less effective in 
ensuring price stability.  Thereby many central banks moved toward targeting monetary 
aggregates. In this regard, Crocket (2000) considers that monetary targets might be a good 
																																																																																					
	
83	
proxy for the credit growth in developing countries. In particular, if the financial market is 
dominated by commercial banks and initial inflation was high, then it could be more 
preferable to target monetary aggregates. But since the end of 1980s most of developing 
economies had been implementing monetary policy to control inflation through targeting 
monetary aggregates. But this approach has become less effective along with development of 
financial markets as it is known from the experience of developed countries during the 
1980/90s. Money demand become quite volatile because of financial innovation made assets 
highly liquid and substitutive of narrow monetary aggregates. This made targeting monetary 
aggregates a complicated strategy for CBs. For this reason many countries with developed 
financial system moved toward an inflation-targeting framework.  
         Nowadays, inflation targeting has attracted increasing attention of both researchers and 
policymakers since 1990s, and the literature evidences that this framework seems to deliver 
better outcomes in terms of output growth, low inflation compared to other frameworks. 
Mishkin (2008) states that developing economies face strong challenges for inflation 
targeting. These obstacles occur due to high exchange rate volatility and weak financial 
markets.  The possibility that high exchange rate depreciation may result in a burst of 
inflation rates provides a reason for developing economies not to ignore exchange rates. In 
order to preclude extreme depreciation, which can destroy balance sheets and cause financial 
crisis, their CBs have to smooth exchange rate fluctuations. Yet, they need to avoid over 
smoothing, as this may result in counterproductive effect to their economies (Mishkin, 2008). 
In this regard, Hammond et al. (2009) also state that many developing countries have adopted 
“inflation targeting with managed float” to smooth high exchange rate volatility.  This option 
may involve significant interventions in the exchange market, as developing countries have a 
fear of letting their exchange rate to float freely. Most apparently, the interventions give them 
a certain degree of freedom to perform inflation targeting effectively. However, in practice, it 
becomes apparent necessity to switch from managed exchange rate to a floating exchange 
rate. An increasing openness of capital accounts makes more difficult for them to control 
exchange rate (in a long term) without exposing it to external shocks (Prasad, 2007). 
Therefore, an adoption of inflation targeting ensures an explicit anchor for monetary policy, 
while a floating exchange rate gives more independence for monetary policy and a certain 
degree of protection against external shocks (Hammond et al., 2009). Nevertheless, Mishkin 
(2005) emphasizes that the framework cannot be a “universal tool” for all developing 
countries, yet it may be appropriate and useful for some of them, which provide sufficient 
level of institutional development, increased transparency and accountability of their central 
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banks’. Despite the hurdles that developing countries face in implementing inflation targeting, 
there are many researches arguing that the framework is yet favorable for them. Inflation 
targeting enhances the credibility of CBs, the anchoring of inflation expectations and 
provision of low inflation even when energy prices and exchange rate shocks occur (Mishkin 
and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007). Furthermore, Batini and Laxton (2007) argue that inflation 
targeting provides better inflation performance even when financial reforms are not yet 
completed. It is mainly because inflation targeting commits the government to keep inflation 
low and to complete required reforms. The government’s commitment to achieve inflation 
targets makes more difficult for the government to explain loose and procyclical policy. Thus, 
it becomes explicit that the government must support and work on implementation of 
financial and fiscal reforms if it aims to sustain successful inflation targeting framework 
(Bernanke et al. 1999; Brash 2000; Batini and Laxton, 2007). Many developing economies 
have benefited abovementioned macroeconomic outcomes by adopting inflation targeting. 
However, the framework should not be seen as a “panacea” for all developing economies. 
These economies have succeed only because they have used it to support institutional reforms 
required to enable inflation targeting work and achieve its objective (Mishkin 2005; 2008). 
       Lastly, referring to the previous research papers, there are only few works investigating 
monetary policy framework in the Kyrgyz Republic and more papers examined monetary 
policy in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). The results of empirical studies 
show that inflation in the KR is very responsive to the exchange rate fluctuations and the 
exchange rate channel is the most important channel, while other channels are less effective. 
In general, monetary policy is hampered by underdeveloped financial market, large informal 
sector and high vulnerability to external shocks. Pypko (2009) investigated the relationship 
between economic growth and inflation (CPI) in the CIS countries for the period of 2001-
2008. Core findings of the study indicate that if inflation is higher than 8 percent, output 
growth decreases. Therefore, the author considers that inflation must be lower than 8 percent 
in the CIS countries in order to promote economic growth. Huseynov and Jamilov (2014) 
examined four transmission channels: the interest rate channel (refinancing rates), the 
exchange rate channel (real exchange rate and remittances), the bank lending channel (lending 
and deposit rates), and monetary channel (M2 and wages) in nine member-countries of the 
CIS for the period of 2000-2009 by employing VAR framework and Auto Regressive 
Distributed Lag Models (ARDL) for each CIS country. The research shows heterogeneous 
results, however general conclusion is that the exchange rate channel affects both output and 
inflation in all CIS countries. Broad money highly influences output, while refinancing rate 
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and remittances have significant effect on inflation.  Isakova (2008) assessed the efficiency of 
monetary policy in the KR, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan by applying VAR framework. The 
empirical findings state that domestic prices are highly responsive to the changes in exchange 
rates, money supply including foreign currency deposits, while the credit channel affects 
output growth. The interest rate channel has been identified as statistically insignificant. The 
study recommends deepening local financial market to achieve efficiency of monetary 
transmission and to improve the resilience to external shocks. Nurbek Jenish and 
Kyrgyzbaeva (2012) examined the possibility of adoption of inflation targeting framework in 
the KR by building a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model 
(DSGE). The study identified the lack of CB independence and low credibility of NBKR, 
inefficient transmission mechanism, the existence of large informal sector, underdeveloped 
financial market and high vulnerability of economy to external shocks as the key obstacles to 
targeting inflation. Atabaev and Ganiyev (2013) analyzed the impact of monetary 
transmission on real output and prices in the KR. The relationship between money supply, 
real output, inflation, interest rate and exchange rate were analyzed by using VAR model for 
the period of 2003-2011. The empirical results show that the credit channel affects the real 
output and the exchange rate affects inflation. The authors identified the exchange rate 
channel as the most effective channel in the KR.   
          Resuming, the fundamentals of monetary policy in developing countries are not 
different from those in advanced countries. Yet there are key challenges that developing 
economies face due the presence of weak financial market and external shocks. Both 
developed and developing countries have a priority objective to maintain price-stability. 
However, CBs of developing economies had been pursuing multiple objectives addressed to 
promote economic growth and employment (in addition to price stability). As it has been 
discussed above, the attempts of CBs to adopt a promotional policy didn’t bring expected 
results, and during the last two decades CBs in developing countries have switched toward 
having price stability as a primary objective by adopting inflation targeting framework. 
However, the inflation in developing countries is very responsive to fluctuations in exchange 
rate, and exchange rate is considered as a major determinant of inflation there. In particular, 
when developing countries are opening their capital accounts and integrating to the world 
economy, it becomes more difficult for them to keep inflation low. Nevertheless, an 
increasing number of developing countries have successfully adopted inflation targeting 
frameworks and this evidences that they are making success in evolving their monetary policy 
frameworks by adapting monetary policies to the hurdles they face. Nevertheless, developing 
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economies still have to make steps toward development of financial markets and overall 
effectiveness of monetary policy. For this purpose complex measures are required to make 
monetary policy achieve its objectives and this should be done with a broader context as to 
monetary policy.  
4.3. The launch of the banking system of the Kyrgyz Republic (1991-2005) 
      Before the independence, the KR was a part of the USSR and therefore a member of 
political, economic and monetary union of the USSR. After the collapse of the USSR, the KR 
started its transition towards the path of gradual liberalization and democratization to form a 
market economy. New realities of independence created a need for new institutions and 
monetary policy capable to provide price stability in particular. Hence, the modern banking 
system of the KR was formed during the economic transformations within the banking system 
reforms in the 1990s. The transition period was characterized by the symbiosis of the old 
(Soviet) and the new banking structures, and it was accomplished in the following three 
stages.  
          During the early transition period (1991-1995), the KR transformed the old system into 
the new two-tier banking system40, which included the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 
(NBKR) and commercial banks. Three largest former state banks such as the Industrial and 
Construction Bank (Kyrgyzprostroybank), “Kyrgyzstan”, the Agricultural and Industrial Bank 
(Agroprombank) were converted into joint-stock companies in 1992. It was also permitted to 
establish private commercial banks, owned by individuals or enterprises, in order to mobilize 
resources in addition to the newly established state banks. This resulted in the rapid growth in 
the number of commercial banks. By the end of 1994, 29 banks were operating in the country 
in the form of joint-stock companies41. At the same time, i.e. the immediate period after the 
establishment of the NBKR was marked by hyperinflation and the absence of own currency 
limited the capacity of the NBKR to manage hyperinflation42. Thus, since May of 1993, with 																																																								
40 Two-tiered banking system was established, with the NBKR as the regulatory authority (the law of the KR on 
the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic) and a network of commercial banks originating from the 
privatization of State banks. 
41 Newly formed commercial banks provided 85% of the value of credits and loans disseminated through their 
branches in all regions of the country. Besides these banks, 16 non-bank microcredit companies had been 
created. 
42 The rates of inflation reached extremely high levels; it was 200% in 1991, 900% in 1992, 929% in 1993 and 
62% in 1994. The core factors causing hyperinflation were repressed inflation that had been during the pre-
independence period, which became explicit through the shock of price liberalization in 1992 and attempts of the 
government to finance its budget deficit. The country’s debt and backward wage-indexation during the Soviet 
Union governance made additional contribution to increase inflation during this period. In order to pay its debt 
back, the national bank was obligated to issue more money, thus with the lapse of time resulted in depreciation 
of the national currency. In the beginning of 1990s the country had not implemented an effective system of 
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the introduction of national currency the Som43, the NBKR was given the right for emission 
of money and it started a restrictive monetary policy (Akmatalieva, 2007).  
         During the period from 1996 to 1999, the government was mainly focused on the 
accomplishment of macroeconomic stabilization reforms and establishing institutions of a 
market economy44. One of the main achievements of the reforms in the banking system was 
the adoption of the Law in July1997, ‘On the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic’. The 
adoption of the law put in place coordination between the NBKR and the Ministry of Finance 
in the field of financial policy, stipulated the rights of the NBKR to supervise and regulate the 
business of commercial banks. According to the paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Article 59: “The 
main objective of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic's monetary policy is to maintain 
price stability. The primary task of the NBKR is facilitating the achievement of the main 
objective by supporting the purchasing power of the national currency, ensuring 
effectiveness, safety and soundness of the banking and payment system of the republic to 
promote long-term economic growth of the country”. As it is defined in the law, the main 
objectives of the NBKR were the provision of price and exchange rate stability. In order to 
promote price stability and to cut continuing bursts of inflation, the NBKR tightened its 
monetary policy and took anti-inflationary measures. This led to a sharp decrease in inflation 
and strengthening of the som by the end of 1998. 
         Dabrowski (1994) mentioned that the KR showed significant results in transforming its 
economy (comparing to other Central Asian economies), including the achievements in 
liberalization and stabilization of its economy. However, successful implementation of 
structural reforms and the KR’s rapid progress in macroeconomic stabilization were 
accomplished mainly due to the significant borrowings and financial aid by donor countries 
and other international institutions. By the end of 1990s the amount of received loans, grants 
and financial aid reached 10 percent of the country’s GDP (Baum, 2007). Nonetheless, the 
economy had not been prepared for occurring external shocks such as the financial crisis in 																																																																																																																																																																													
managing wages and extremely rapid growth of wages resulted in individual’s income growth. Thus high budget 
deficit, government’s debt, higher wages, individual’s income growth and excess money supply led to increase 
in inflation (Huseynov and Jamilov, 2014). 
43 The word “Som” has a Turkish origin, and in all Turkish languages (even in tajik, which is the Persian 
language). In all Soviet Union banknotes the meaning of  “the ruble” appeared as “som”. The word “som” is 
translated as “pure”, which implies “the pure gold”. Thus, the national currency of Uzbekistan is “Soum” 
(introduced in July, 1994), Tajikistan’s currency is “the somoni” (introduced in May, 1995). Differently, the 
Turkmen “manat” is from the Russian word “moneta” meaning  “coin” (introduced in October, 1993). The 
Kazakh “tenge” is borrowed from Russian word “den’gi”, which implies “money” (introduced in November, 
1993). 
44 The country set up its main  state institutions such as the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of economy, Ministry of 
Finance, State Fiscal Authority, State Authority for regulation and supervision of financial market, State 
Authority to regulate financial crime, State Authority of financial intelligence service and etc. 
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Russia (1998-1999) and other Former Soviet Union economies. The immediate period before 
the Russian crisis, the KR was recovering its economy, achieved relative price and exchange 
rate stability. But the Russian crisis of 1998 became another challenge for the economy and 
the depreciation of the Russian ruble by almost 70 percent worsened the competitiveness of 
kyrgyz tradable sector, the balance of payments, putting more pressure on the som. 
         In July of 2000, the NBKR declared the adoption of a partial monetary targeting 
framework, which was coherent with the financial programming framework used by the IMF 
programs  (the evolution and changes in monetary policy framework of the NBKR will be 
discussed more in the next section). Further, following the recommendations of the IMF, the 
NBKR moved towards a much more conservative monetary policy aimed to cut inflation 
(Dabrowski, 2013). Due to the policy shift and the restrictive monetary policy inflation was 
significantly decreased from 18,7 percent in 2000 to 3,4 percent in 2005 and the exchange 
rate was stabilized comparing to the previous years (NBKR, 2005). Hence, the main 
achievements of the third period  (2000-2005) were the shift in the monetary policy 
framework and appropriate measures of the NBKR to stabilize prices and exchange rate 
volatility. 
       Resuming, achieving price stability has become a serious challenge for the KR during its 
15 years of transition. In the first half of the 1990s, the country faced hyperinflation, which 
came as a consequence of the so-called ‘perestroika’ (reconstructuring) following the collapse 
of the USSR. After the implementation of the som and stabilization programs during the 
1990s, the country recovered its economy after hyperinflation and extreme depreciation, 
however it did not succeed in preventing the consequences of the financial crisis of 1998. In 
general, during the 1990s, the institutional and operational framework of the banking system 
was successfully reconstructed; the legal and institutional bases were established in order to 
implement an independent monetary policy. This allowed the country for a return to 
macroeconomic stability with stronger fundamentals by the end of 2005, but nevertheless it 
was still premature to consider that the country achieved sustaining price stability and 
economic growth. 
4.4. The choice of the current monetary policy framework (2005-2015) 
        So far we provided a brief background on the launch of monetary policy of the KR, after 
the collapse of the USSR, over the first 15 years of transition. In this section we aim to review 
the choice of monetary policy framework of the NBKR during the period of 2005-2015. In 
this regard, we proceed as follows: firstly, we briefly discuss the evolution of monetary policy 
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framework of the NBKR in 2005-2015; secondly, we provide an overview of the current 
monetary policy framework of the NBKR with more focus on the objectives and operational 
framework. 
         Referring to the development of monetary policy framework of the country over the 
period of 2005-2015, we follow the assessment of monetary policy frameworks of the CIS 
countries by Dabrowski (2013), and we attempt to give more insights to monetary policy 
conducted by the NBKR by comparing the legal and the actual frameworks of the NBKR. 
Our comparison is based on the classification provided by Dabrowski (2013) and the IMF 
(2011)45; we intentionally use this classification in order to show substantial differences 
between the actual and the legal frameworks of the KR.    
        In many CIS countries, the de jure framework (i.e. officially declared by the monetary 
authorities of a country) differs from the de facto framework (i.e. declared by the IMF 
reports) 46.  As well as in the KR, since the implementation of independent monetary policy in 
1992, the legal framework was announced as monetary targeting until July 2014. However, 
the actual framework has been changed several times (see the fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1. The evolution of monetary policy framework of the KR 
Source: Dabrowski (2013); IMF (2011); (NBKR, 2014a) 
 
          According to fig.1, in 2005-2008 the NBKR performed the so-called 'Fund-supported 
or other monetary program' (Dabrowski, 2013) following the recommendations the IMF. 
This, in fact, was a form of  partial monetary targeting framework in a compliance with the 																																																								
45 Every year the IMF publishes Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange restrictions, which 
compares monetary policy frameworks of all IMF member states. It is based on the IMF’s classification using a 
two-dimensional description of the framework, i.e. distinguishing between exchange rate regime/ arrangement 
and monetary policy framework. Furthermore, it proposes more detail and slightly different typology of 
exchange rate arrangements. For more detailed classification see  Habermeier et al (2009), Dabrowski (2013) or 
the Annual IMF Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
46  See IMF (2011), Habermeier et al (2009), Dabrowski (2013)  
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IMF criteria, which set  a ceiling on the NBKR’s net domestic assets and a minimum level of 
net foreign assets. During the same period, the NBKR officially declared free-floating 
exchange rate from 2005 till 2009, but  in practice it switched to anchoring its currency to the 
US dollar in 2008 (see fig.1). The combination of monetary policy anchoring its currency to 
the US dollar and the announcement of free-floating exchange rate (2008-2009) does not 
actually represent floating exchange rate. This is rather a hidden form of currency peg. Such 
contradictory characteristics may reflects either the inconsistent monetary policy of the 
NBKR or the monetary policy framework was disrupted by the global financial crisis of 
2008-2009.  
          The following period of 2009-2012 is more difficult to explain, as no explicit anchor 
for monetary policy was declared and the exchange rate  was announced as 'other 
management arrangement' (Dabrowski, 2013). Previous research considers that this actually 
was a soft peg, i.e. when the NBKR implemented flexible exchange rate with some degree of 
exchange rate control (or flexible exchange rate targeting), while monetary policy was 
switched again to partial monetary targeting framework. 
           Since 2012 the KR’s monetary policy has become more specified and the legal 
monetary policy framework declared by the NBKR was consistent with the actual framework. 
Thus, during 2012-2014 the NBKR adopted a full-fledged monetary targeting framework 
using M2 as an intermediate target and reserve money as an operational target 47 .  
Nevertheless, the difference between the legal exchange rate arrangement and the actual 
arrangement still remained. Regardless of announcing free-floating exchange rate, the NBKR 
used to intervene in foreign exchange market to smooth the high fluctuations of exchange rate 
(exchange rate operations of the NBKR will be discussed later).  
          According to the reports of the NBKR (2014a), since the march of 2014 it has been 
implementing interest rate targeting framework using the short-term interest rate as an 
intermediate target of its monetary policy. However, it is generally known from the 
mainstream literature and as well as we mentioned in the literature review section that interest 
rate targeting is not  a generally accepted framework. We consider that the framework 
announced by the NBKR is rather a version close to flexible inflation targeting48 or this is an 
attempt of the NBKR to implement an intermediate (transitional) framework from monetary 
targeting to inflation targeting.  This consideration is supported by Bernard et al. (2015), they 																																																								
47  The NBKR did not provide data on the targets for M2 during the analysed period.  According to IMF (2012) 
targets for M2 in 2012 was announced at 18,3%, however the actual rate of M2 reached 23,8% 
48 Hammond  et al., 2009, Svensson 1997, 2009; 
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entitle the current framework of the NBKR as 'the journey to inflation targeting' or ' interest-
rate focused’ framework49. This is in line with the following changes in the operational 
framework of the NBKR monetary policy: firstly, along with the implementation of the 
interest rate targeting framework, the NBKR has set a numerical inflation target as an explicit 
monetary policy objective and it has started publicly announcing its inflation targets, this was 
not the case before. Secondly, the NBKR set the so-called “corridor” for short-term policy 
rate, where the upper-limit of the corridor - “ceiling” is determined by the “overnight” loan 
rate, and the floor-limit of the corridor is determined by “overnight” deposit rate. The values 
of the upper-limit and the floor-limit of the corridor are the indicators of rate limits for 
commercial banks and other participants of money market; this allows them making 
transactions within the interest rate corridor (the values and dynamics of the corridor will be 
discussed later in detail). Lastly, as it has been previously investigated by Nurbek and 
Kyrgyzbaeva (2012)50 and Sydykova and Rodriguez (2015) whether the KR is capable to 
adopt a full-fledged inflation targeting. Both papers conclude that the country does not fulfill 
the economic and institutional preconditions for the successful implementation of inflation 
targeting and stressed that the KR could benefit either from  implementing a more flexible 
inflaiton targeting or a stronger response to inflation and less control on exchange rate. 
         As we stressed at the beginning of this section, our discussion of the choice of monetary 
policy framework is more focused on the current choice, now we proceed to analysing the so-
called ‘interest rate targeting’ framework with emphasis on objectives and operaitonal 
framework. 
         Regarding the main objective of the current monetary policy, it remains unchanged and 
the NBKR’s primary objective is to maintain price stability, as a necessary condition to 
contribute to economic growth of the KR. The NBKR carries out the following tasks to 
maintain price stability: supporting the purchasing power of the som, provision of the 
efficiency, safety and reliability of the banking and payment systems (NBKR, 2014). The 
NBKR defines price stability as year-on-year increase in the CPI and the quantitative target of 
the monetary policy is maintaining inflation within the range of 5-7 percent over the medium 
term (NBKR, 2014a).  Hence, price stability is defined as the primary objective of the NBKR, 
this is coherent with the evolving monetary policy frameworks over the world, as both 																																																								
49 Argentina, Belarus, Haiti, Lao P.D.R., Costa Rica, Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Sudan, Tunisia, Vanuatu 
are considered as the countries that implement  ‘interest rate focused’ or the so-called ‘the journey to inflation 
targeting’ framework (see Bernard et al., 2015) 
50 Nurbek Jenish is the actual Deputy Chairman of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic.  
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developing and developed countries have moving towards making price stability an unique 
goal of their monetary policies.     
        To achieve price stability objective, the  NBKR uses a combination of monetary policy 
instruments and we proceed to reviewing the NBKR's monetary instruments following the 
scheme presented in fig.2. The NBKR established the interest rate corridor in July 2014, the 
main objective of establishing the corridor is to minimize the volatility of the money market 
rates by ensuring the movement of the short-term interest rates within a reasonable range. In 
this regard, open market operations play an important role in steering interest rates and 
signaling the monetary stance of the NBKR. The NBKR states that the actual price of 
borrowed resources are reflected by repo rates (weighted average rates of repo operations 
with maturity of up to 7 days). 
 
Fig.2. Monetary policy objectives and instruments of the NBKR 
Source: NBKR (2014a, 2016) 
       According to the NBKR (2014b, 2015), the width of the corridor was initially set at 770 
bps (7.7 percent) and it has been gradually increasing, while the overnight deposit rate (the 
floor) increased from 1.3 percent to 4 percent, and the overnight loan rate (the ceiling) 
increased from 9 percent to 12 percent. At the same time the policy rate was increased from 6 
percent to 10 percent (see fig.3)  
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Figure 3. Changes in Rates of National Bank and Interbank Repo Operations  
* repo rates - weighted average % rate of repo operations (maturity of up to 7 days)  
Source: NBKR (2014b, 2015, 2016) 
         
       From fig. 3, it is quite evident that the corridor adopted by the NBKR has several 
discrepancies from a conventional corridor system. Firstly, corridor should be considerably 
narrower than the one adopted by the NBKR. Since the establishment of the corridor, its 
width has been fluctuated between 650 – 900 bps.  By the end of 2015, the width of the 
corridor was 800bps, whereas in developed countries this number does not exceed 100 bps 
and in developing countries 500bps. If the corridor is too wide, which is the case of the 
NBKR, this gives a scope for a greater volatility in the short-term market rates, which in turn 
impairs the transmission of monetary policy.  Secondly, the NBKR’s interest rate corridor 
tends to widen over the time (see fig.3). In international practice, the corridor tends to narrow 
over time as the central bank gains experience and this allows the central bank to better 
stabilize the interbank rates and enhance the price signal. In regard to the NBKR’s policy, the 
dynamic of its corridor represent an opposite trend, giving possibility for even greater 
volatility for the market rates.  In addition, the changes in the width of the corridor fluctuate 
within 100-200 bps, whereas in developed countries this value is kept within 10-25 bps. 
Thereby, by frequently changing the width of its corridor at very large bounds, the NBKR is 
unlikely to be able to ensure stability of rates. These actions create even more uncertainty and 
volatility in the market. Thirdly, unlike the conventional corridor where interbank rate is close 
to the policy rate, the NBKR’s corridor exhibits systematically large divergence between the 
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interbank rates (repo rates51) and the policy rate, which signals about relatively weak 
transmission of the policy changes to the real economy. 
         Following the scheme presented in fig.2, another instrument of the NBKR’s monetary 
policy is a ratio of required reserves, which implies that commercial banks are required to 
hold a certain amount of funds as reserves at the correspondent account of the NBKR. In 
practice, the ratio of reserve requirements is a monetary tool used by both developed and 
developing countries mainly to stabilize money market interest rates and to manage liquidity 
in the market. However, many developing countries use required reserves also as a tool to 
achieve financial stability and to control credit fluctuations52.  This could be the case of the 
KR, as it is stated by the NBKR that: ‘the required reserves – is the instrument used as a 
regulator of monetary aggregates volume, banking credit and demand for liquidity and as the 
means for risk reduction of the banking system insolvency’ (NBKR, 2015). In this context, the 
NBKR adjusts the reserve requirements also for financial stability purpose, which is the case 
of some developing countries such as Argentina, Chile, China, Indonesia, Peru, Russia, 
Serbia, and Turkey53. Furthermore, the NBKR takes also a different approach using the 
reserve requirements for distributional purposes, as the NBKR differentiates the required 
reserves ratios for liabilities in national and foreign liabilities starting from the end of 2015. 
For instance, the ratio of required reserves for the banks remained between 8-10 percent 
during the period from 2005 till 2014 for liabilities in all currencies, but in 2015 the NBKR 
has introduced differentiated norms of the reserve requirements on liabilities in national and 
foreign currencies aiming to reduce dollarization in the economy and promote savings in 
national currency. The ratio of required reserves on liabilities in national currency was set at 4 
percent 54, and on liabilities in foreign currencies 12 percent (NBKR, 2015). This implies that 
the NBKR adjusts reserve requirements not only to manage the liquidity and availability of 
credits in the economy, but also it uses the reserves as a tool for macropridential and 
distributional goals.  																																																								
51 The main open market operations are repo operations of the NBKR. In this regard, weekly auctions are held 
for buying/selling the NBKR’s notes with maturity of 7, 14 and 28 days. The yields of notes are set according to 
the NBKR’s policy rate at the issuance date. Other government securities issued by the Ministry of Finance such 
as state treasury bills/bonds, government securities, treasury obligations are conducted through the NBKR' 
electronic trading system. This allows the primary dealers and their clients to conduct purchases or sales from 
their offices. 
52 For more discussion see  Glocker and Towbin (2011) 
53 see Lim et al.,2011 for more detailed discussion. 
54 The same percentage (4%) was fixed for liabilities in Armenian drams, Belarusian rubles, Chinese Yuans 
Renminbi, Kazakhstan tenges, Russian rubles amounts taking into account close trade relations of the KR with 
China and the countries of the EEU. 
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        The next monetary instrument that we aim to review is exchange rate operations 
(following the scheme in fig.2). As we stated in the literature review, the exchange rate has a 
special importance for developing countries, and in the case of the KR, we discussed in the 
previous section that the NBKR officially performs floating exchange rate, but in fact, it has 
been managing the exchange rate to varying degree. For this purpose, the NBKR intervenes in 
foreign exchange market not to target a certain level but to limit the exchange rate volatility 
and to smooth the trend path of the exchange rate. In this context, it uses several foreign 
exchange operations: (a) foreign exchange interventions by buying/selling of foreign currency 
in interbank foreign exchange market (spot operations); and (b) it carries out foreign 
exchange swap operations which involve spot purchase (sale) of the som against foreign 
currency and simultaneous resell (or repurchase) them forward on predetermined date and 
exchange rate. The operation aims to provide liquidity in the som (direct swap) or to 
withdraw excessive liquidity (reverse swap) from the banking system. 
 
 
 
Fig4.  Foreign exchange market interventions, international reserves and exchange rate fluctuations  
*data  on the NBKR’s interventions is available only from 2010. Positive values indicate a purchase of USD, while a negative value indicate 
a sale of USD 
Source: NBKR (2016)    
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         As it can be seen in the fig.4, during the analyzing period the NBKR performed very 
frequent and significant foreign exchange market interventions. The NBKR intensively 
intervened in the foreign exchange market, with the exception of years 2012-2013 
(considerably less). The interventions de facto mostly concerned sales of the US dollar in 
order to slow down the depreciation of the som. Two periods occurred in (i) january 2010-
january 2012; (ii) august 2014- december 2015, the period of first intervention was followed 
by quite long period of no interventions. 
       Comparing the exchange rate development in both cases, the first period  (2010-2011) 
was less intense than the second period (2014-2015), however there were strong pressures 
against the som. These pressures came not only from the post-financial crisis period, but were 
also reinforced by the further weakening of the som (by nearly 7 percent), which followed the 
political revolution of 2010 and the Civil War of 2011. Concerning about the effectiveness of 
the interventions, after the first period of active interventions, the exchange rate appreciated 
by 1 percent in the beginning of 2012 and the following year was marked by relative stable 
exchange rate. This might be two-sight effect: the role of active interventions and also the fact 
that the NBKR switched from the managed exchange rate to free floating rate, allowing 
market forces define its exchange rate. This intervention period was consistent with the actual 
managed exchange rate arrangement that the NBKR performed during this period. In contrast, 
the second period was more intense caused by the strong appreciation of the US dollar over 
the world and as well as rapid devaluation of the currencies and economic slowdown in the 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan (which are the main strategic and trade partners of the 
KR). Moreover, much more intense interventions during the second period did not lead to the 
stabilization (the som appreciated by 19.3 percent in 2014 and 27.5 percent in 2015). As 
something that worked in one case, may have a little effect in another.  
         Concluding, monetary policy framework of the NBKR has been frequently changed 
over the period of 2005-2015. This could be either the result of lack of full consensus between 
the government and the NBKR regarding price stability; or the result of a burdening of 
monetary policy with too many obligations: a provision of low inflation, exchange rate 
control, output growth and etc. This is a sort of the list which is “impossible to accomplish” 
only with monetary policy, particularly for the country, which has just completed its transition 
to a market economy. In regard with the current stance of monetary policy of the NBKR, the 
KR stands to benefit from moving towards a standard practice in advanced and other 
developing countries. In these countries, active open market operations by the central bank 
contribute to ensure that key interbank rates are anchored around the policy rate, and where 
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the market rates fluctuate between the two standing facility rates (in the case of the NBKR 
these are overnight loan and deposit rates, see fig. 4). Even if the anchoring is not ‘perfect’, 
which is the case of the NBKR; active open market operations might allow the NBKR to 
align market rates with the policy rate if appropriate measure will be taken. However, the 
notable differences between the KR and other developed countries that implement interest 
rate corridor system is the extent of exchange rate management and the use of reserve 
requirements. The latter is a common monetary tool used by many central banks in developed 
and developing countries. However, in the case of the NBKR, it gives too much role to 
reserve requirements including macroprudential and distributional roles. Nevertheless, relying 
on the aforementioned discussion, it is more likely that the NBKR’s monetary policy 
framework is evolving over time in line with the frameworks of the CIS and other developing 
countries, but there are many discrepancies from developed ones. 
4.5. Rules-based analysis of the monetary policy of the NBKR during 2005-2015     
          Following our structure that we indicated at the introduction, this section is devoted to a 
rule-based analysis of monetary policy of the NBKR. It is observed that the NBKR’s priority 
objective is to maintain price stability as a necessary condition to achieve economic growth. 
As well as exchange rate dynamic is important for the Kyrgyz economy and the NBKR 
frequently intervenes in foreign exchange market aiming to smooth the exchange rate 
volatility. Thereby, by estimating different version of the Taylor-type rule we aim to define if 
the NBKR follows any rule-based policy and particularly to identify which indicators are the 
main policy concern.  
         As it was mentioned in the literature review, developing countries face different 
challenges in implementing their monetary polices, and it is likely that it is difficult for their 
CBs to follow any explicitly formulated monetary policy rules. However, it is still worth 
empirically analyzing the behavior of their monetary policy. For this purpose we apply the 
Taylor rule (1993).  Since Taylor (1993) presented his seminal work, monetary policy rules 
have gained an increasing attention of policymakers and researchers, and considerable 
research has been done to examine the validity of Taylor principle in different countries. 
Taylor rule has been widely applied as the standard by many central banks and it has been 
used to explain the behavior of monetary policy in the past and as a reference for CB in 
setting its future policy. Taylor principle suggests that interest rate should respond to the 
deviation of inflation from its target level and to the deviation of output from its trend level.  
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         The original work of Taylor (1993) proposed the following equation: 
                                       𝑖! = 𝑟 +  𝑝! + 𝛼 𝑝! − 𝑝!∗ +  𝛽(𝑦! − 𝑦!∗)                                               (1) 
 
where 𝑖! is the nominal interest rate (Taylor rate) set by the CB, 𝑟 is the long-run equilibrium 
real interest rate (usually assumed to be constant). Current rate of inflation is denoted by 𝑝!, 
while 𝑝!∗ is the target for inflation set by CB, 𝑝! − 𝑝!∗  is the deviation of inflation rate from 
its target level 𝑝!∗ . Finally, 𝑦!  is the real GDP, while 𝑦!∗  is the trend of real GDP, thus (𝑦! − 𝑦!∗) represents the output gap.  The weights 𝛼 and 𝛽 indicate the reaction of CB’s 
nominal interest rate to the changes in inflation gap 𝑝! − 𝑝!∗  and output gap 𝑦! − 𝑦!∗ . 
            This formulation of the principle (equation 1) has been modified by later research in 
order to be implemented in open economies and developing countries. Considerable research 
shows that the monetary policy behavior of developed countries can be explained by Taylor 
policy reaction function (Clarida et.al 1998). However, the relevance of Taylor rule for 
monetary policy in developing countries has been less investigated. An important finding is 
that CBs in developing countries tend to respond not only to inflation and output, but most 
apparently to the exchange rate fluctuations.  In this regard, Taylor (2000) and Garcia et al. 
(2011) argue that including the exchange rate in the equation does not bring significant 
benefit for developed countries, but it is effective for developing ones. Additionally, Taylor 
(2000) emphasizes the possible changes in the rule for developing countries. These changes 
could be in terms of the choice of instrument (to use monetary aggregates instead of short-
term interest rate as it is more appropriate for developing economies due to the difficulties to 
measure the equilibrium real interest rate), including the exchange rate variable in the rule (or 
other variables) or in the response coefficients "𝛼" and "𝛽". 
          The theoretical literature mainly emphasizes several explanations in regard to the 
importance of the exchange rate in CB’s policy reaction function, particularly in developing 
economies: the first explanation is related to the need to keep CB’s credibility. Mohanty and 
Klau (2004) consider that in developing countries the exchange rate shocks tend to be larger 
and more persistent compared to developed ones. Hence, there is a higher probability of 
missing their inflation targets. Therefore, in order to maintain their credibility, the CBs of 
those economies may have to react to the exchange rate fluctuations. Another explanation is 
the presence of a high path-through of the exchange rate into inflation (through import prices) 
in developing countries. Thus, Svensson (2000) and Ball (2000) suggest that their CBs might 
intensively use the direct exchange rate channel to affect inflation more rapidly and to keep its 
																																																																																					
	
99	
inflation close to their targets. Furthermore, there is an implicit assumption about weak 
monetary transmission mechanism; hence relying on the interest rate channel is insufficient in 
the case of developing countries. Given the importance of exchange rate as a main 
determinant of inflation, developing countries may take an advantage of the exchange rate 
channel which might be faster and more effective than the traditional interest rate channel 
(Benlialper  et al., 2017). 
         The empirical studies suggest including the exchange rate variable in Taylor rule to be 
implemented in small open economies 55 . As these economies, which participate in 
international trade, but there are small compared to the world markets, that’s their policies do 
not alter the world prices, interest rates or incomes.  Countries with small open economies are 
therefore price takers. The  empirical papers, which estimated the monetary policy in 
emerging and transition economies, find that CBs respond to exchange rate more than to 
inflation and output gap. The same results were found by the research of Edwards (2006) who 
indicates that economies, which faced historically high inflation and the real exchange rate 
volatility, tend to have a higher response coefficient to the the exchange rate in Taylor rule.  
Other papers examined Taylor type principles in developing economies56 and found a high 
responsiveness of their policy rates to the changes in exchange rate57. 
Model specification and data description 
       Following the arguments and the empirical results of previous research (cited above) in 
regard to add the exchange rate in the rule, we analyze the behavior of monetary policy of the 
NBKR by estimating Taylor rules. For a computation of Taylor rates we run an OLS 
regression of original Taylor rule and its modified versions. The original principle (Taylor, 
1993) is consistent with the following OLS formulation: 
                                                  𝑖! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃! +  𝛽!𝑌! + 𝜀!                                                        (2) 
 
where  𝛽! = 𝑟 − 𝛼𝑝!∗ (see equation 1),  𝑃! is the inflation deviation term 𝑝! − 𝑝!∗  which  is 
determined as the growth of consumer price index over the inflation target determined by the 
NBKR58. 𝑌!  is denoted to output gap (𝑦! − 𝑦!∗); 𝜀!  is an error.  																																																								
55 Sensson (2000; 2003);  Ball, (2000); Clarida et al. (1998); Obstfel and Rogoff (2000); Froyen and Guender 
(2016); 
56 Emerging Asian and Latin American Countries; 
57 Filosa (2001); Corbo (2002); Alper and Ozan (2006);  Moura and De Carvalho (2010); 
58 We use the inflation target observed at the beginning of the analyzed year, as this should be the most 
appropriate. Due to the fact that when it became clear that the target for inflation (set in the beginning of the 
year) could not be achieved, the NBKR changed its inflation target at the end of the year (the study does not 
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        In regard to open economy versions of Taylor rule, which takes into account the role of 
exchange rate (𝑒!), we add the exchange rate according to the following formulations: 
        The first formulation suggests CB to react to the current exchange rate (for all measures 
related to exchange rates (𝑒!), an increase means a depreciation): 
                                                    𝑖! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃! +  𝛽!𝑌! +  𝛽!𝑒!+ 𝜀!                                          (3) 
         
this is the simplest and most direct way to add the exchange rate to the rule. In this case, a 
positive response weight on the exchange rate  (𝛽! > 0) tends to reduce the exchange rate 
volatility. If exchange rate depreciates then interest rate should be increased59.  
        In the second formulation, the current exchange rate is replaced by the exchange rate 
gap, which is measured as the difference between current exchange rate and its equilibrium 
level (𝑒! − 𝑒!∗) or the lagged level (𝑒! − 𝑒!!!). 
                                                 𝑖! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃! +  𝛽!𝑌! +  𝛽!(𝑒! − 𝑒!∗)+ 𝜀!                               (4a) 
                                                 𝑖! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃! +  𝛽!𝑌! +  𝛽!(𝑒! − 𝑒!!!)+ 𝜀!                          (4b) 
 
 where CB aims to keep the exchange rate close to its equilibrium level (equation 4a), this is 
expected to prevent the negative effect of  exchange rate fluctuations on the balance of 
payment and  international competitiveness of the country60. If CB reacts to the deviation of 
the exchange rate from its lagged level, it aims to adjust the exchange rate smoothly to its 
lagged level61. In case if the exchange rate is depreciating above its equilibrium 𝑒!∗ or its 
lagged level 𝑒!!! (𝛽! > 0), then CB will increase its policy rate. 
          And the last formulation was emphasized by Taylor (2001), he suggested adding the 
current exchange rate and the lagged exchange rate. Adding the lagged exchange rate is more 
																																																																																																																																																																													
consider these changes). Additionally, in some years the inflation target was set with its upper and lower limits, 
and we take only upper limit of the target. 
59 see Aizenman et. al (2011); Elshamy (2012); Froyen and  Guender  (2016); 
60 An appreciation (higher than normal) has a contractionary effect on aggregate demand; the appreciation makes 
imports cheaper and exports more expensive (decreasing the competitiveness of the country), therefore 
decreasing exports (negative effect on the balance of payment). A depreciation might improve the situation, 
however, on the other hand depreciation (higher than a “normal” level) is expected to lower export prices and 
increase import prices. If the increase in the nominal value of imports exceeds the increase in the nominal value 
of exports, then the exchange rate depreciation worsens the trade balance.  
61 see Korbonen and Nuutilainen (2016); Leitemo (2001); Benlialper et. al (2017); Frömmel  et al. (2011); Helmi 
(2011). 
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complicated dynamics than simply reacting to the current exchange rate or the exchange rate 
gap (as in equation 3, 4a and 4b): 
                                             𝑖! =  𝛽! +  𝛽!𝑃! +  𝛽!𝑌! +  𝛽!𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑒!!!+ 𝜀!                               (5)                                                                                                
      
when  𝛽! < 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽! = 0 then the currency appreciates and this would call CB to decrease its 
nominal interest rate, which would represent a “relaxing of monetary policy”; if  𝛽! >0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽! < 0, but absolute value (𝛽! +  𝛽! > 0) is more than zero, the initial interest rate 
reaction is partially offset in the next period. In case if 𝛽! > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽! > 0, then CB gives 
high weights to the exchange rate stability, when shocks to the exchange rate are large and 
persistent. Taylor (2001) argues that the partial interest rate offset is due to the lagged impact 
of the depreciated exchange rate on inflation. Inflation rate is temporarily high because of the 
depreciation, however, the increase in inflation might be temporary, thus it is not appropriate 
for a CB to over-tighten its monetary policy, because the higher inflation that would 
otherwise occur using the equation (1 or 2), the negative coefficient of 𝛽! prevents additional 
tightening.   
          So far we have identified our estimation models (equation 2-5). In the OLS regression 
estimation, we use monthly data for CPI (𝑝!), GDP (𝑦!), REER (𝑒!) and the NBKR’s key 
policy rate (𝑖!) that covers the period between January 2005 and December 2015. Our sample 
includes data from the NBKR official statistics, the National Statistical Committee of the 
Kyrgyz Republic (NSCKR) database and Interstat Statistical Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS STAT) (see in Annex 1).  
        We use the key policy rate of  NBKR as the policy interest rate ( 𝑖!). The actual inflation 
rate is measured in CPI (𝑝!).  Output gap is calculated as the difference between GDP growth 
rate (𝑦!) and the potential rate of output (𝑦!∗), which is calculated by using Hodrick –Prescott 
filtering (HP)62.  The exchange rate  (𝑒!) is the real effective exchange rate, which is 
calculated as the weighted average of the KR’s currency relative to its major trade-partners 
adjusted for the effects of inflation (extracted from the NSCKR).  The exchange rate gap (𝑒! − 𝑒!∗) is calculated as the difference between (𝑒!) the real effective exchange rate and HP 
trend value (𝑒!∗).  
 																																																								
62 Hodrick –Prescott filter applied to the data series from 01/2005 to 12/2015. Smoothing parameter 𝜆 = 14400.  
    Output gap = !!!!!∗!!∗ ∗ 100% 
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Results and discussion 
      Now we proceed to the estimation results of the following policy reaction functions for 
the NBKR:  (a) an original Taylor rule (equation 2) and its open economy versions (equation 
3, 4a, 4b, 5). The estimates of response coefficients for the whole samples are reported in 
Table 1. 
        The findings about monetary policy in the KR state that the NBKR follows the Taylor 
rule marginally during the analyzed period. The response coefficient on the inflation gap is 
positive, statistically significant and close to 0.5 in all the specifications (as recommended by 
Taylor). This result implies that the NBKR performs the “active” monetary policy by 
increasing its policy rate in response of increase in inflation. 
Taylor type rules estimations for the NBKR 
 
 
Taylor rule (1) 
 
Taylor rule (2) Taylor rule (3a) Taylor rule (3b) Taylor rule (4) 
𝛽! 
(Constant) 
6.40** 
(0.22) 
 
5.22** 
(0.18) 
 
6.46** 
(0.20) 
 
6.40** 
(0.22) 
5.51** 
(0.18) 𝑝! − 𝑝!∗  0.50** (0.05) 0.40** (0.05) 0.40** (0.05) 0.50** (0.05) 0.40** (0.05) (𝑦! − 𝑦!∗) - 0.31** (0.07) - 0.22* (0.06) - 0.20* (0.07) - 0.31** (0.07) - 0.22* (0.06) 𝑒! - 0.23** (0.02) - - 0.11 (0.08) (𝑒! − 𝑒!∗) - - 0.30** (0.06) - - (𝑒! − 𝑒!!!) - - - 0.03 (0.12) - 𝑒!!! - - - - 0.012 (0.08) 𝑹𝟐 𝒂𝒅𝒋. 
 0.49 0.68 0.57 0.49 0.68 
Note: Number of observations 132 (for each specification). In parentheses are given robust standard errors 
(the errors were corrected for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-Eicker-White Procedure). 
** and * denote the 1%, 5% level of significance level, respectively. 
 
         However, in the case of output gap, the coefficient is negative and significant in all the 
samples. According to the results, the NBKR reacts counter-cyclically to output growth 
deviation, which implies that the NBKR follows pro-cyclical monetary policy63. This finding 
is not surprising for a developing economy, a number of previous researches that assessed 
monetary policy behavior of developing countries by estimating Taylor type rules, presented 
similar results. This is in line with the researches of Frommel and Schobert (2006), Saiful  																																																								
63 Additionally, a correlation analysis proves that the key policy rate of the NBKR has not a strong relation to the 
output gap. The degree of correlation of the policy rate with respect to inflation rate and the real exchange rate is 
strong and positive (0.62 with inflation and 0.63 with the exchange rate). However there is no meaningful 
correlation with output gap (see annex 2). 
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(2009), Korbonen  and Nuutilainen (2016), the response coefficient on inflation is consistent 
with Taylor rule, but the negative value of output gap is not.  
        The coefficient of the exchange rate is of special interest in the case of a developing 
country with a small open economy. Regarding the effect of the exchange rate in the policy 
reaction function of the NBKR, the results do not provide a clear picture, which of these rules 
is pursued by the NBKR. According to the estimation results, it is more likely that the 
exchange rate is included to the policy reaction function, as two specifications (3 and 4a) have 
higher values of 𝐴𝑑𝑗.𝑅!  (0.68 and 0.57) and provide positive and statistically significant 
coefficients for all variables  (the inflation gap, the output gap and the exchange rate). These 
results imply two possible scenarios: one might conclude that the NBKR follows the equation 
(3), assuming that the NBKR aims to reduce the exchange rate volatility by reacting to any 
fluctuations of the actual exchange rate (without any implicit target for the exchange rate). 
Another scenario is that the NBKR follows the equation (4a), assuming that it aims to keep 
the exchange rate close to its equilibrium level. This means that the NBKR aims to prevent 
the problems related to the balance of payments and low competitiveness of the country (as 
discussed before), which may occur due to the high fluctuations in the exchange rate. Hence, 
it is clear that either the NBKR reacts to any depreciation (appreciation) of the exchange rate 
following the Taylor rule (3) or it response to the deviation of exchange rate from its 
equilibrium level (Taylor rate (4a)). The results for the last two specifications (4b and 5), 
however, are less encouraging, as they are statistically insignificant. In this regard, we 
consider that the NBKR adds the exchange rate variable to its policy reaction without taking 
into consideration the lagged exchange rate. 
 
Fig. 5 Actual policy rate versus estimated rates 
Note: the Authors’ own calculations 
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      Figure 5 above demonstrates a graphical comparison of the rules that we found the most 
appropriate to explain the monetary behavior of the NBKR. The baseline Taylor rule (2) does 
not provide a satisfactory explanation for the policy reaction of the NBKR, as it shows 
significantly different dynamic than the policy rate. This also corresponds with the low value 
of 𝑅!, which proves that the inflation gap and the output gap explain only a half of the overall 
variation in interest rate reaction function (𝑅! =0.50). According to the estimations and its 
graphical illustration, it seems that the Taylor rule described by equation (3) better 
characterize the behavior of the NBKR’s key policy rate. The movement of the Taylor rate (3) 
is in line with the key policy rate of the NBKR almost during the whole analyzing period 
(except the time lapse from the beginning of 2010 till the end of 2013).  If the NBKR follows 
the rule (3), this could suggest that it performs a pro-cyclical monetary policy. The rule (3) 
reflects the dominance of the inflation and the exchange rate stability objective over the 
output stability.  Another interesting finding concerns the dynamics of the Taylor rate 
described by the equation (4a), when the NBKR responds to the deviation of the exchange 
rate from its equilibrium level. This rule displays less encouraging results, the graph shows 
that it’s dynamics is noticeably different form the NBKR’s rate almost in all analyzed period, 
however it gives some signs of convergence with the NBKR policy rate at the end of 
analyzing period (from the beginning of 2014). This could be more appropriate for the 
NBKR, if it has started following the rule (4a). As maintaining the exchange rate close to its 
equilibrium level and preventing too high appreciation (or depreciation) would allow the KR 
to avoid problems with the negative trade balance and low international competiveness.  
4.6. Conclusions 
         In this paper we aimed to make a contribution to the understanding of monetary policy 
in developing economies by analyzing the NBKR’s monetary policy.  During the transition 
period of 1991-2005, the country rapidly accomplished the list of exhaustive reforms to 
establish a market economy and reconstructed its banking system following the 
recommendations of the IMF. By the middle of 2000s the economy was recovered after 
hyperinflation of 1990s, the Russian financial crisis of 1998 and achieved relative price 
stability and economic growth. However, this did not necessarily lead to the functioning of 
effective monetary policy.  
        As for the second period of our analysis, during the period of 2005-2015 in order to 
define at what extent the NBKR responds to the changes in inflation, exchange rate and 
output growth, we estimated the variety of Taylor-type rules for the KR. By using different 
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specifications for the NBKR we obtained some interesting results that give good insights into 
monetary policy of the NBKR. The estimation results provide a general picture of the 
NBKR’s behavior including the magnitudes of its reaction.  Firstly, the paper provides an 
evidence of a strong policy reaction on inflation, as the NBKR responses significantly and 
positively to inflation in all our specifications, and the coefficient is very close to the 
recommended one. This suggests that inflation is the primary concern of the NBKR and this 
is coherent with the NBKR’s official announcements. Secondly, based on the theoretical 
implications and taking into account the actual exchange rate arrangement of the NBKR 
regarding the exchange rate, we added the real exchange rate variable to our specifications of 
the Taylor rule.  According to the results, it is clear that the NBKR strongly reacts to the 
movements in the exchange rate (most close to the values recommended by Taylor). 
Nevertheless, the problem related to the negative sign of the output gap remains in all out 
specifications, leading to a conclusion that the NBKR follows an open economy Taylor rule 
marginally. It is mainly concerned with the price stability and the exchange rate stability, but 
reacting counter-cyclically to output gap fluctuations. Thereby, the rule-based estimation 
results indicate that the traditional Taylor rule cannot describe reasonably well monetary 
policy of the NBKR. However, the results of the modified versions suggest that the NBKR 
follows either procyclical policy or stabilizing policy. Yet, both possible policies cannot 
provide a plausible explanation for opposite response on output growth deviation. 
       Concluding, the paper contributes to the body of knowledge about monetary policy in 
developing countries and the CIS countries in particular. In general, the NBKR has been 
evolving its monetary policy framework in line with other emerging and developing 
countries. This is evident from its current interest rate focused monetary policy framework the 
so-called ‘the journey to inflation targeting’. This implies that the NBKR has been gradually 
moving from a partial monetary targeting to inflation targeting, but it still has not moved 
beyond the preliminary stage. Apart from this, the exchange rate arrangement remains as the 
important policy concern; the NBKR, in practice, continues intervening in foreign exchange 
market.  
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Annex 1 
 
Variables Measure Source Availability 
Key policy rate Monthly rate in %  (end of period) NBKR 1/2005-12/2015 
Consumer price index Year-on-year CPI  (%) NSCKR 1/2005-12/2015 
Inflation target Annual target range for CPI 
inflation in % 
NBKR 1/2005-12/2015 
GDP growth rate Year-on-year change in GDP 
growth in % 
CIS STAT 1/2005-12/2015 
Real effective exchange rate  REER index in  %   (2010 = 100)  NBKR 1/2005-12/2015 
NBKR – the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic 
NSCKR – the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic 
CIS STAT – Internstat Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
 
 
Annex 2 
 
Correlation of the NBKR’s key policy rate 
Inflation gap 0.67** 
GDP gap -0.15* 
Real effective exchange rate  0.63** 
Note:  ** and * denote the 1%, 5% level of significance, respectively. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
           As it is said in the beginning of the thesis, the main concern of growth economics has 
been understanding of causes of economic growth. In this regard, the current thesis, in a broad 
context, is devoted to contribute to the body of knowledge about economic growth in 
developing economies. Our objective is to analyze economic growth in the KR by different 
perspectives: the cluster theory, the growth diagnostics framework and the performance of the 
National Bank of the KR. In general, achieving economic growth in developing countries is 
more complex than those in developed countries due to the specific challenges these 
economies face. Therefore it is important to integrate and reconcile the aspects within a 
holistic sustainable growth concept. Both theoretical an empirical background of growth 
theories highlight its advantages and drawbacks, underlining the fact that there is no a general 
concept that can provide a sustainable growth for all.  
 
      The empirical analysis presented here attempts to test the applicability of three theories of 
mainstream growth economics that we consider would be relevant for a developing economy 
such as the KR. Firstly, the growth theory argues that location matters for growth, and there 
are considerable theoretical and empirical evidence for that. However, our objective is to 
check the relevance and applicability of the cluster approach in the Kyrgyz economy as one of 
the forces that could foster economic growth. Secondly, economic growth is country-specific 
and that growth policies should be designed based on the uniqueness of a country; thus, we 
apply the growth diagnostics approach. Thirdly, the most recent growth theory evidences that 
‘institutions matter’, following this idea we analyze the performance of the main financial 
institution of the country and its role in promoting price stability as an essential condition for 
economic growth.  For this reason, we developed three papers aiming to respond these 
questions and as each chapter is developed as a self-contained unit, a summary and results of 
each chapter is presented separately. 
 
        In the first chapter, we attempt to answer the question: “if the Kyrgyz Republic has 
strong economic opportunities and prerequisites in agriculture in order to implement an 
effective agro cluster in the livestock sector?” A summary of the main findings is as follows: 
• As for the KR, agriculture is one of the prioritized sectors of its economy due the 
several facts. Firstly, agricultural sector is a main part of national production and 
income. Secondly, the poverty in rural areas is very high, where more than a half of the 
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population lives below the poverty line and agriculture is the main sector providing 
employment opportunities there. Thirdly, being a major source of income and 
employment, this sector uses only 2 percent of all its production capacity.  
• Historically, Kyrgyz people were nomads and they have been engaged in cattle breeding 
for centuries, and up to now they could preserve traditional ways of livestock breeding, 
this gives them additional opportunities and advantages to provide “bio” meat products 
in the region. As well as the country was known as the main meat-supplier during the 
USSR period and therefore the KR has a good reputation of the supplier of high-quality 
meat among the former soviet countries.   Furthermore, our research identified that the 
KR has advantageous natural and climatic conditions to provide farmers and processors 
with required inputs of production.   
• Having identified that the country possesses necessary climatic and other natural 
preconditions to implement livestock cluster, we proposed a detailed model of livestock 
cluster in the KR. We recommend implementing a cluster in Chui region as a pilot 
cluster with a possibility to expand it over time as the country creates background and 
gains experience. This region is found as the most relevant in terms of its location and 
access to international markets, mainly Kazakhstan and Russia, which are the main 
foreign markets of meat; the presence of labor resources (internal labor migration to 
Chui region) and agricultural educational institutions that provide skilled labor force. 
• Regardless of advantages we mentioned above, the impediments to implement an 
effective livestock cluster remain. The obstacles are mainly in terms of institutional 
conditions, as the institutions that control the compliance with food quality and safety, 
as well as organizations that assess veterinary and sanitary conditions are weak. Most of 
them belong to the ministries or the other government bodies and operate in conditions 
of poorly equipped laboratories from the Soviet era. In such conditions, the country 
would not be able to reach international markets that require compliance with a certain 
level of quality and sanitary standards.  Thereby, the costs of compliance with these 
standards can be high and additional funding and support from the government is highly 
important at least at the initial stages. Furthermore, the government involvement is 
essential for the success of livestock cluster and requires its active involvement in 
creating and supporting networks and knowledge exchange structures for all involved 
parties in the cluster. 
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• Concluding, we assert that implementation of successful cluster in the livestock sector 
could result in agricultural production growth, thus the country could provide with meat 
products its domestic market; higher income of farmers, which is more than a half of the 
population; alignment of regional economic development and reduction of migration. 
Thereby, this could become a key measure to overcome the poverty in rural areas and 
enhance regional growth, consequently economic growth of the country. 
 
Outlook for future research, the analysis could be extended in several directions. One 
possibility is to conduct analysis by using Porter’s Diamond analysis, which could be useful 
to make a deeper analysis and to identify possible drawbacks and risks of a cluster. Another 
possible extension could be an application of principal component analysis and cluster 
analysis in order to assess the potential economic performance of farms and their possibility 
to be involved in livestock cluster in the KR.  However, this is rather complicated due to the 
shortage of data at national and regional level. Finally, it would be also interesting to study 
clustering possibilities in other sectors of the Kyrgyz economy and their performance on 
economic growth.  
 
           The second chapter is an attempt to identify the most binding constraints to economic 
growth of the KR by applying the Growth Diagnostics approach. In order to build a plausible 
hypothesis on obstacles to growth, we selected a comparator group of countries that are at the 
same stage of economic development, with similar geographical, historical and political 
background. It is worthy to mention that there has been done only little research that 
employed this approach with respect to the CIS countries, and current research, therefore, 
provides a country specific research on the KR’s economy and the main findings are as 
follows:  
• Given the KR’s long history of successful accomplishment of the reforms in 
democracy and rules of law following the recommendations of international 
organizations, it is reasonable to expect significant improvements in institutions that 
ensure rule of law and secure property rights.  Certainly, the KR has made 
considerable progress in modernizing its legal and economic institutions since its 
independence, nevertheless, our study identified that corruption index is one of the 
highest in the KR and it is assessed as the major constraint for business. The judiciary 
system and law institutions are considered as the most corrupt and weak institutions of 
the country. So it is appropriate to stress that our results indicate that property rights 
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protection is the lowest comparing internationally and the weakest comparing to the 
comparator group of countries. The country with highly corrupt legal institutions is 
not capable to ensure clearly defined property rights secured by the rule of law. 
Thereby, instead of playing a major role in safeguarding the rule of law, access to 
justice and secure property rights, it is impeding the ability of individuals and 
businesses to optimally contribute to growth of the economy.  
• Furthermore, our findings indicate that the economy and its agents are hampered by 
the existing high costs of domestic funds, which limits the capacity of the country to 
promote new businesses and invest in profitable projects. The high costs of credit 
(measured by the real rates of interest) resulted in extremely low level of domestic 
credit and low savings rate. The results of the World Bank’s surveys are consistent 
with our findings, indicating that almost a half of local firms identified access to 
finance as a major constraint for their business.  
• We have stated in the beginning, that the KR has rich natural resources and it is the 
country with the second richest hydro resources in Central Asia.  Therefore, being 
predetermined by climatic and natural conditions, water resources are only source of 
energy supply in the KR. The country’s energy production does not allow the KR to 
provide with water and energy resources even its domestic market and its energy 
supply is the lowest compared to the comparator countries. Assessment of the sector 
indicates that energy sector faces number of difficulties related to low productivity, 
outdated equipment from the USSR period, high level of electricity outages and a 
shortage of qualified labor force. Unreliable electricity supply and low efficiency of 
the sector has a strong negative impact on business and it is identified as a binding 
constraint to economic growth of the country. These results of the research are also 
supported by the reports of international organizations. 
• Lastly, the country characterized by the lowest educational quality. Educational 
quality matters for growth; firstly, what people know has powerful effects on their 
earnings, on the distribution of income, consequently on economic growth. From 
another perspective, the lack of skilled labor force can become a constraint for firms, 
limiting their capacity to growth. As for the KR, almost half of firms consider that 
they suffer from the lack of qualified labor force. Our study defined that the lack of 
labor force is determined by the shortage of higher educational institutions that could 
educate graduates with required skills. Furthermore, the lack of qualified labor force is 
partly caused by low wages in the country, which leads to the migration of graduates 
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abroad for better conditions. Yet, at the current point of time, the lack of human 
capital is not considered as the binding constraint, but might become in the future if 
required measure will not be done. 
 
As an outlook for future research, as our research is mainly based on the qualitative data, 
therefore it would be useful to perform a statistical analysis by employing a standard Euler 
equation. Furthermore, the growth diagnostics approach has not been applied for other 
Central Asian countries, and it could be interesting to extend the analysis at regional level. 
Both extensions could face difficulties in collecting statistical data, as the data provided at 
national level, are on yearly basis or some data is not available.  
 
     In chapter three, we analyzed monetary policy of the NBKR since independence in 1991 
till the present. We aim to assess if the NBKR follows any rule-based policy and to identify 
its concern with respect to price and exchange rate stability, as well as economic growth. A 
summary of results are presented below: 
• After the collapse of the USSR, the Kyrgyz government, with the aim to form a 
market economy began carrying out the structural reforms, including rapid 
privatization, liberalization and democratization in the 1990s. By the end of 1990s, the 
country successfully accomplished its reforms and the modern banking system was 
formed. The KR could overcome hyperinflation and rapid depreciation of its currency 
followed by the structural adjustments and financial crisis of 1998. Thus, in the fists 
half of 2000s, having stronger fundamentals the country reached relative price 
stability and moderate economic growth.  
• As for monetary policy of the NBKR during the period of 2005-2015, we found 
inconsistency between the legal and the actual frameworks. In practice, the NBKR has 
frequently changed its monetary policy framework without providing any plausible 
explanations for the shifts in its policy. We assume that this could be either a result of 
lack coordination (or consensus) between the government and the NBKR with respect 
to price stability; or the result of aiming to achieve too many objectives only with 
monetary policy.  
• In order to analyze the behavior of the NBKR’s policy for the period of 2005-2015 we 
applied the traditional Taylor rule and its modified versions including exchange rate. 
As based on the theoretical implications on the importance of exchange rate in 
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developing countries and as well as the NBKR’s statements on the importance of 
exchange rate for price stability. 
• Referring to inflation concerns, the NBKR declares that maintaining price stability is 
the main objective of its monetary policy. Our results of rule-based analysis confirm 
that the NBKR strongly reacts to the changes in inflation and the response coefficient 
is very close to that recommended by the Taylor rule in all our specifications. 
• The empirical estimation results indicate that NBKR strongly reacts both to inflation 
and exchange rate, but it seems that output fluctuations are not the main policy 
concern. As in all our specifications we obtained counter-cyclical reaction. However, 
this is not surprising as the previous studies that applied the Taylor-type rules give 
very similar outcome, where their central banks react to inflation and exchange rate 
according to the Taylor rule, but oppositely to output. 
• Main insight from the estimation results is that the traditional Taylor rule cannot 
describe the behavior of monetary policy of the KR. However, the modified versions 
including the exchange rate variable provide useful insights, as two specifications lead 
to a conclusion that the NBKR performs either a countercyclical monetary policy if it 
responds to fluctuations of the current exchange rate; or it performs a stabilization 
monetary policy if it responds to the exchange rate gap aiming to smooth its volatility. 
• To conclude, our research shows that the NBKR’s monetary policy has a priority 
objective to maintain price stability and the estimation results confirm its legal 
statement. The exchange rate has a special importance to achieve price stability in the 
KR, as it is the case in many other developing countries. Hence, the NBKR concerns 
about price stability as an essential condition for economic growth, but its reverse 
reaction to output growth signals about countercyclical monetary policy rather than 
stabilizing. 
 
      Outlook for the future research, there are many relevant research areas on the 
effectiveness of monetary policy of the NBKR and its impact on the Kyrgyz economy. From 
our perspective, there is particularly one issue needing more focused analysis: investigation of 
the legal and the actual independence of monetary policy of the NBKR. This aspect is 
important for any central bank both in developed and developing economies. However, 
literature highlights that central bank independence is critical in developing economies, as the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is frequently hampered by the actions of fiscal authorities. 
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Regardless of the few papers investigating the legal independence of the NBKR, there is a 
lack of research on the actual independence of the NBKR. 
    Concluding, we started the thesis by emphasizing that ‘one size does not fit all’, and aimed 
to understand economic growth features of the KR. Analyzing economic growth by different 
approaches of growth economics and by providing findings related to each approach, from 
our point of view, three chapters in a broad context signal about one key binding obstacle. 
Thus, we are referring to the institutional weakness (certainly it is not the only, but the main). 
The findings of first chapter indicate the role of market-regulating institutions as for 
effectiveness and success of cluster implementation; the Growth Diagnostics approach 
indicates market-creating institutions (financial institutions, rule of law and property rights); 
and lastly, the third chapter stressed market-stabilizing institutions.  
 
      Actually, the recent literature on growth economics asserts that institutions are a 
fundamental cause of growth and a right set of institutions stands for a catalyst for growth. 
This is an evidence of the institutional arrangement of an economy, yet defining the right set 
of institutions that matter for the KR needs to be investigated. Yet, the current analysis 
contributed to the body of knowledge in economic growth  in developing countries and in the 
CIS countries in particular.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
